How did Athens' relationship with other Greek states change under Pericles, and how do historians evaluate Athenian democracy and empire given the problems of the surviving evidence?
Athens' relationships with other societies, including the transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian empire, Periclean imperial policy, and the causes of the Peloponnesian War; ancient and modern evaluations of Athenian democracy and empire, and the problems involved in using the available evidence
A focused answer to the HSC Ancient History dot point on Athens' relations with other Greek states under Pericles. The Delian League's transformation into empire, tribute, cleruchies, the 454 BC treasury transfer, the road to the 431 BC Peloponnesian War, and the historiographical debate over democracy, empire, and the problems of hostile, elite evidence.
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What this dot point is asking
NESA expects you to explain Athens' relationship with other Greek societies under Pericles: how the Delian League, a voluntary wartime alliance founded in 478/477 BC, became the Athenian empire, and how Periclean policy on tribute, cleruchies and the League's treasury deepened Athenian control and worsened relations with Sparta until war broke out in 431 BC. You are then expected to EVALUATE that record: to weigh differing modern interpretations of Athenian democracy and empire, and to assess the problems involved in using evidence that is overwhelmingly elite, male and often openly hostile to the democracy it describes.
The answer
From alliance to empire: the transformation of the Delian League
The Delian League was founded in 478/477 BC after Sparta withdrew from leadership of the anti-Persian coalition, leaving Athens, under the respected statesman Aristides, to organise a new alliance. Members swore oaths at Delos, contributed ships or money (phoros) according to an assessment Aristides devised, and kept the treasury on the sacred island under the hellenotamiai, the League's treasurers. On paper, membership was voluntary and every state retained its independence.
That independence proved theoretical. Around 470 BC, Naxos tried to leave the League; Athens besieged the island, tore down its walls and forced it to remain as a tribute-paying subject with no fleet of its own. Thucydides (1.98) records this as the moment an ally was "reduced to slavery contrary to established custom", the historian's own verdict that the League had begun to change in kind, not just in size. Thasos revolted in 465 BC over a dispute concerning mines and trading posts on the Thracian coast; Athens crushed the revolt after a roughly three-year siege (465-463 BC), again dismantling the ally's walls and confiscating its fleet.
Periclean imperial policy: tribute, cleruchies and the treasury
Under Pericles' leadership from the late 450s BC, the machinery of empire tightened. Tribute (phoros) was assessed regularly and recorded on the Athenian Tribute Lists, stone inscriptions displayed publicly on the Acropolis from 454 BC, the year the treasury itself moved from Delos. The traditional justification for the move, that Delos was vulnerable after the destruction of an Athenian fleet supporting a failed revolt in Egypt, conveniently placed the allies' money under direct Athenian guard and within reach of the Athenian assembly.
Pericles used cleruchies, colonies of Athenian citizens who kept their citizenship and civic rights while farming allotted land abroad, to garrison sensitive or previously rebellious territory: a cleruchy was planted at Chalcis on Euboea after that island's revolt was crushed in 446 BC, and similar settlements followed at other flashpoints. Some allied lawsuits, particularly capital cases, were required to be tried before Athenian courts, a further erosion of allied self-government that the hostile "Old Oligarch" reports without apparent embarrassment as normal Athenian practice.
Tribute also paid for the great building programme that produced the Parthenon (447-432 BC) and the wider Periclean Acropolis. Plutarch (Pericles 12) reports that contemporary critics in the assembly, led by the conservative Thucydides son of Melesias (not the historian), accused Pericles of taking allied money "meant for the war" and using it to "gild and beautify" Athens "like a vain woman decking herself with costly stones and statues and temples worth a thousand talents". Around 449 BC, Pericles is also said to have proposed a Congress Decree inviting all Greek states to a conference on rebuilding temples destroyed by Persia, funded from League money; Sparta refused to attend, and the episode, known only from Plutarch writing over five centuries later, is itself a case study in how thin the evidence for Periclean diplomacy can be.
Relations with Sparta and the road to war, 431 BC
Athens and Sparta had already fought an inconclusive First Peloponnesian War (c. 460-445 BC) before agreeing the Thirty Years' Peace in 446/445 BC, which divided the Greek world into an Athenian and a Spartan sphere of influence. The peace held for barely fifteen years. In 433 BC Athens allied with Corcyra against Corinth, a leading Spartan ally, in a naval dispute that was not originally Athens' quarrel. In 432 BC Athens besieged Potidaea, a Corinthian colony within the Athenian empire that had revolted with Corinthian and Spartan-bloc encouragement, and Pericles carried the Megarian Decree, excluding Megara, another Spartan ally, from all Athenian and allied harbours and markets.
