Caesar's First Triumvirate and consulship of 59 BC: HSC Ancient History
“The formation of the First Triumvirate in 60 BC, cemented by the marriage of Pompey to Caesar's daughter Julia; Caesar's consulship of 59 BC, including the agrarian law for Pompey's veterans, the ratification of Pompey's eastern settlement, tax relief for Crassus's publicani, and the lex Vatinia; and the securing of allies through the tribune Clodius and the marriage to Calpurnia”
In 60 BC, Caesar brokered an informal, extra-legal pact with Pompey and Crassus, each blocked by the Senate on a separate demand, and sealed it with Julia's marriage to Pompey. As consul in 59 BC, Caesar forced through an agrarian law for Pompey's veterans against Bibulus's obstruction and Cato's filibuster (hence the joke "the consulship of Julius and Caesar"), ratified Pompey's eastern settlement, won tax relief for Crassus's publicani, and secured his own extraordinary five-year Gallic command through the lex Vatinia, while building further support through Clodius's transfer to the plebs and his marriage to Calpurnia.
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What this dot point is asking
NESA expects you to explain how Caesar, Pompey and Crassus formed an informal alliance in 60 BC to overcome separate blockages each faced in the Senate, how the marriage of Pompey to Caesar's daughter Julia cemented that pact, and how Caesar used his consulship of 59 BC (the agrarian laws, the ratification of Pompey's eastern settlement, tax relief for Crassus's publicani, and the lex Vatinia) to deliver on the deal, while also securing further allies through the tribune Clodius and his own marriage to Calpurnia.
Picture three powerful parents on a school P&C committee who each want something the treasurer keeps blocking: one wants the new sports oval funded, one wants a tax break on the canteen contract, and one just wants enough votes to get elected chair. Instead of arguing it out in the open meeting, they agree in secret beforehand to vote as a bloc for each other's pet projects, and they cement the deal by marrying off their kids to each other. Once the chair is elected, the three of them simply talk over the treasurer, ignore his objections, and push every item through on the same night. Nothing they do is technically against the rules, but everyone in the room can see the ordinary process has been switched off. That is the First Triumvirate and Caesar's consulship: three separate blocked demands solved at once by an off-the-books deal, sealed by a marriage, and executed by simply overpowering the one office (the consulship of Bibulus) meant to check it.
The answer
Three blocked men, one deal: the formation of the pact in 60 BC
By 60 BC, three of Rome's most powerful men each had a demand the Senate had refused.
Pompey had returned from the East in 62 BC after defeating Mithridates VI of Pontus and reorganising the Roman provinces and client kingdoms there, and had disbanded his army as a show of good faith. The Senate, led by his old rival Lucullus and by Cato, refused for about three years to ratify his eastern settlement (the "Acta of Pompey") as a single package, and refused land for his veterans.
Crassus was the patron of the Roman company of publicani who held the tax contract for the province of Asia. Having overbid at auction, they sought a rebate on what they owed the treasury. Cato led the Senate in refusing, calling it an unjustified bailout of greedy contractors.
Caesar returned from his propraetorship in Further Spain in 60 BC wanting both a triumph and the consulship for 59 BC. Roman law required a candidate to register for the consulship in person inside the city, which would forfeit the right to a triumph (held only outside the pomerium, the city boundary); Cato blocked a special exemption. Caesar chose the consulship over the triumph.
Caesar saw that Pompey and Crassus, personal rivals since their stormy joint consulship of 70 BC, both needed a champion in the consulship who could overpower Cato's opposition. He brokered a reconciliation between them and struck an informal three-way pact: his votes and political muscle in exchange for Pompey's veteran support and Crassus's money.
"First Triumvirate" is a label modern historians attach after the fact; unlike the Second Triumvirate of 43 BC (Antony, Octavian, Lepidus), which had statutory power under the lex Titia, the 60 BC pact was a private, extra-legal agreement with no official standing. Ancient writers still recognised it as a single dominant force: Varro's satirical pamphlet Tricaranus ("The Three-Headed Monster") mocked it as one beast with three mouths.
The pact was sealed with a marriage: in 59 BC, during Caesar's consulship, Caesar broke his daughter Julia's existing betrothal to Quintus Servilius Caepio and married her to Pompey instead. By Plutarch's account the marriage, though arranged, became a genuine and affectionate one, giving the alliance a personal bond alongside its political and financial one.
