Β§-Philosophy syllabus
VIC Β· VCAAβ Philosophy
Philosophy syllabus, dot point by dot point
Every dot point in the VIC Philosophy syllabus, with a focused answer for each. Click any dot point for a worked explainer, past exam questions and links to related points.
Unit 3: Minds, bodies and persons
Module overview βCan mental states be analysed entirely in terms of behaviour and dispositions to behave, as Ryle claims?
logical (philosophical) behaviourism as a theory of mind, including Ryle's category mistake and its objections
Is personal identity over time a matter of having the same body or the same brain?
the bodily and brain criteria of personal identity, including their objections from teleportation and brain swaps
Does Searle's Chinese Room show that running the right program can never be sufficient for genuine understanding?
the Chinese Room argument against strong AI and functionalism, including Searle's syntax and semantics distinction
What is the relationship between the mind and the body, and does substance dualism survive its objections?
substance dualism and the mind-body problem, including Descartes' arguments and the problem of interaction
Is there really a persisting self, or only a bundle of fleeting experiences, as Hume and the Buddhist tradition claim?
Hume's bundle theory and the Buddhist no-self doctrine, including the argument from introspection and its objections
Could the solution to the mind-body problem be that there is no matter at all, only minds and their ideas, as Berkeley argues?
idealism as a monist response to the mind-body problem, including Berkeley's argument and its objections
If teleportation or fission could divide me, what really matters in survival, and is it identity at all?
Parfit's psychological continuity theory, the fission problem, and the claim that identity is not what matters
What makes a person at one time the same person at a later time, and is memory the answer?
personal identity over time, Locke's memory or consciousness criterion, and its leading objections
Can mental states be fully explained as physical or functional states of the body?
physicalist theories of mind including identity theory and functionalism, and their objections
Can property dualism take consciousness seriously without inheriting the interaction problem that sinks substance dualism?
property dualism and epiphenomenalism as responses to the mind-body problem, including the threat to mental causation
Do qualia show that consciousness cannot be captured by any physical description, as Jackson and Nagel argue?
qualia and the case against physicalism, including Jackson's knowledge argument and Nagel's bat
How, if at all, can I know that anyone other than myself has a mind?
the problem of other minds, including the argument from analogy and its objections
Unit 4: The good life
Module overview βIs the good life a life of virtuous activity, as Aristotle's account of eudaimonia claims?
Aristotle's eudaimonist conception of the good life: function, virtue, the mean and external goods
If wellbeing is not pleasure, is it getting what we want, or is it achieving certain objective goods whether we want them or not?
desire-satisfaction and objective list theories of wellbeing, including their advantages over hedonism and their objections
Do the ancient schools of Epicureanism and Stoicism offer a better route to the good life than Aristotle's eudaimonism?
Epicurean and Stoic conceptions of the good life, including tranquillity, pleasure and the role of virtue
Is the good life a life of pleasure, and can Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures save hedonism?
hedonism and well-being: Mill's qualitative utilitarianism and the higher and lower pleasures distinction
Would you plug into a machine guaranteeing perfect experiences, and what does the answer reveal about well-being?
theories of well-being: hedonism, desire-satisfaction and objective list, and Nozick's experience machine
Do technology and human enhancement help us live the good life in the twenty-first century, or undermine it?
living the good life in the twenty-first century: technology, human enhancement and contemporary debates
Must the good life be a moral life, or can a person flourish while acting immorally?
the relationship between the good life and morality, including whether moral goodness is necessary for the good life
