Quick questions on The Good Life and Wellbeing - TCE Philosophy (Tasmania)

Hedonism holds that wellbeing consists in pleasure and the absence of pain. It is simple, fits the obvious appeal of enjoyment, and traces back to Epicurus, who argued that a tranquil life free from disturbance is the height of pleasure. Bentham and Mill built utilitarianism on a hedonist account of the good. The classic objection comes from Robert Nozick's experience machine: imagine a machine that could give you any pleasurable experiences you wanted, indistinguishable from reality, while you float in a tank.

This theory says your life goes well to the extent that your desires are satisfied, whatever they are for. It respects individual differences, since it lets each person's own preferences set the standard of their good. But it faces the problem of defective desires. You might desire something based on false beliefs, or desire something whose fulfilment you never experience, such as a stranger's recovery you never hear about.

Objective list theorists hold that certain things are good for you whether or not you desire them or take pleasure in them: knowledge, deep friendship, achievement, autonomy and aesthetic experience often appear on such lists. The strength is that it explains why a contented person whose life is built on illusions seems to be missing something, and why we want our children to have friendship and accomplishment, not just pleasant feelings. The weakness is justifying the list: critics ask what makes these items good if not pleasure or desire, and worry the theory imposes one ideal of life on everyone.

Aristotle offers an influential objective view: the good life is eudaimonia, flourishing, achieved through activity of the soul in accordance with virtue over a complete life. It is not a feeling but a way of living well, requiring the exercise of our distinctively human capacity for reason. External goods like health and friends matter too, but the core is virtuous activity. This account ties the good life to character and explains why merely passive pleasure seems an impoverished ideal.