What is the great debate over Macedon?

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How did Athens attempt to recover and rebuild its power in the fourth century BC, from the rebuilding of the Long Walls to the collapse of the Second Athenian Confederacy and the debate over Philip II of Macedon?

Athens in the fourth century BC, its recovery after defeat in 404 BC and its attempt to rebuild power, the rebuilding of the Long Walls under Conon after the Battle of Cnidus in 394 BC, the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 378 BC and its charter renouncing the abuses of the fifth-century empire, the Confederacy's successes and its collapse in the Social War of 357 to 355 BC, the fourth-century democracy and the theoric fund, the professionalisation of politics and generalship, Athenian finances under Eubulus and then Lycurgus, and the great debate over Macedon between Demosthenes and Isocrates, set against Athens' relative decline

Athens rebuilt power after 404 BC - Conon's Long Walls after Cnidus in 394 BC, the Second Athenian Confederacy of 378 BC renouncing cleruchies and tribute, its collapse in the Social War of 357 to 355 BC, the theoric fund and the finances under Eubulus then Lycurgus, and the Demosthenes versus Isocrates debate over Philip II.

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Quick answer

After total defeat in 404 BC (the Long Walls demolished, the Thirty installed, the empire dissolved), Athens recovered fast: Conon, backed by Persia, destroyed Sparta's fleet at Cnidus in 394 BC and rebuilt the Long Walls in 393 BC. In 378 BC Athens founded the Second Athenian Confederacy to resist Sparta, and its charter (the Decree of Aristoteles) advertised a deliberate break with the fifth-century empire: no tribute (only voluntary syntaxeis), no cleruchies, no garrisons or governors, and a council of allies with a real vote. The league grew to about seventy members and won victories such as Chabrias at Naxos (376 BC), but Athenian pressure revived old distrust, and in the Social War (357 to 355 BC) Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium revolted (backed by Mausolus) and won their independence, breaking the Confederacy. Internally the restored democracy leaned on the theoric fund, politics and generalship professionalised into separate careers (rhetores such as Demosthenes and Eubulus versus mercenary strategoi such as Chabrias and Chares), and finance was managed first by Eubulus' cautious peace policy and then, after Chaeronea, by Lycurgus' impressive revival (revenue to about 1,200 talents, a major building programme). The defining argument, Demosthenes' Philippics urging resistance to Philip II against Isocrates' call for a panhellenic crusade under him, was settled at Chaeronea in 338 BC, where Philip defeated Athens and Thebes and ended the age of the independent Greek city. Historians such as Cawkwell, Worthington and Davies read Athens' relative decline as a mismatch between fourth-century ambition and fourth-century resources.

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What this dot point is asking

This strand of the period asks you to trace Athens across the fourth century BC: how the city recovered from its crushing defeat of 404 BC and tried to rebuild the power it had held in the age of empire, and why that attempt ultimately fell short. You need the recovery narrative (Conon's rebuilding of the Long Walls after the Battle of Cnidus in 394 BC), the great institutional experiment (the Second Athenian Confederacy of 378 BC and its charter, deliberately framed to renounce the abuses of the fifth-century empire), the Confederacy's early successes and its collapse in the Social War of 357 to 355 BC, and the internal history that runs alongside these events: the fourth-century democracy and the theoric fund, the professionalisation of politics and generalship, and the management of Athenian finances first by Eubulus and then by Lycurgus. Above all you must handle the great debate over Macedon, Demosthenes' call to resist Philip II against Isocrates' call for a panhellenic crusade under him, and set the whole story against Athens' relative decline behind Thebes, Persia and, finally, Macedon.

In plain English

Imagine a once-champion football club that gets thrashed, relegated and stripped of its stadium. Over the next few decades it claws its way back: it rebuilds the ground (the Long Walls), signs up a new league of smaller clubs by promising, this time, not to bully them the way it used to (the Second Confederacy and its charter), and even wins some trophies again. But the money never quite adds up. The club keeps spending its spare cash on keeping the fans happy (the festival, or theoric, fund) instead of on the team, its star players are really freelancers who take jobs with rival clubs to get paid, and eventually the smaller clubs get fed up and quit the league (the Social War). Meanwhile a hungry new rival is buying up everything (Philip's Macedon). Inside the club two loud voices argue about what to do: one says fight the new rival now, whatever it costs (Demosthenes); the other says stop fighting fellow Greeks and instead let the strong newcomer lead everyone against the old foreign enemy (Isocrates). Athens in the fourth century BC is that club, never quite champion again.

