Theories of wellbeing: hedonism, desire-satisfaction and objective list accounts

What this dot point is asking

This dot point belongs to the strand of the TASC Philosophy course concerned with how to live the good life. You are asked to lay out the main theories of wellbeing, test them against intuitive cases, and assess which best captures what makes a life good.

What the question is

Notice that this is not the same as asking what is morally right. A person could live a good life, full of wellbeing, without being especially moral, and a saint might suffer greatly. The good life here means a life that goes well for the one living it, what philosophers call prudential value or welfare. The leading theories disagree about where that value lies.

Hedonism

Hedonism holds that wellbeing consists in pleasure and the absence of pain. It is simple, fits the obvious appeal of enjoyment, and traces back to Epicurus, who argued that a tranquil life free from disturbance is the height of pleasure. Bentham and Mill built utilitarianism on a hedonist account of the good. The classic objection comes from Robert Nozick's experience machine: imagine a machine that could give you any pleasurable experiences you wanted, indistinguishable from reality, while you float in a tank. Most people would refuse to plug in, suggesting we value actually doing things and contacting reality, not just the feeling of doing them. If so, pleasure is not all that matters.

Desire-satisfaction theory

This theory says your life goes well to the extent that your desires are satisfied, whatever they are for. It respects individual differences, since it lets each person's own preferences set the standard of their good. But it faces the problem of defective desires. You might desire something based on false beliefs, or desire something whose fulfilment you never experience, such as a stranger's recovery you never hear about. To handle these, philosophers often refine the view to informed desires, the desires you would have if fully informed and rational, a move associated with Richard Brandt and Peter Railton.

Objective list theories

Objective list theorists hold that certain things are good for you whether or not you desire them or take pleasure in them: knowledge, deep friendship, achievement, autonomy and aesthetic experience often appear on such lists. The strength is that it explains why a contented person whose life is built on illusions seems to be missing something, and why we want our children to have friendship and accomplishment, not just pleasant feelings. The weakness is justifying the list: critics ask what makes these items good if not pleasure or desire, and worry the theory imposes one ideal of life on everyone.

Aristotelian eudaimonia

Aristotle offers an influential objective view: the good life is eudaimonia, flourishing, achieved through activity of the soul in accordance with virtue over a complete life. It is not a feeling but a way of living well, requiring the exercise of our distinctively human capacity for reason. External goods like health and friends matter too, but the core is virtuous activity. This account ties the good life to character and explains why merely passive pleasure seems an impoverished ideal.

Evaluating the theories

A strong answer weighs how each handles the experience machine and the contented but deceived life. Hedonism is intuitive but seems to leave out reality. Desire-satisfaction respects autonomy but needs refining to exclude foolish desires. Objective list and eudaimonist views capture our sense that some lives go better than others regardless of feelings, but owe an account of why their chosen goods are authoritative. For the exam, defend a theory and show it survives the standard counterexamples.