Obligations to others and the good life: VCE Philosophy
“Viewpoints and arguments on the obligations we have to others, including those beyond our immediate communities”
Singer argues that if we can prevent something very bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought to do so; distance and the number of other potential helpers do not change this, so affluent people have a duty, not just a charitable option, to give to relieve famine. Weil argues that obligations are more basic than rights: every human being has needs, and the obligation to meet them exists whether or not anyone claims a right. Cicero, in his dialogue on friendship, treats the duties of friends as part of virtue. Objections to Singer: the principle is too demanding, and it may ignore special relationships and the value of personal projects.
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What this dot point is asking
Do we owe anything to other people, and how far does the obligation reach: family, neighbours, distant strangers, non-human animals? The study design flags obligations to those beyond our immediate communities as a live contemporary issue.
Singer's argument
In the extract from 'Famine, Affluence and Morality' Singer uses the situation of mass starvation in East Bengal in 1971 to argue about duty. His argument can be reconstructed as:
- Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad.
- If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
- It is in the power of affluent people to prevent such suffering by giving, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.
- Therefore affluent people ought to give.
Two supporting claims: distance is not morally relevant (a person far away suffers as much as one nearby, and modern communication and transport make help possible), and the fact that many others are equally placed does not reduce my duty. He illustrates with the drowning child in a shallow pond: you would be expected to wade in and ruin your clothes. In the paper as a whole he goes on to conclude that giving is not charity beyond duty, and that the usual distinction between duty and charity should be revised. Check how far your extract (pp. 229 to 235) takes the argument.
Weil: obligations before rights
At the start of The Need for Roots, Weil argues that the notion of obligations is prior to that of rights. A right is not effective by itself, it is made real by the recognition of an obligation on others. The obligation to human beings arises from the fact that they are human, and does not depend on any condition such as their abilities or contracts. She then speaks of the needs of the human being, the extract ending with a comparison between spiritual and physical needs and hunger. For you this gives a contrasting foundation: rather than weighing consequences, she starts from the unconditional worth of every human and from what people need.
Cicero on the duties of friendship
The prescribed Cicero extracts come from Laelius: On Friendship. There, true friendship rests on virtue and goodwill and carries obligations of loyalty and help, limited by the rule that a friend should never be asked to do wrong. Use him to show obligations arising from close relationships and compare with Singer's more impartial and global approach. Rely on your extract for specific claims.
Comparing the approaches
- Singer: reasoning from a general principle about preventing harm, with an impartial scope.
- Weil: obligations grounded in the human being and their needs, with rights as the secondary expression.
- Cicero: duties of loyalty grounded in virtue and close relationships.
All three reject the idea that we owe nothing to others, but they differ in how far duty extends and why.
Objections
- Too demanding. If the principle holds, we should give until further giving would sacrifice something of comparable importance, which would transform ordinary life. Singer responds that this shows our current practices are the problem, and offers a weaker version for people not ready to accept the strong one.
- Special relationships. We think we owe more to family and friends than to strangers. A purely impartial duty seems to ignore this.
- Effectiveness and responsibility. Critics ask whether donations reliably help, and whether those who did not cause the problem have the same duty as those who did.
- Weil's claim that obligations are prior to rights may be opposed by those who think rights protect individuals from demands made in the name of obligation.
- Analogy objection. The pond is a one-off emergency right in front of you, while global poverty is ongoing and shared.
Question: Do we have a duty to help distant strangers?
Reconstruct Singer's premise 2, the key principle. Test it: would we judge a passer-by who ignores a drowning child to have done wrong? Yes. What differs for a distant child? Only the distance and the presence of others. Are these morally relevant? A child's suffering feels no less. So the principle seems plausible.
Response to the demandingness objection: even if full compliance is too much, it does not follow that we have no duty. The principle can be accepted while allowing some room for personal commitments.
Conclusion: we have a real duty to help distant strangers, though its exact limit is arguable.
Practice questions
State the principle at the core of Singer's argument.
Model answer: If we can prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought to do so.
Explain what Weil means by saying obligations come before rights.
Model answer: A right only has force because someone is obliged to respect it. Obligations to human beings arise from their being human and having needs, regardless of whether they have claimed or been granted rights, so obligation is the more basic idea.
Do not summarise Singer as 'everyone must give everything away'. His principle is conditional on not sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, and you should present it, and the demandingness objection to it, accurately.