Do the ancient schools of Epicureanism and Stoicism offer a better route to the good life than Aristotle's eudaimonism?
Epicurean and Stoic conceptions of the good life, including tranquillity, pleasure and the role of virtue
A VCE Philosophy Unit 4 answer on Epicurean and Stoic conceptions of the good life. Explains Epicurus on pleasure as the absence of pain and Stoic virtue and apatheia, and evaluates both against objections about passivity and the demandingness of their ideals.
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What this dot point is asking
VCAA wants you to explain two ancient conceptions of the good life that rival Aristotle's, Epicureanism and Stoicism, set out what each says the good life consists in and how to achieve it, and evaluate them. The high-band answer distinguishes Epicurean pleasure (correctly understood) from crude hedonism, distinguishes the Stoic placing of the good entirely in virtue, and presses objections about whether each ideal is liveable or desirable.
Epicurus on pleasure and tranquillity
Epicurus is a hedonist: pleasure is the good and pain the bad, and a good life is a pleasant one. But he means something subtler than the pursuit of intense sensual enjoyment. The highest pleasure is katastematic (static) pleasure, the settled state of having no pain in the body (aponia) and no disturbance in the mind (ataraxia), rather than kinetic pleasures of active gratification. Once pain is removed, pleasure is at its limit and cannot be increased, only varied. So the good life is achieved not by piling up enjoyments but by removing pain and anxiety.
To do this, Epicurus classifies desires: natural and necessary (food, shelter, friendship, freedom from fear), natural but unnecessary (luxuries), and vain and empty (fame, unlimited wealth). We should satisfy the first, moderate the second, and reject the third, because unnecessary desires breed anxiety and dependence. He also targets the two great sources of mental disturbance: fear of the gods (answered by his view that the gods do not meddle in human affairs) and fear of death (answered by the argument that death is nothing to us, since where death is we are not, and where we are death is not, so there is no subject left to be harmed). Friendship and a simple, withdrawn life are central to Epicurean tranquillity.
Stoic virtue and acceptance
The Stoics (Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius) take the opposite view of externals. For them the good life, eudaimonia, consists in virtue alone. Only virtue is truly good and only vice truly bad; everything else, health, wealth, reputation, even life itself, is an indifferent, neither good nor bad. Such things may be preferred or dispreferred indifferents (it is reasonable to prefer health), but they cannot add to or subtract from a person's flourishing, which depends solely on the state of their character and reason.
The key practical doctrine is the dichotomy of control (Epictetus): some things are up to us (our judgements, choices, attitudes) and some are not (our bodies, possessions, what others do). The wise person invests their concern only in what is up to them and accepts the rest as it comes, achieving apatheia, freedom from destructive passions. Living well is living in agreement with nature and reason, which for the Stoics is also the rational order of the cosmos. The sage is self-sufficient and serene because nothing external can touch the one thing that matters, their virtue.
Evaluation
Both views have clear strengths. They locate the good life largely within our own control, answering the objection from luck that troubles Aristotle: if flourishing depends only on managing desire (Epicurus) or on virtue alone (Stoics), then fortune cannot destroy it. Both offer practical, teachable regimes for reducing anxiety and increasing equanimity, which is why both have been revived as therapies of life.
The objections differ. Against Epicureanism: defining pleasure as the absence of pain seems to confuse a neutral state with a positive good, and the prescription to minimise desire and withdraw from public life can look like a timid, diminished existence that avoids the risks (love, ambition, commitment) that give life much of its value. Critics also note tension in valuing friendship highly while grounding everything in one's own tranquillity. Against Stoicism: declaring health, loved ones and one's own life mere indifferents seems to demand a detachment that is neither possible nor desirable. If the death of one's child genuinely makes no difference to one's flourishing, the view appears to deny something deeply true about human love and loss; if it does make a difference, then externals are not indifferent after all. The Stoic can reply that one may act lovingly while not being destroyed by loss, but the line between healthy resilience and cold indifference is hard to hold.
Judgement: both schools make a real advance on Aristotle by securing the good life against fortune, and both offer usable disciplines for tranquillity. But each buys security at a cost to richness: Epicurus by shrinking the scope of desire and engagement, the Stoics by demanding an indifference to external goods that strains against the value we rightly place on relationships and projects. Between them, Stoicism is the more rigorous and inspiring but the more psychologically demanding, while Epicureanism is more achievable but more deflationary. Neither fully displaces the Aristotelian thought that a complete good life includes some external goods, not merely the right inner attitude toward their loss.