The answer

Recovery after 404 BC: Conon and the Long Walls

Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC was total. Sparta, through Lysander, forced the demolition of the Long Walls linking the city to its port at Piraeus, dissolved the fifth-century empire, and installed the narrow oligarchy of the Thirty. Yet the democracy was restored within the year (403 BC), and recovery came faster than Sparta can have expected, driven by Persian gold and Spartan overreach.

The turning point was the Battle of Cnidus in 394 BC. During the Corinthian War (395 to 387/386 BC), in which Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos combined against Sparta, the exiled Athenian admiral Conon, commanding a Persian fleet alongside the satrap Pharnabazus, destroyed Spartan sea power off Cnidus. Conon then sailed home and, in 393 BC, used Persian money and crews to rebuild the Long Walls and the fortifications of Piraeus. Athens once again had a walled city joined to a defensible naval base, the physical precondition for any revival of maritime power. The King's Peace (Peace of Antalcidas) of 387/386 BC, however, showed the limits of that revival: it was dictated by Persia, handed the Greek cities of Asia Minor to the King, and used a general "autonomy" clause that Sparta exploited to break up rival alliances.

The Second Athenian Confederacy, 378 BC

Spartan high-handedness under the King's Peace provoked a response. In 378 BC Athens founded the Second Athenian Confederacy, a new naval alliance explicitly formed to resist Sparta and defend the autonomy the King's Peace claimed to guarantee. Its founding charter, the Decree of Aristoteles (inscribed 378/377 BC and surviving on stone, with a long list of members added over time), is one of the most important documents of the period because it advertises, clause by clause, that this league would NOT repeat the imperialism of the fifth century.

The charter promised members that they would remain "free and autonomous," keep whatever constitution they chose, and be free of the specific abuses Athens had committed as head of the Delian League: no phoros (tribute) but voluntary contributions called syntaxeis; no cleruchies and no Athenian ownership of land or houses in allied territory; and no garrisons or governors imposed by Athens. Decisions were to be taken jointly by the Athenian ekklesia and a separate synedrion (council) of the allies meeting at Athens, in which each ally had a vote and Athens itself did not. It was, in effect, a constitutional promise never to become the old empire again.

Successes and collapse: the Social War, 357 to 355 BC

At first the Confederacy worked. It grew to around seventy members, and Athenian generals won real victories: Chabrias defeated the Spartan fleet off Naxos in 376 BC, the first major Athenian naval win since the Peloponnesian War, and Timotheus campaigned successfully in the western Aegean. Sparta's power was broken for good, though by Thebes, not Athens, at Leuctra in 371 BC, after which the 360s BC belonged to the Theban hegemony rather than to Athens.

Over time, however, Athenian behaviour strained the charter's promises. Athens planted cleruchies again (for example on Samos from 365 BC), pressed allies for syntaxeis, and used its fleet in ways that looked increasingly like the old domination. Distrust revived, and in 357 BC the major allies Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium revolted, encouraged and financed by Mausolus of Caria, the Persian satrap. In the resulting Social War (357 to 355 BC) Athens could not force the allies back: the veteran general Chabrias was killed at Chios in 357 BC, the campaign stalled, and in 355 BC Athens made peace and recognised the allies' independence. The Confederacy survived on paper but was finished as a great power, and Athens' bid to rebuild a maritime empire had failed.

The fourth-century democracy and the theoric fund

The democracy restored in 403 BC was not identical to the fifth-century system. After the trauma of the Thirty, Athens carried out a careful revision and re-publication of its laws and drew a sharper line between laws (nomoi), now changed only through a special board of nomothetai, and ordinary decrees (psephismata) of the assembly. Pay was introduced for attending the assembly (the ekklesiastikon), so that, as with the fifth-century jury pay, poorer citizens could actually take part. The graphe paranomon (the indictment of an unconstitutional proposal) remained a powerful check.