Sparta's allies, especially Corinth, pushed for war at the Spartan assembly in 432 BC; Sparta issued Athens an ultimatum, including a demand to repeal the Megarian Decree, which Pericles persuaded the Athenians to reject. War began in spring 431 BC. Thucydides (1.23) gives his famous verdict that the immediate disputes (Corcyra, Potidaea, Megara) were merely the surface causes: "the truest cause, though least openly stated, was, I believe, the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta." In the funeral oration for the war's first casualties (Thucydides 2.34-46), Pericles offered Athens' own self-image in reply: a city that was "an education to Greece", open, self-governing and worth the risk of empire.
Evaluation: how do historians read Athenian democracy and empire?
Two long-running interpretive debates dominate the "evaluation" side of this dot point. The first concerns democracy itself. Historians such as Mogens Herman Hansen and Josiah Ober present Periclean Athens as a genuinely radical participatory system: isegoria (equal right to speak in the assembly), sortition (selection by lot) for most magistracies, ostracism as a safety valve against overmighty individuals, and, from Pericles, pay for jury service (misthos) so that poorer citizens could actually afford to serve. Against this, social historians led by Sarah Pomeroy point out that this "radical" democracy governed a minority: women held no political rights at all, metics (resident foreigners, some long settled and economically vital) could neither vote nor own land, and a large enslaved population, plausibly comparable in size to the citizen body on modern estimates, had no rights whatsoever. Pericles' own Citizenship Law of 451/450 BC, restricting citizenship to those with two Athenian parents, narrowed the privileged group further even as it dignified it.
The "popular imperialism" debate: de Ste Croix and Meiggs
The second debate concerns the empire. G.E.M. de Ste Croix, in The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (1972), argued for "popular imperialism": the empire was not simply imposed from above but was actively supported by ordinary Athenians, whose jury pay and festival funds it financed, and often by the ordinary people of subject states too, since Athens tended to favour local democratic factions over allied oligarchs. Russell Meiggs, in the same year's The Athenian Empire (1972), used the same tribute-list evidence to build a more cautious, administratively detailed picture, stressing the steady tightening of coercive controls, garrisons, cleruchies, compulsory Athenian jurisdiction, and treating the revolts at Naxos, Thasos and Samos as real evidence of resentment rather than isolated exceptions to a generally popular system. Neither historian disputes the facts on the tribute lists; they disagree about what those facts, and the silence of most subjects in the surviving sources, actually prove.
Problems of evidence
Nearly every literary source for this period is elite, male, and often hostile to or ambivalent about the democracy and empire it describes. Thucydides, our principal narrative source, was an aristocratic Athenian general exiled after failing to save Amphipolis in 424 BC; although broadly admiring of Pericles, he wrote as a critic of the demagogues who followed him. The "Old Oligarch" is an openly anti-democratic pamphlet that explains the system's logic while despising it. Aristophanes' comedies mock Pericles' policies and successors such as Cleon for a citizen audience that enjoyed seeing its leaders satirised. Plutarch's Life of Pericles, our fullest biographical source, was written around AD 100, more than five centuries after Pericles died, compiling earlier writers, including the hostile fifth-century pamphleteer Stesimbrotus and the more favourable Ion of Chios, whose original works are now lost. None of these voices belongs to a woman, a metic or an enslaved Athenian; their experience of the empire and the democracy survives, if at all, only through what their social superiors chose to record.
How to read a source on this topic
Section II sources on Athens under Pericles are usually extracts (real or, in your own exam responses, owned reconstructions) from tribute-list inscriptions, hostile political pamphlets like the "Old Oligarch", comic drama, or later biographical writing such as Plutarch. Three reading habits matter here.
First, separate epigraphic (inscribed) evidence from literary evidence. A tribute list is administrative and close to contemporary, but it records what was paid, not why, or how allies felt about paying it. A literary source supplies motive and reaction but comes from a narrow, often hostile viewpoint.
Second, always place the source's author and date precisely. A source written during the Delian League's early years reads very differently from one written after 454 BC, once tribute funded the Parthenon and Sparta had begun to fear Athenian power. Plutarch's distance of over five centuries is itself evidence you should weigh, not ignore.