The consulship of 59 BC: the agrarian law and Bibulus
Caesar and Bibulus, an optimate opposed to the pact, were elected consuls for 59 BC. Caesar dominated from the outset.
His first major bill, the lex Julia agraria, distributed public land to Pompey's veterans and to poorer urban citizens with three or more children, funded initially by state purchase using the wealth Pompey had brought back from the East. A second, harsher bill went further, dividing the ager Campanus, a large tract of profitable public land near Capua that earlier agrarian laws had deliberately left untouched because its rents helped fund the treasury. A commission of twenty (the vigintiviri) administered the distribution; Caesar pointedly declined a place on it himself, to appear less self-interested.
Cato filibustered the debate by speaking through an entire day. Caesar had him arrested and marched toward prison; when the Senate rose as a body and followed Cato out in protest, the backlash forced Caesar to have him quietly released.
Bibulus tried to block the bill in person and was driven from the Forum by Caesar's supporters, with his fasces (the bundles carried by his lictors, symbolising his authority) broken. He then withdrew to his house for the rest of the year and announced he was "watching the skies" (obnuntiatio) for unfavourable religious omens, a technicality that, if respected, would have invalidated any business conducted on the remaining assembly days.
Caesar and his allies simply ignored the announcement and kept legislating. The result was open mockery: contemporaries began joking, as Suetonius records (Divus Julius 20), that the year's business was done not in the consulship of "Bibulus and Caesar" but of "Julius and Caesar," naming the same man twice.
Delivering for Pompey and Crassus
Once the agrarian law had removed the main obstacle to majority support, Caesar used the same direct-to-the-people method to deliver the rest of the pact's demands in a single year.
- For Pompey
- the Senate's three-year refusal to ratify his eastern settlement was overridden; his arrangements for Pontus, Syria, Judaea and the client kingdoms were confirmed as a single package, and his veterans received their land under the same agrarian law.
- For Crassus
- the publicani who held the Asian tax contract received a one-third reduction in the sum owed to the treasury, resolving the dispute Cato had blocked for years.
- For Caesar himself
- the tribune Publius Vatinius put a law, the lex Vatinia, directly to the tribal assembly rather than letting the Senate fix Caesar's province in the ordinary way. It granted Caesar the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum for an unprecedented five years with an initial three legions. When the governor-designate of neighbouring Transalpine Gaul, Metellus Celer, died suddenly, the Senate itself, fearing the People would simply grant that province too if it did not act first, added Transalpine Gaul and a fourth legion by senatorial decree. The lex Sempronia of 123 BC had required the Senate to fix consular provinces before elections precisely to stop this kind of manipulation; Caesar's command sidestepped it entirely.
Securing further allies: Clodius and Calpurnia
Caesar used his consulship to build support beyond the pact itself.
Publius Clodius Pulcher, a patrician of the Claudian family and a bitter personal enemy of Cicero, wanted to stand for the tribunate of the plebs, an office open only to plebeians. Caesar, as pontifex maximus, presided over the procedure (a lex curiata) that let a plebeian family adopt Clodius, transferring him out of the patrician order. Elected tribune for 58 BC, Clodius repaid the favour immediately: he passed a law driving Cicero into exile and had Cato sent out of Rome to annex Cyprus, removing two of the pact's sharpest critics.
Calpurnia. In December 62 BC, Caesar had divorced his third wife, Pompeia, after the Bona Dea scandal (a religious festival for women only, which a man, Clodius, had allegedly infiltrated in disguise); Caesar had no evidence against Pompeia personally but divorced her anyway, reportedly saying "Caesar's wife must be above suspicion." In 59 BC he married his fourth wife, Calpurnia, daughter of Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus. Piso was elected consul for 58 BC, giving Caesar a reliable ally in the senior magistracy for the year after his own.
The alliance at a glance
Historiography
Adrian Goldsworthy (Caesar: The Life of a Colossus, 2006) treats the pact as pragmatic self-interest rather than the opening move of a plan for one-man rule: each man solved an immediate, unrelated problem, and the arrangement was informal and unstable from the start.
Erich Gruen (The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, 1974) cautions against reading the pact as a coherent "conspiracy" against the constitution, arguing that traditional Republican institutions and factional politics continued to operate around and after it.
Ronald Syme (The Roman Revolution, 1939) and Christian Meier (Caesar, 1982) place the events of 60-59 BC within a longer-run crisis of the Republic, in which personal alliances backed by armies and money had become more decisive than the Senate's authority, whatever any individual's immediate intentions.