The most politically loaded institution of the period was the theoric fund (theorika), a state fund that distributed money to citizens, originally to cover attendance at festivals, and more broadly a channel into which budget surpluses were by law directed. Because surplus revenue flowed to the theorika rather than to war, the fund became the symbol of a domestic, peace-minded use of public money. Demosthenes' repeated demand that surpluses be transferred to the military (stratiotic) fund to resist Philip was politically explosive precisely because the theorika were popular; the transfer was finally made only around 339/338 BC, on the eve of Chaeronea.

The professionalisation of politics and generalship

A structural change ran underneath all this. In the fifth century a leader like Pericles had been both politician and general at once. In the fourth century the two careers separated. Policy was led by rhetores, orators such as Demosthenes, Aeschines, Eubulus and Isocrates, who shaped decisions by speaking in the assembly and the courts but did not command armies. Military command passed to professional strategoi, career soldiers such as Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheus and Chares, who often campaigned far from Athens for years, relied heavily on hired mercenaries, and sometimes served foreign paymasters (Persia, Egypt) to fund themselves. War had become too technical and continuous, and assembly politics too demanding, for one man to master both. This split, together with the financial pinch, meant that the men who decided policy at home and the men who fought abroad were increasingly different people with different interests.

Finance under Eubulus and then Lycurgus

Fourth-century Athens could no longer fund power from imperial tribute, so finance became central politics. After the Social War, Eubulus (dominant from about 355 BC) rebuilt the city's revenues through a deliberate policy of peace: avoiding costly wars, developing the theoric fund, improving the dockyards and infrastructure, and husbanding resources. Critics such as Demosthenes attacked this caution as weakness in the face of Philip; defenders, ancient and modern, saw it as realism about what Athens could afford.

After the defeat at Chaeronea, Lycurgus controlled Athenian finances for roughly twelve years (c. 336 to 324 BC) and presided over a remarkable revival. He raised annual revenue to around 1,200 talents (an ancient figure reported in the tradition on his administration), rebuilt the navy to over 400 ships, and financed a major building programme: the stone theatre of Dionysus, the Panathenaic stadium, and the Piraeus ship-sheds and naval arsenal (the skeuotheke). The "Lycurgan era" shows Athens still capable of impressive organisation and civic pride, even after political independence had, in reality, passed to Macedon.

The great debate over Macedon: Demosthenes and Isocrates

The defining argument of the age was how Athens should respond to the rise of Philip II of Macedon. Two contemporaries framed the alternatives.

Demosthenes (384 to 322 BC), in the Philippics (from 351 BC) and the Olynthiacs (349 BC), urged Athens to recognise Philip as a mortal danger and to resist him directly: to fund a real standing force, divert the theoric surpluses to war, serve in person rather than through mercenaries, and rally other Greek states against Macedon. Isocrates (436 to 338 BC), by contrast, argued in the Panegyricus (380 BC) and above all the Philippus (346 BC) that the Greeks were exhausting themselves in fratricidal wars and should instead unite; in the Philippus he called on Philip himself to lead a panhellenic crusade against Persia, turning Macedonian power outward rather than fighting it. The debate was not simply hawk versus dove but two visions of Greek survival, resistance to Macedon or partnership under it, and it was settled on the battlefield. At Chaeronea in 338 BC Philip defeated the combined forces of Athens and Thebes, ending the era of independent Greek states and vindicating neither orator entirely: Athens neither stopped Philip nor willingly led the crusade Isocrates imagined.

How to read a source on this topic

Section IV sources for this dot point are usually one of three kinds: an extract from an orator (a Demosthenes Philippic or Olynthiac, an Isocrates panhellenic tract, or a forensic speech of Demosthenes or Aeschines); a described inscription, above all the founding charter of the Confederacy (the Decree of Aristoteles); or a passage of narrative from Xenophon's Hellenica or from later writers such as Diodorus and Plutarch. Three habits matter.