Third, treat hostility as a clue, not just a flaw. The "Old Oligarch" hated democracy, but his very complaints (that the poor were deliberately favoured, that allied lawsuits came to Athens) are more credible as description precisely because they run against his own preferences. Corroborate wherever you can against the epigraphic record.
Historians on Athens' empire and democracy
Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War), a contemporary and largely admiring source for Pericles, supplies the "truest cause" analysis of the war and the funeral oration as Athens' self-image. Plutarch (Life of Pericles, c. AD 100) is the fullest ancient biography, drawing on earlier, now-lost writers including the hostile Stesimbrotus and the favourable Ion of Chios. Pseudo-Xenophon, the "Old Oligarch", supplies a rare, if hostile, contemporary analysis of how democracy and empire reinforced each other. Aristotle's school produced the Athenaion Politeia, a calmer institutional account written a century later. Among modern historians, G.E.M. de Ste Croix argued for "popular imperialism", Russell Meiggs built the standard administrative history of the empire from the tribute lists, Mogens Herman Hansen and Josiah Ober defend the radicalism of Athenian democracy as a participatory system, and Sarah Pomeroy reframed the same democracy around the majority it excluded, women, metics and the enslaved.
Practice questions
Original practice questions graded from foundation to exam level, each with a full worked solution. Try them before revealing the solution.
foundation3 marksOutline how the Delian League, founded in 478/477 BC, developed into the Athenian empire.Show worked solution →
A 3-mark "outline" rewards several correctly named points, briefly developed, not full explanation.
- Founding purpose
- The League was formed in 478/477 BC under Athenian leadership to continue the war against Persia and free Greek states still under Persian influence, with its treasury held on the sacred island of Delos.
- Contribution became coercion
- Members contributed ships or money (phoros); when Naxos tried to leave the League around 470 BC, Athens besieged the island and forced it to remain, converting a voluntary ally into a subject that paid tribute without a fleet.
- The treasury moved to Athens
- In 454 BC, after the destruction of an Athenian fleet in Egypt, the League's treasury was transferred from Delos to Athens for safekeeping, placing the allies' money directly under Athenian control.
Markers reward the founding purpose, at least one named coercive episode (Naxos or Thasos), and the 454 BC treasury transfer.
foundation4 marksOutline Pericles' key imperial policies of tribute, cleruchies and the use of League funds.Show worked solution →
A 4-mark "outline" wants several developed points on Periclean policy.
- Tribute (phoros)
- Allied states paid an annual assessment in silver, recorded on inscribed tribute lists and collected by the hellenotamiai; Athenian naval power, not voluntary alliance, now underwrote the payment.
- Cleruchies
- Pericles used cleruchies, settlements of Athenian citizens who kept their Athenian citizenship while holding allotted land on allied soil, to garrison strategically important or rebellious territory, for example at Chalcis on Euboea after the revolt of 446 BC.
- Building funds
- Ancient critics, reported by Plutarch, accused Pericles of spending League tribute on Athens' own building programme, including the Parthenon, rather than on the war against Persia the League was raised to fight.
- Judicial control
- Some allied lawsuits were required to be tried in Athenian courts, extending Athenian legal authority over nominally independent allies.
Markers reward tribute, cleruchies, and at least one further concrete policy (building funds or judicial control), each correctly explained.
core5 marksSource A (an ExamExplained reconstruction, in the style of a fragment from the Athenian Tribute Lists inscribed on stone in the 440s BC): "...from the islanders of the Aegean: eight talents; from the cities of Ionia: eleven talents, three thousand drachmas; from Aegina: thirty talents..."
Using Source A and your own knowledge, explain what this type of evidence reveals about the Athenian empire.
Show worked solution →
A 5-mark "explain" needs the source used plus supporting own knowledge.
- Use the source
- The list records fixed cash payments (talents and drachmas) from named regions, showing tribute was standardised, differentiated by wealth or size (Aegina's thirty talents dwarfs the Aegean islanders' eight), and recorded permanently in stone for public display.
- Own knowledge: what the lists are
- The real Athenian Tribute Lists were inscribed annually on the Acropolis from 454 BC, once the treasury moved from Delos to Athens, and are the single most valuable body of evidence for the empire's scale and administration, because they are near-contemporary and administrative rather than literary.
- Own knowledge: their limits
- The lists record what was paid, not how allies felt about paying it, and their fragmentary, weathered state means figures for some cities and years are reconstructed or disputed by epigraphists.
