The good life and being morally good: VCE Philosophy
“Viewpoints and arguments on the relationship between the good life and being morally good”
Socrates in the Gorgias argues that wrongdoing damages the agent, so the moral life and the good life coincide; Callicles denies it, claiming the best life is the strong person's unrestrained satisfaction. Aristotle makes virtue central to flourishing. Nietzsche attacks conventional morality as the herd's values and claims great individuals may need to go beyond it. Wolf argues from the opposite side: a moral saint, someone whose every action is as morally good as possible, would lack other valuable qualities and projects, so it is not good, in a broader sense, to be a moral saint. The most defensible view is that morality is a major part of a good life but not the only value.
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What this dot point is asking
Is a good life the same as a morally good life, or can they diverge? Two directions of worry arise. Could someone live well while being immoral? And could someone be so morally good that their life is not a good one for them? The set texts cover both.
Two kinds of goodness
Keep distinct: a life good for the person living it (wellbeing, flourishing) and a life that is morally good (acting rightly). The question is how they connect. Options: they are identical, they overlap, or they can conflict.
Socrates and Callicles
Socrates holds, in the Gorgias as a whole, that doing wrong harms the wrongdoer, since it disorders the soul, so the just person is happier than the unjust. Your extracts concentrate on Callicles' challenge and the leaky jars image, so draw on the wider argument cautiously. Callicles rejects conventional justice as the weak's invention. In the extracts, he argues that natural superiority entitles the strong to take more, and that self-control is a pretence made to disguise weakness. This sets up the question starkly: does morality serve the good life or restrict it?
Aristotle
Aristotle ties the good life to the exercise of virtue, which includes moral virtues like courage, justice and generosity. For him virtue is not only a means to flourishing, it is part of the activity that constitutes it. So someone who lacks moral virtue cannot fully flourish.
Nietzsche
Nietzsche argues that what passes for morality is historically and psychologically conditioned, and that different types of people have different moralities. He suggests that morality of pity and equality protects the weak and holds back the strong, so for exceptional individuals, a good life may involve going beyond conventional moral limits. This is one of the strongest challenges to the claim that the good life requires being morally good in the ordinary sense.
Wolf: against the moral saint
In 'Moral Saints', Wolf considers two kinds of saint: the loving saint, whose motivation is love of others, and the rational saint, who acts on duty. She argues that either way, a life devoted to maximising moral goodness would crowd out other things we value: a developed sense of humour, a passion for art or sport, a taste for the ironic, projects that are not about others. These non-moral qualities are admirable and make a person interesting. So we have reason not to want to be a moral saint. She does not say morality is unimportant. She says it is not the only source of reasons or value in a good life.
The argument:
- The moral saint devotes themselves to morality over all else.
- Doing so requires giving up or limiting other valuable qualities.
- A life without those qualities is not clearly the best life for a person.
- So being as morally good as possible is not necessarily part of the ideal life.
Evaluation
- Against Wolf: critics reply that her description of the saint is a caricature, since a saint could have humour and taste, and that she assumes moral demands are excessively all-consuming. Another reply is that the saint's life is admirable even if not attractive, which separates admiration from wanting to live that way.
- Against Callicles and Nietzsche: even if conventional morality is a social product, some basic requirements, such as not harming others, are needed for trust, friendship and cooperation, which are central to any life.
- For Socrates and Aristotle: wrongdoing often damages relationships and self-respect. But the reply is that some wrongdoers seem to thrive.
Question: Must a person be morally good to live a good life?
Thesis: moral goodness is a major component of a good life but it is not all of it.
Support: Aristotle and Socrates show how virtue and relationships are linked to flourishing, and examples of those who gain wealth by deceit but live in fear and isolation suggest wrongdoing often damages the wrongdoer.
Objection: Callicles and Nietzsche point to people who seem to flourish while disregarding conventional morality.
Reply: their examples usually depend on admiring other qualities, such as courage and creativity, which are themselves virtues in a wider sense. Also, Wolf shows the opposite limit: moral perfection is not required. So the good life needs enough moral goodness to sustain trust and care, plus room for other valuable things.
Practice questions
Explain Wolf's claim that we have reason not to want to be moral saints.
Model answer: A moral saint devotes themselves entirely to moral goodness, which leaves little room for non-moral qualities such as wit, artistic or athletic achievement, and personal interests. These are valuable parts of a good life, so a life of maximal moral goodness is not obviously the best life.
Why might a defender of Socrates reply to Callicles that the unjust person is unhappy?
Model answer: They would argue that a life of unlimited desire is unsatisfying and that injustice cuts the person off from friendship and trust, leaving a disordered soul.
Do not take Wolf to be arguing that morality is unimportant or that immoral people live well. Her target is the ideal of maximal moral goodness, not moral decency.