First, identify the genre and its built-in slant. An orator's speech is advocacy written to win a vote or a case, so it exaggerates and simplifies; an inscribed decree records what the state formally enacted, which is reliable for intention but not for later practice; a narrative history has its own author's shaping (Xenophon is pro-Spartan and often silent on Theban successes).

Second, fix WHO produced the source, WHEN and FOR WHOM. Demosthenes in 351 BC is arguing a policy to the assembly; Isocrates in 346 BC is addressing Philip in a pamphlet; the Decree of Aristoteles in 378/377 BC is a public promise to nervous allies. That judgement usually decides reliability.

Third, move from content to reliability to usefulness to perspective, and always test one source against another, an orator's claim against an inscription or against Xenophon, rather than retelling a single speech as fact.

Model exam responses

1. Source-analysis response (usefulness and reliability of the Confederacy charter). "A source in the style of the Decree of Aristoteles, guaranteeing members that they will remain 'free and autonomous' and receive 'neither garrison nor governor nor tribute,' is highly useful for a historian investigating how Athens founded the Second Confederacy in 378 BC: it shows Athens deliberately renouncing, clause by clause, the specific abuses of the fifth-century empire (phoros, garrisons, cleruchies) in order to reassure states that remembered its domination. As an official inscribed decree its reliability for Athens' stated INTENTIONS is high. Its limitation is that a founding charter records promises, not conduct: by the Social War (357 to 355 BC) some allies complained Athens had drifted back toward imperial behaviour, so the decree must be read alongside later evidence of what Athens actually did, not treated as proof that the promises were kept."

Marker's note: markers reward a source-specific usefulness claim (renouncing named fifth-century abuses), a limitation grounded in the gap between a charter's promises and later practice, and the link to the Social War.

2. Essay paragraph (finance as the constraint on recovery, from the failure essay). "Athens' inability to make its fourth-century recovery permanent was, at root, a problem of money. Unlike the fifth-century empire, which had drawn tribute from hundreds of subjects, the Second Confederacy raised only voluntary syntaxeis, and Athenian law directed budget surpluses into the theoric fund rather than the military one. The result was a city that could win a battle like Naxos in 376 BC but could not sustain a long campaign: in the Social War it failed to force the allies back and made peace in 355 BC. Eubulus' subsequent policy of peace was, as G. L. Cawkwell argues, a realistic response to these limits rather than the cowardice Demosthenes alleged, and even Lycurgus' later revival of revenue to some 1,200 talents came only after Chaeronea had already decided the political question. Power in the fourth century required money Athens no longer had, and could not raise without the coercion its allies had revolted against."

Marker's note: this paragraph scores because it sustains an argument (finance as the binding constraint), deploys precise dated evidence (Naxos 376 BC, peace 355 BC, Lycurgus' 1,200 talents), and integrates a named historian (Cawkwell) as argument rather than decoration.

Command words and using a source

Command words: "Outline"/"describe" want located, sequenced points with dates (the recovery steps, the charter terms, the Social War); "explain" wants a causal chain (why the charter renounced fifth-century abuses, why politics and generalship separated); "assess"/"to what extent"/"evaluate" demand a sustained judgement, and on this dot point the strongest essays weigh several reasons for Athens' relative decline (finance, allied distrust, the international environment) rather than narrating events.
Using a source on this topic: Work through CONTENT (what it actually claims), RELIABILITY (who produced it, when and why: an orator's speech is persuasive advocacy, a decree records formal intention, Xenophon narrates with a pro-Spartan slant), USEFULNESS (what precise question it answers: a policy debate, the league's founding terms, a battle), and PERSPECTIVE (Demosthenes the anti-Macedonian, Isocrates the panhellenist, the Athenian state advertising reform, a rival satrap financing revolt each frame the period differently).
Weaving historiography: Use a historian to do argumentative work: "Cawkwell's defence of Eubulus' finance reframes Demosthenes' 'do-nothing' charge as a rational response to Athens' resources," rather than dropping a name at a paragraph's end.