Markers reward correct decoding of the source (standardised, differentiated payments), the identification of the tribute lists as a genuine epigraphic source, and a stated limitation.
core6 marksSource B (an ExamExplained reconstruction, in the style of the anonymous pamphlet modern historians call the "Old Oligarch"): "The Athenian people do not desire good government, in which the good hold power over the poor, but rather that the ordinary people should prosper. The people are right to prefer their own advantage to that of the well-born; for it is this very thing that constitutes democracy."
Using Source B and your own knowledge, assess the value and limitations of this type of source for a historian investigating Athenian democracy.
Show worked solution →
A 6-mark "assess" requires balanced values and limitations plus wider knowledge.
- Origin and perspective
- The real "Old Oligarch" (Pseudo-Xenophon's Constitution of the Athenians, probably written in the 430s-420s BC) is an anonymous, wealthy, openly anti-democratic Athenian; Source B reconstructs its blunt, class-based tone.
- Value
- Precisely because it is hostile, it is valuable: it concedes, almost grudgingly, that the democracy worked deliberately and consistently in the interest of the ordinary citizen (the demos), corroborating the real institutions of pay for jury service and office by lot that made participation possible for the poor.
- Limitation
- It is a polemic, not a neutral description; it generalises, gives no dates or named individuals, and its claim that Athens deliberately favoured "the poor" over "the well-born" simplifies a system that still excluded women, metics and enslaved people entirely from power.
- Wider knowledge
- Corroborate against Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia (a calmer, later institutional account) and the fact that citizenship itself was narrowed by Pericles' own Citizenship Law of 451/450 BC, which shows the "people" who benefited were a shrinking, defined group.
Markers reward identification of the hostile perspective, a genuine value AND a genuine limitation (not just one), and corroboration with named wider evidence.
core5 marksExplain how relations between Athens and Sparta deteriorated between 446 BC and 431 BC.Show worked solution →
A 5-mark "explain" wants a sequenced causal chain with named evidence.
- The Thirty Years' Peace (446/445 BC)
- The First Peloponnesian War ended with a treaty dividing Greece into an Athenian and a Spartan sphere of influence, an uneasy truce rather than a resolved rivalry.
- Corcyra and Corinth (433 BC)
- Athens allied with Corcyra in its dispute with Corinth, a key ally of Sparta, drawing Athens into a quarrel that was not originally its own.
- Potidaea (432 BC)
- Athens besieged Potidaea, a colony of Corinth within the Athenian empire that had revolted with Corinthian and Spartan-bloc encouragement, further inflaming Corinth against Athens.
- The Megarian Decree (432 BC)
- Pericles' decree excluded Megara, a Spartan ally, from Athenian and allied markets, an economic weapon that Megara's allies treated as an act of aggression.
Markers reward the named 446 BC treaty, at least two of the 433-432 BC flashpoints, and the causal logic that each event narrowed the room for compromise before Sparta's ultimatum in 431 BC.
exam20 marksTo what extent was the transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian empire the result of deliberate Periclean policy, rather than a series of unplanned reactions to crisis? In your answer, refer to specific events and to at least one modern historian.Show worked solution →
A Band-6 response sustains a judgement across the whole essay, using specific dated evidence and named historiography, not a narrative retelling.
- Thesis
- The transformation was neither purely deliberate design nor pure accident: early coercive steps (Naxos, Thasos) were reactive, but from the mid-450s BC Periclean policy consolidated and extended empire deliberately, exploiting crises it did not always create.
- Argument line 1: reactive origins
- The suppression of Naxos (c. 470 BC) and Thasos (465-463 BC) responded to specific attempts to leave the League; nothing in the League's founding purpose of 478/477 BC anticipated permanent subjection.
- Argument line 2: the 454 BC pivot
- The disastrous Egyptian expedition gave Athens a pretext, not a cause, to move the treasury to Athens; the decision to keep and spend the tribute after this point was Periclean choice, not accident.
- Argument line 3: deliberate consolidation under Pericles
- The cleruchy at Chalcis (446 BC), the use of tribute to help fund the Parthenon (criticised by contemporaries, per Plutarch), and the personally led suppression of Samos (440-439 BC) show a sustained, directed policy of tightening control, not a series of one-off crises.
- Historiography
- Russell Meiggs (The Athenian Empire, 1972) traces this administrative tightening through the tribute-list evidence and reads it as cumulative policy rather than accident; G.E.M. de Ste Croix (The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, 1972) argues the empire, whatever its coercive machinery, was maintained because it was deliberately made to work for ordinary Athenians and for the demos in many subject cities, a strategy, not drift.