1. Source-analysis response (using the Suetonius joke about "Julius and Caesar"). "Suetonius's report that contemporaries dated the year's business to 'Julius and Caesar' rather than 'Bibulus and Caesar' is valuable evidence for how completely Caesar dominated his consulship. Its usefulness lies in showing that this was public knowledge and public mockery, not merely a later historian's judgement; its reliability is limited because Suetonius wrote under Hadrian, more than a century later, drawing on earlier sources rather than eyewitness testimony, and gossip of this kind can exaggerate for effect. Corroborated against Cicero's contemporary letters describing the same year with alarm, the substance of Bibulus's marginalisation is well supported even if the precise joke cannot be verified word for word."
Marker's note: markers reward a response that separates content from reliability and then corroborates the claim against an independent, contemporary source rather than accepting Suetonius uncritically.
2. Essay paragraph (the pact as coordinated strategy, not coincidence). "The strongest evidence that Caesar's consulship was strategy rather than circumstance is that four separate constitutional safeguards failed in the same twelve months, each defeated by a different method. Bibulus's collegial veto was defeated by ignoring his religious obstruction; the Senate's control of debate was defeated by taking the agrarian bill straight to the People; Cato's opposition was defeated by arrest and, when that backfired, by public humiliation; and the Senate's constitutional right to fix consular provinces under the lex Sempronia was defeated by the lex Vatinia. No single failure proves intent, but four coordinated failures, each removing a different check, are difficult to explain as coincidence."
Marker's note: this paragraph scores because it argues from a PATTERN across the year rather than retelling the agrarian law, the ratification and the lex Vatinia as separate, unconnected events.
Outline/describe wants a small number of clearly separated points; explain wants a point, evidence and why it matters; assess/evaluate/to what extent wants a sustained argument reaching a supported judgement.
Using a source properly means four things every time: (1) content - what it actually shows or says; (2) reliability - who produced it, when, and for what purpose; (3) usefulness - what specific question it can help answer, and how far; (4) perspective - whose viewpoint it represents, and what it leaves out. A response that only describes Source A or B earns little; one that moves content, then reliability, then usefulness, then perspective, then judgement earns full marks.
Weaving in historiography means using a historian's named position as part of your argument, e.g. "as Goldsworthy (2006) argues, the pact was pragmatic rather than a plan for monarchy" used to support a specific claim about motive, not dropped in as an unconnected quote at the end of a paragraph.
How to read a source on this topic
Section III sources on this dot point typically include reconstructed inscriptions, edicts, letters or graffiti referring to the pact, the agrarian law, Bibulus's obstruction, or the lex Vatinia. Three reading habits.
First, separate ancient WRITTEN evidence (Suetonius, Plutarch, Cassius Dio, Appian, Cicero's letters) from later interpretation. Cicero's letters to Atticus from 59 BC are contemporary and give elite reaction as it happened; Suetonius and Plutarch wrote more than a century later, drawing on earlier accounts now lost.
Second, watch for perspective. Cicero disliked the pact and used the loaded word "regnum" (kingship); Caesar's own later writings (the Bellum Gallicum, begun after 58 BC) say almost nothing about 59 BC at all, since it did not suit the image he wanted to project.
Third, treat satirical or informal sources (Varro's Tricaranus, graffiti, jokes recorded by Suetonius) as evidence of PERCEPTION, not as a neutral record of fact; use them alongside more securely dated evidence rather than instead of it.
- Calling it "the Triumvirate" as if it were an official office
- It had no legal basis in 60 BC; only the Second Triumvirate of 43 BC was statutory, under the lex Titia.
- Retelling the year in order instead of arguing
- Listing "first the agrarian law, then the ratification, then the lex Vatinia" scores poorly; explain WHY each event mattered or how they connect.
- Forgetting Crassus
- Many answers cover Caesar and Pompey in detail and mention Crassus only in passing; the tax relief for the publicani is a distinct, examinable outcome.
- Ignoring the marriages
- Julia's marriage to Pompey and Caesar's own marriage to Calpurnia are not side details; NESA specifically expects you to explain how allies were secured.
Practice questions
Original practice questions graded from foundation to exam level, each with a full worked solution. Try them before revealing the solution.
foundation3 marksOutline the personal political and financial motives that drew Pompey and Crassus into an alliance with Caesar in 60 BC.Show worked solution →
A 3-mark "outline" needs three distinct motives, one per figure.