Common exam traps

Confusing the two confederacies: The Second Athenian Confederacy of 378 BC is NOT the fifth-century Delian League. Its whole point, in the Decree of Aristoteles, was to renounce tribute, cleruchies and garrisons; do not describe it as simply the empire revived.
Crediting Athens with breaking Sparta: Athens revived, but it was THEBES, at Leuctra in 371 BC, that ended Spartan supremacy. Athens spent the 360s BC behind the Theban hegemony, not leading Greece.
Merging the theoric and military funds: The theoric (festival) fund and the stratiotic (military) fund were separate; the political fight was over diverting surpluses from one to the other, achieved only around 339/338 BC.
Turning the Macedon debate into hawk versus dove: Isocrates was not simply "pro-appeasement": he wanted Greek unity and a crusade against Persia LED by Philip. State his actual position, not a caricature.
Retelling the orators as fact: Demosthenes and Aeschines accuse each other of treason to win their cases; a strong answer evaluates the speeches as advocacy and tests them against inscriptions and Xenophon rather than quoting them as neutral record.

Practice questions

Original practice questions graded from foundation to exam level, each with a full worked solution. Try them before revealing the solution.

foundation4 marksOutline how Athens rebuilt its fortifications and naval strength in the 390s BC.

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A 4-mark "outline" wants several correct, briefly developed points, roughly one mark each.

Defeat and demolition: In 404 BC, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, the victorious Spartans forced Athens to pull down the Long Walls that had joined the city to its port at Piraeus, leaving it exposed and stripped of its fleet (1 mark).
The Battle of Cnidus, 394 BC: The exiled Athenian admiral Conon, commanding a Persian fleet alongside the satrap Pharnabazus, destroyed the Spartan navy at Cnidus, breaking Spartan sea power in the Aegean (1 mark).
Rebuilding the Long Walls, 393 BC: Conon returned to Athens with Persian money and manpower and rebuilt the Long Walls and the fortifications of Piraeus, restoring the city's defensive link to the sea (1 mark).
A revived naval base: With its walls and harbour restored, Athens could again build and shelter a fleet, the foundation for its renewed activity in the Aegean in the following decades (1 mark).

Marker's note: markers reward the 404 BC demolition, Cnidus (394 BC) with Conon and Persian backing, and the rebuilding of the walls in 393 BC, not a vague statement that Athens "recovered."

foundation4 marksOutline the terms of the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy that were designed to distinguish it from the fifth-century empire.

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A 4-mark "outline" rewards several correct terms with brief development.

No tribute (phoros): The charter (the Decree of Aristoteles, 378/377 BC) promised there would be no phoros of the fifth-century kind; members instead paid voluntary contributions called syntaxeis (1 mark).
No cleruchies or Athenian landholding: Athens undertook not to plant cleruchies (settlements of Athenian citizens) on allied land, and no Athenian, public or private, was to own property in an allied state (1 mark).
No garrisons or governors: Athens promised not to impose garrisons or resident officials (as it had in the fifth century), leaving allies "free and autonomous" to govern themselves (1 mark).
A council of allies: Policy was to be decided jointly by the Athenian assembly and a separate synedrion (council) of the allies sitting at Athens, in which Athens itself had no vote (1 mark).

Marker's note: markers reward the explicit contrast with fifth-century abuses (tribute, cleruchies, garrisons) and the syntaxeis and synedrion as the reassuring machinery of the new league.

foundation3 marksExplain the difference between the theoric fund and the military (stratiotic) fund in fourth-century Athens.

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A 3-mark "explain" needs the function of each and why the distinction mattered.

The theoric fund (theorika): A state fund that distributed money to citizens, originally to pay for attendance at festivals, and more broadly a channel for surplus public revenue spent on civic and domestic purposes rather than war (1 mark).
The military (stratiotic) fund: The separate fund that paid for campaigns, fleets and soldiers; keeping the army and navy in the field depended on it being supplied (1 mark).
Why the difference mattered: By law, budget surpluses were directed into the theoric fund, so money the city might have spent on defence was tied up in domestic distributions. Demosthenes repeatedly urged that surpluses be diverted to the stratiotic fund to resist Philip, a politically dangerous proposal because the theorika were popular; the transfer was finally made only around 339/338 BC (1 mark).