- Model paragraph
- "The pivot of 454 BC shows policy overtaking accident. The Egyptian disaster gave Athens a plausible security justification for moving the League's treasury to the Acropolis, but nothing compelled Pericles to keep using allied tribute once the immediate danger passed. Instead, tribute helped fund the Parthenon, a monument to Athens rather than to the alliance, provoking Plutarch's report that contemporaries accused Pericles of decorating the city like a harlot with the allies' money. As Meiggs demonstrates from the tribute-list evidence, the machinery of empire, cleruchies and judicial oversight among them, was extended steadily through the mid-440s and 430s: a pattern of deliberate consolidation, not a single reactive lurch."
Marker's note: markers reward a stated, sustained thesis, precise dated turning points, engagement with a named historian's actual argument, and a model paragraph that argues rather than narrates.
exam25 marksEvaluate the differing historical interpretations of the nature of Athenian democracy and the Athenian empire, with reference to the problems involved in using the available evidence.Show worked solution →
A 25-mark evaluation essay needs a defended thesis, engagement with competing interpretations, and explicit treatment of evidence problems.
- Thesis
- Modern interpretations of Athenian democracy and empire diverge sharply because historians read the same fragmentary, elite and often hostile evidence through different questions: celebratory readings stress participation and popular benefit, critical readings stress exclusion and coercion, and a defensible answer holds both readings against the surviving evidence rather than choosing one outright.
- Argument line 1: the radical democracy debate
- Historians such as Mogens Herman Hansen and Josiah Ober treat fifth-century Athenian democracy as a genuine, radical achievement: isegoria (equal right to speak in the assembly), sortition for most offices, ostracism, and Pericles' introduction of pay for jury service (misthos) that let poorer citizens actually participate. Against this, Sarah Pomeroy and other social historians stress that citizenship, narrowed further by Pericles' own Citizenship Law of 451/450 BC, excluded women, metics and a large enslaved population, perhaps 80,000 to 100,000 people in Attica on some modern estimates, entirely from political life, so "radical" applied only to a bounded minority of adult male citizens.
- Argument line 2: the "popular imperialism" debate
- G.E.M. de Ste Croix (The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, 1972) argued the empire amounted to popular imperialism: it funded the participatory institutions of Athenian democracy and, by favouring democratic factions in allied cities over local oligarchs, benefited the ordinary demos abroad as well as at home. Russell Meiggs (The Athenian Empire, 1972) is more cautious, reading the same tribute-list and inscriptional evidence as showing tightening coercion, garrisons, cleruchies, and compulsory litigation in Athenian courts, alongside any genuine popularity, and treating revolt at Naxos, Thasos and Samos as evidence that resentment was real.
- Argument line 3: the problem of evidence
- Almost every literary source is elite, male, and frequently hostile to or ambivalent about democracy: Thucydides was an exiled aristocratic general; the "Old Oligarch" is openly anti-democratic even while conceding the system worked; Aristophanes' comedies mock Pericles and the demagogues who followed him; Plutarch writes over five centuries later, compiling earlier, now-lost sources such as Stesimbrotus and Ion of Chios. Epigraphic evidence, the tribute lists and decrees, is more neutral in origin but fragmentary, weathered, and contested in its dating, so even the "hard" evidence still requires careful interpretation.
- Model paragraph
- "The 'popular imperialism' debate exposes how far interpretation depends on the historian's angle into thin evidence. De Ste Croix reads the empire's machinery, tribute, garrisons, the promotion of democratic factions abroad, as a system ordinary Athenians and many ordinary subjects had reason to support, since jury pay and festival funds flowed from tribute and allied oligarchs, not allied commoners, bore the brunt of Athenian interference. Meiggs, working from the same tribute lists, stresses instead the steady tightening of control, cleruchies planted on rebel land and lawsuits removed to Athenian courts, and treats the revolts at Naxos, Thasos and Samos as evidence of resentment that a purely popular reading understates. Neither historian invents evidence; they weigh the same fragmentary inscriptions and a hostile literary tradition differently, which is precisely why the evaluation of Periclean Athens remains contested rather than settled."
Marker's note: markers reward a defended thesis, both named interpretive debates addressed rather than just one, explicit discussion of WHY the evidence is problematic rather than a bare list of sources, and a model paragraph that argues the historiographical disagreement rather than merely reporting it.