- Pompey's motive
- He wanted Senate ratification of his eastern settlement and land for his veterans, both blocked for three years by Lucullus's faction and Cato (1 mark).
- Crassus's motive
- He wanted tax relief for the publicani, who had overbid on the Asian tax contract and were also blocked by Cato (1 mark).
- Caesar's motive
- He needed Pompey's veteran support and Crassus's money to guarantee a dominant consulship and a major military command afterwards (1 mark).
Marker's note: markers reward three separately named motives rather than one motive elaborated at length.
foundation4 marksSource A: a reconstructed political pamphlet fragment of this type, echoing Varro's satirical work Tricaranus ("The Three-Headed Monster"), mocks the 60 BC pact as a single beast ruling Rome through three mouths. Using Source A, outline the perspective this pamphlet represents.Show worked solution →
A 4-mark "outline" needs the perspective identified, its target, and one supporting detail from the source.
- Perspective
- Source A represents a hostile, senatorial-aligned perspective that saw the pact as a threat to collective Republican government (1-2 marks).
- Target
- The pamphlet attacks the pact's informality and the concentration of power in three private individuals rather than the constitutional magistracies (1 mark).
- Supporting detail
- The "three-headed monster" image itself shows contemporaries viewed the pact as one hidden power operating through three mouths, not three independent statesmen acting openly (1 mark).
Marker's note: markers reward candidates who name the perspective explicitly (hostile/senatorial) rather than only describing the source's content.
foundation4 marksOutline the terms of the lex Vatinia of 59 BC.Show worked solution →
A 4-mark "outline" needs the proposer, the provinces, the duration and the initial military force.
- Proposer
- The tribune Publius Vatinius, a close ally of Caesar, put the law directly to the tribal assembly rather than letting the Senate allocate the province in the usual way (1 mark).
- Provinces
- It granted Caesar the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum (1 mark).
- Duration
- For an unprecedented five years, far longer than the usual one-year proconsular term (1 mark).
- Military force
- An initial army of three legions, later four once the Senate added Transalpine Gaul (1 mark).
Marker's note: markers reward all four specific terms, not a general description of "a big command in Gaul."
core6 marksSource B: a reconstructed edict of this type, issued by Bibulus from his house in the second half of 59 BC, declares that he is "watching the skies" for unfavourable omens and that all business conducted on those days is therefore invalid. Using Source B and your own knowledge, explain the significance of Bibulus's actions for the conduct of Caesar's consulship.Show worked solution →
A 6-mark "explain" needs the source used as evidence, an explanation of the tactic, and its outcome.
- Use of the source
- Source B shows Bibulus tried to invalidate Caesar's legislation through religious obstruction (obnuntiatio) rather than open debate, confirming that ordinary political opposition had already failed (1-2 marks).
- Explanation
- Announcing he was watching the skies invoked a religious technicality that, if respected, would make any assembly held on those days invalid; this followed his earlier failed attempt to block the agrarian law in person, after which he was driven from the Forum (1-2 marks).
- Significance
- Caesar and his allies simply ignored the announcement and kept legislating, so the tactic achieved nothing beyond demonstrating Caesar's disregard for constitutional convention, giving rise to the sneer that the year's business was done in "the consulship of Julius and Caesar" (2 marks).
Marker's note: markers reward candidates who explain WHY the tactic failed (Caesar's disregard), not only what Bibulus did.
core5 marksExplain the significance of the marriage between Pompey and Julia for the First Triumvirate.Show worked solution →
A 5-mark "explain" needs the marriage described, its political function, and its later significance.
- The marriage
- In 59 BC Caesar married his only child, Julia, previously betrothed to Quintus Servilius Caepio, to Pompey, sealing the political pact with a personal bond (1-2 marks).
- Function
- The marriage gave the alliance a familial dimension beyond a transactional exchange of votes and money; by Plutarch's account it also became a genuine, affectionate match (1-2 marks).
- Later significance
- Julia's death in childbirth in 54 BC removed this personal bond at almost the same time as Crassus's death at Carrhae removed the third leg of the pact, and rivalry between Caesar and Pompey escalated into civil war by 49 BC (1 mark).