Marker's note: markers reward the two funds' distinct purposes and the political significance of the surplus rule, not just a definition of the theorika.

core5 marksSource A (an ExamExplained reconstruction, in the style of the inscribed decree that founded the Second Athenian Confederacy): 'If any of the Greeks or barbarians living on the mainland or the islands, save those subject to the King, wishes to be an ally of the Athenians and their allies, he may be, remaining free and autonomous, keeping whatever constitution he wishes, receiving neither garrison nor governor nor tribute. It shall not be permitted to any Athenian, publicly or privately, to acquire house or land in the territory of the allies.' Using Source A and your own knowledge, explain what this evidence reveals about how Athens tried to build its new alliance in 378 BC.

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A 5-mark "explain" with a source needs the source USED, the inference it supports, and own knowledge beyond it.

Use the source: Source A shows Athens publicly guaranteeing that members would remain "free and autonomous," keep their own constitutions, and receive "neither garrison nor governor nor tribute," and it flatly bans any Athenian from owning house or land in allied territory (2 marks).
The inference: Each promise answers a specific grievance of the fifth-century empire, tribute (phoros), imposed garrisons and governors, cleruchies and Athenian landholding on allied soil. The decree is therefore a deliberate advertisement that this league would NOT repeat the old imperialism, published on stone to reassure states that remembered Athenian domination (1 mark).
Own knowledge: The clause excepting those "subject to the King" shows the league was framed to respect the King's Peace of 387/386 BC and target Sparta, not Persia; members paid syntaxeis instead of phoros and shared decisions through the allied synedrion (1 mark).
A caution: As an official founding document, the decree states Athens' promises, not its later practice; by the Social War some allies complained Athens had drifted back toward imperial behaviour, so the inscription reveals intention more than outcome (1 mark).

Marker's note: markers reward decoding each clause as a corrective to a fifth-century abuse, the anti-Spartan and King's-Peace context, and the caution that a charter records intention rather than practice.

core6 marksSource B (an ExamExplained reconstruction, in the style of a fourth-century Athenian political speech): 'While we sit voting decrees and drawing our festival money, Philip does not stop; he takes town after town, and our generals abroad live off plunder and mercenaries because you will not fund them. If you will not march yourselves and pay for a real force, the day will come when there is nothing left to defend.' Assess the usefulness and reliability of this type of source for a historian investigating attitudes to Philip II in Athens.

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A 6-mark source-analysis task needs balanced usefulness AND reliability, anchored in origin, motive and audience, plus own knowledge and a historian.

Origin, motive, audience: This type of source represents the deliberative oratory of Demosthenes (the Philippics and Olynthiacs, from 351 BC on), delivered to the Athenian assembly to persuade citizens to fund war against Philip; it is a persuasive speech, not a neutral report (1 mark).
Usefulness: It is genuinely useful for recovering the debate itself: it names the precise obstacles Demosthenes attacked, the pull of the theoric ("festival") money, reliance on distant generals funded by plunder and mercenaries, and citizen reluctance to serve in person, all central features of fourth-century Athenian politics and finance (2 marks).
Reliability: Reliability is limited by its purpose: oratory exaggerates crisis, flatters or scolds the audience, and blackens opponents to win a vote, so its picture of near-total paralysis is a rhetorical weapon, not a measured account. Isocrates, by contrast, argued Athens should back Philip in a panhellenic crusade against Persia, so this hostility is one contested position among several (2 marks).
Own knowledge and historian: G. L. Cawkwell reads Demosthenes' alarm critically, arguing the peace policy of Eubulus was a rational response to Athens' real financial limits rather than the cowardice Demosthenes alleged, which is why the orators must be cross-checked against Athens' actual resources (1 mark).

Marker's note: markers reward origin/motive/audience analysis, BALANCED usefulness and limitation grounded in the genre of persuasive oratory, the Isocrates counter-position, and a named historian.

core6 marksExplain how and why the roles of politician and general became separated in fourth-century Athens.

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A 6-mark "explain" needs the change described and its causes, not a list of names.

The fifth-century pattern: In the age of Pericles, a leading Athenian was typically both a politician and a general at once: Pericles guided policy in the assembly AND was elected strategos year after year, so political and military leadership were fused in the same men (1 mark).
The fourth-century split: After 404 BC the two careers increasingly separated. Policy came to be led by "rhetores," orators such as Demosthenes, Aeschines, Eubulus and Isocrates, who shaped decisions by speaking in the assembly and courts but did not command armies. Military command passed to professional strategoi, Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheus and Chares, career soldiers who often campaigned far away and even served foreign paymasters such as Persia or Egypt (2 marks).
Why it happened - warfare: War had become more technical and continuous, fought increasingly by hired mercenaries and light troops (Iphicrates' peltasts) rather than short citizen levies, so command demanded professional specialists who stayed in the field for years (1 mark).
Why it happened - politics and finance: Persuading a sovereign assembly and prosecuting rivals in the courts was itself a full-time skill, while the city's tight finances meant generals often had to raise their own pay by plunder or foreign service, pulling them away from domestic politics. The result was a structural gap between those who decided policy at home and those who executed it abroad (2 marks).

Marker's note: markers reward the contrast with the Periclean fusion, named rhetores and strategoi on each side, and causes in both the professionalisation of warfare and the demands of finance and assembly politics.

exam25 marksESSAY. Assess the reasons for Athens' failure to rebuild lasting power in the period 404 to 338 BC. In your response, refer to relevant sources and historians' interpretations.

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A Band-6 essay sustains a judgement on the reasons for failure, ties argument to specific dated evidence, and uses historiography. This is a PLAN plus a model paragraph.

Thesis: Athens recovered impressively after 404 BC and, in the Second Athenian Confederacy, built a genuine second naval power; but a combination of structural weaknesses, chronic financial limits, allied distrust that resurfaced as renewed imperial behaviour, and a hostile international environment (Persia, Thebes, then Macedon) meant the recovery could not be made permanent. The single deepest reason is that Athens lacked the money to sustain empire without recreating the very coercion its allies had joined the Confederacy to escape.
Argument line 1: the recovery was real: Conon rebuilt the Long Walls in 393 BC after Cnidus (394 BC); the Confederacy, founded in 378 BC on the reassuring charter of the Decree of Aristoteles (no tribute, cleruchies or garrisons), grew to around seventy members and won naval victories such as Chabrias at Naxos in 376 BC. Athens was again a leading Aegean power.
Argument line 2: finance was the binding constraint: Athens could no longer fund fleets and armies from tribute as in the fifth century. Surpluses were tied to the theoric fund; generals abroad lived off plunder and mercenaries; and the peace policy of Eubulus (dominant after 355 BC) deliberately avoided expensive war to rebuild revenue. Power without a war chest could not be sustained.
Argument line 3: allied distrust and the Social War: As Athens pressed allies for syntaxeis and drifted toward old habits, resentment revived. In the Social War (357 to 355 BC) Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium, backed by Mausolus of Caria, revolted; Athens lost the general Chabrias, could not force the allies back, and in 355 BC recognised their independence, breaking the Confederacy as a great power.
Argument line 4: a hostile environment and the rise of Macedon: Athens never operated alone: Persian money shaped the whole period, Thebes broke Sparta at Leuctra (371 BC) and dominated the 360s BC, and from the 350s BC Philip II of Macedon rose steadily. Divided over how to respond, Demosthenes urging resistance, Isocrates a panhellenic crusade under Philip, Athens was defeated with Thebes at Chaeronea in 338 BC.
Historiography: G. L. Cawkwell argues Eubulus' cautious finance was realistic given Athens' means, and is sceptical of Demosthenes' war policy; Ian Worthington stresses Philip's superiority and the impossibility of the task Demosthenes set Athens; J. K. Davies emphasises the structural gap between fourth-century ambitions and fourth-century revenues. These readings converge on money and power outstripping resources rather than mere failure of will.
Model paragraph (argument line 3): The Social War exposed the flaw at the heart of the recovery. The Confederacy had been sold in 378 BC as the anti-empire, its charter renouncing tribute, cleruchies and garrisons precisely because allies remembered fifth-century domination. Yet by 357 BC Athens' need for money and control had strained those promises, and when Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium revolted with Mausolus' support, Athens could neither pay for a decisive campaign nor coerce them back, losing Chabrias in the fighting and conceding their independence in 355 BC. The episode shows why lasting power eluded Athens: it could only hold an empire by the coercion that destroyed the trust the Confederacy depended on, and it could not afford the alternative.
Judgement: Athens failed to rebuild lasting power less through any single defeat than through a persistent mismatch between imperial ambition and fourth-century resources, which turned allies into rebels and left a divided, cash-poor city unable to meet the Macedonian challenge by 338 BC.