Marker's note: markers reward candidates who explain the marriage's political FUNCTION, not merely that it happened.
exam8 marksSource C: a reconstructed graffito of this type, scratched near the Forum in late 59 BC, reads "done in the consulship of Julius and Caesar" where a genuine record would name both consuls. Using Source C and your own knowledge, assess the usefulness and reliability of this graffito as evidence for the conduct of Caesar's consulship.Show worked solution →
An 8-mark "assess the usefulness and reliability" answer needs content, usefulness, reliability/limitation, and a supported judgement.
- Content
- Source C reproduces the joke recorded by Suetonius (Divus Julius 20) that the year's business was dated to "Julius and Caesar" rather than the two actual consuls, Caesar and Bibulus (2 marks).
- Usefulness
- It is highly useful as evidence for how contemporaries PERCEIVED the balance of power in 59 BC: Caesar dominant, Bibulus sidelined after withdrawing to watch the skies (2 marks).
- Reliability/limitation
- As anonymous, informal graffiti it cannot be dated precisely or attributed to a known author, and its humour exaggerates for effect; it should be read as popular opinion and satire, not a legal or administrative record (2 marks).
- Judgement
- The graffito is most reliable as evidence of public perception and least reliable as a precise constitutional description; it corroborates the more securely dated accounts in Suetonius and Cicero's contemporary letters, which independently describe Bibulus's near-total withdrawal from public business (2 marks).
Marker's note: markers reward candidates who separate "what the source shows" from "how far it can be trusted," and who corroborate it against named ancient authors.
exam25 marksTo what extent did Caesar's formation of the First Triumvirate and his consulship of 59 BC represent a deliberate strategy to bypass the constitutional constraints of the Republic, rather than a legitimate use of his office? In your response, refer to relevant sources and historians' interpretations.Show worked solution →
A Band-6 response needs a clear thesis, four argument lines tied to dated evidence, engagement with historiography and the counter-view, a model paragraph, and a judgement.
- Thesis
- Caesar's actions were overwhelmingly a deliberate strategy to bypass constitutional restraint: almost every element of the pact and the consulship was engineered to route around a body (the Senate) that had already refused each man's demand individually.
- Argument 1 - the pact itself was extra-legal
- Unlike the later Second Triumvirate, formalised by the lex Titia in 43 BC, the 60 BC pact had no statutory basis; it was a private agreement among three citizens, satirised in Varro's Tricaranus and alarming Cicero enough to write of a "regnum" forming (ad Atticus, 59 BC).
- Argument 2 - the agrarian law bypassed debate
- Caesar took the bill directly to the People instead of the Senate, had Bibulus driven from the Forum, and had Cato arrested mid-filibuster; only public outcry forced Cato's release, showing procedural norms broken by design, not accident.
- Argument 3 - Bibulus was neutralised, not defeated in debate
- His obnuntiatio was simply ignored, producing the taunt "the consulship of Julius and Caesar"; collegiality, the core constitutional check on a consul's power, was made meaningless for a year.
- Argument 4 - the lex Vatinia overrode the Senate's own safeguard
- The lex Sempronia of 123 BC required consular provinces to be fixed before elections precisely to stop this manipulation; Caesar's five-year, eventually four-legion Gallic command was won by tribunician law instead, of unprecedented length and scale.
- Counter-view
- Ratifying Pompey's settlement and easing the publicani's tax bill were arguably overdue and popular; the People voting directly was itself a legitimate, if aggressive, use of Republican sovereignty, not inherently illegitimate.
- Historiography
- Goldsworthy (2006) reads the alliance as pragmatic self-interest rather than a plan for monarchy. Gruen (1974) resists over-reading a coherent "conspiracy," noting traditional institutions still functioned. Syme (1939) and Meier (1982) see it as symptomatic of a constitution no longer able to restrain personal power, whatever Caesar's immediate intentions.
- Model paragraph
- "The clearest sign of deliberate strategy is not any single law but the pattern across the year: every one of Caesar's opponents was neutralised by a different method - Bibulus by ignored religious obstruction, Cato by arrest and public humiliation, the Senate's control of provinces by a tribunician law. A single breach could be circumstance; four coordinated breaches, each defeating a different constitutional safeguard, is strategy."
- Judgement
- To a very large extent, deliberate strategy, operating through popular legislation that was technically lawful but designed to make senatorial and collegial checks irrelevant.
Marker's note: markers reward a sustained argument answering "to what extent," at least four dated pieces of evidence, engagement with historiography AND the counter-view, and a paragraph that argues from a pattern rather than retelling events in order.