Marker's note: Band 6 answers assess several weighted reasons (finance, allied distrust, the international environment) with precise dated evidence (394, 378, 357 to 355, 338 BC), use named historians as argument, and reach a judgement rather than narrating the period.

exam20 marksESSAY. Evaluate the value and limitations of the orators as sources for the history of fourth-century Athens.

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A Band-6 essay evaluates the orators on both value and limitation, uses precise examples, and weaves historiography. This is a PLAN plus a model paragraph.

Thesis: The Attic orators, above all Demosthenes and Isocrates, are indispensable and unusually rich sources for fourth-century Athens, giving contemporary voice to its politics, finance and foreign policy; but because every speech was written to persuade a specific audience to a specific verdict, they are partisan advocacy that must be read against their purpose and cross-checked, never transcribed as neutral fact.
Argument line 1: exceptional value: Oratory is contemporary, detailed and central to how Athens actually decided things. Demosthenes' Philippics and Olynthiacs (from 351 BC) preserve the live debate over Philip, the workings of the theoric and military funds, and the reliance on mercenary generals; Isocrates' Panegyricus (380 BC) and Philippus (346 BC) preserve the rival panhellenic vision. Court speeches open windows onto finance, the courts and daily life found in no narrative source.
Argument line 2: the limitation of genre: These are persuasive performances. A deliberative speech exaggerates crisis and flatters or scolds the assembly; a forensic speech blackens an opponent to win a case (Demosthenes and Aeschines each accuse the other of bribery and treason in On the Crown and On the False Embassy). Published versions were often revised after the event, so even the "record" is shaped to protect the speaker's reputation.
Argument line 3: the remedy - triangulation: The orators must be set against other evidence: Xenophon's Hellenica for narrative, Aristotle's Athenian Constitution for institutions, inscriptions such as the Decree of Aristoteles for what the state actually enacted, and Diodorus and Plutarch's Lives (Demosthenes, Phocion) with due caution. Where the orators agree with a decree on stone, confidence rises; where they merely assert, it does not.
Historiography: G. L. Cawkwell reads Demosthenes sceptically, arguing his rhetoric overstated both the crisis and the failings of Eubulus' realistic finance; Ian Worthington treats Demosthenes as a great patriot whose policy nonetheless underrated Philip; Mogens Herman Hansen uses the orators, checked against inscriptions, to reconstruct the working democracy in detail. The debate is precisely about how far to trust the speeches.
Model paragraph (argument line 2): The clearest warning against taking oratory at face value is the way two of the greatest orators describe the same events. In the trials arising from the embassies to Philip, Demosthenes and Aeschines each paint the other as a bribed traitor who sold Athens' interests, in speeches (On the False Embassy, On the Crown) crafted to sway a jury rather than to inform posterity. Both cannot be true, and the historian who quoted either as fact would simply be adopting a litigant's case. The value of the speeches lies not in believing their charges but in reading them as evidence of how Athenian politics was conducted, by persuasion, accusation and the courts, and then testing their claims against inscriptions and the narrative sources.
Judgement: The orators are among the richest sources for any Greek state, but they are advocacy, not testimony; used critically and triangulated with Xenophon, Aristotle, inscriptions and archaeology, they are invaluable, and read naively they mislead.

Marker's note: Band 6 answers evaluate the orators on BOTH value and limitation with specific speeches and dates, explain the distorting effect of the deliberative and forensic genres, name the cross-checking sources, and deploy historians as argument rather than decoration.