Metaethics, Moral Realism and Relativism - TCE Philosophy (Tasmania)
“Metaethics: moral realism, relativism and the status of moral claims”
Metaethics steps back from particular moral questions to ask what moral claims even are. Moral realists hold that there are objective moral facts that make claims true or false. Relativists hold that moral truth depends on a culture or individual. Error theorists like J. L. Mackie agree morality aims at objective facts but say there are none, so all moral claims are false. Emotivists and expressivists deny moral claims describe facts at all, treating them as expressions of attitude.
What this dot point is asking
This dot point develops the ethics strand by asking not what is right but whether anything is really right at all. You are asked to map the main metaethical positions and evaluate whether morality can be objective.
What metaethics asks
Normative ethics asks which actions are right. Metaethics asks prior questions: are there moral facts, are moral claims true or false, and what do moral words mean? The central divide is between cognitivism, which says moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false, and non-cognitivism, which says they express something else, such as emotions or commands. Cutting across this is the question of objectivity: even if moral claims can be true, are they made true by mind-independent facts?
The branch of ethics that investigates the nature, status and foundations of moral claims, rather than recommending particular actions. It asks what morality is, not what to do.
Moral realism
Moral realists hold that some moral claims are objectively true, true independently of what anyone thinks. On this view, the wrongness of torturing an innocent for fun is a fact, much as the roundness of the earth is a fact. Realists point to the apparent objectivity of moral discourse: we argue about morality, take ourselves to discover moral truths, and think people can be mistaken. Some realists, like the moral naturalists, identify moral properties with natural ones such as wellbeing; others, following G. E. Moore, hold that goodness is a non-natural, indefinable property and that defining it in natural terms commits the naturalistic fallacy.
G. E. Moore argued that for any natural property, such as maximising pleasure, it remains an open and sensible question whether that property is good. This suggests goodness cannot simply be identical to any natural property.
Relativism
Moral relativism holds that the truth of moral claims is relative to a framework, usually a culture. What is right in one society may be wrong in another, with no neutral standpoint to judge between them. The main evidence is the diversity of moral codes across history and cultures. Relativism promotes tolerance and humility, but faces a serious objection: it seems to make moral reform impossible, since reformers like the abolitionists were, by their own society's standards, simply wrong. It also struggles to condemn practices we are confident are wrong, such as slavery, on more than parochial grounds.
Error theory and non-cognitivism
J. L. Mackie defended an error theory: ordinary moral thought assumes there are objective values, but no such queer entities exist, so all positive moral claims are systematically false. His argument from queerness holds that objective values would have to be metaphysically and epistemologically strange, unlike anything else we know. A different anti-realism comes from emotivism, associated with A. J. Ayer, who held that saying stealing is wrong merely expresses disapproval, like saying boo to stealing. Later expressivists such as Simon Blackburn refined this to explain why moral language behaves logically like fact-stating language even if it expresses attitudes.
Ask two questions. First, do moral claims aim to state facts (cognitivism) or express attitudes (non-cognitivism)? Second, if they state facts, are any of them true? Realism says cognitivist and some true. Error theory says cognitivist but all false. Emotivism says non-cognitivist, so the true or false question does not apply.
Evaluating the debate
A strong answer weighs the cost of each view. Realism best fits how moral practice feels but owes an account of where moral facts come from and how we know them. Relativism explains diversity but undercuts cross-cultural criticism. Error theory takes objectivity seriously but concludes our moral claims are all false, which is hard to live by. Non-cognitivism avoids spooky facts but must explain moral disagreement and reasoning. Many contemporary philosophers seek a middle path, such as quasi-realism or constructivism associated with Christine Korsgaard, which grounds objectivity in the demands of practical reason. For the exam, show you can place a view on the cognitivism and objectivity map and state its leading objection.
Students often treat relativism as obviously generous because it preaches tolerance. But if morality is relative, tolerance is just one more local value with no claim on cultures that reject it. Relativism cannot consistently insist that everyone ought to be tolerant, so do not present tolerance as something relativism can demand.
Exam-style questions
Questions in the style of TASC exam questions on this dot point, each with a worked answer. They are written by ExamExplained unless tagged "Past paper"; the year shows the paper a question is modelled on.
Practice5 marksExplain the difference between moral realism and moral relativism about the status of moral claims.Show worked answer →
A 5 mark short response needs both positions and the contrast.
Moral realism. Some moral claims are objectively true, true independently of what anyone thinks or which culture they belong to. The wrongness of torturing an innocent for fun is a fact, much as the earth's shape is a fact.
Moral relativism. The truth of a moral claim is relative to a framework, usually a culture, so what is right in one society can be wrong in another with no neutral standpoint to judge between them.
Contrast. Markers reward the clear point that realism affirms mind-independent or framework-independent moral truth while relativism makes truth framework-dependent. Strong answers note evidence each side cites: realism the apparent objectivity of moral argument, relativism the diversity of moral codes.
Practice16 marks"There are no objective moral facts." Critically evaluate this claim with reference to at least two metaethical positions.Show worked answer →
A 16 mark extended argument essay should map the positions and defend a verdict.
Exposition. Distinguish cognitivism (moral claims express truth-apt beliefs) from non-cognitivism (they express attitudes). The claim is defended by relativism (truth is framework-relative, so no framework-independent facts), error theory (Mackie: morality aims at objective facts but there are none, so all positive moral claims are false), and emotivism (Ayer: moral claims merely express approval or disapproval).
Case for the claim. Mackie's argument from queerness: objective values would be metaphysically and epistemologically strange. The diversity of moral codes supports relativism. Emotivism explains the motivational pull of moral judgement.
Objections. Realism best fits moral practice: we argue, take ourselves to discover truths, and think people can be mistaken (the abolitionists were right against their society, which relativism cannot easily say). Moore's open question argument and the difficulty of living by error theory cut against anti-realism.
Judgement. Conclude with a defended position, e.g. that the claim survives the queerness worry only if a middle path like quasi-realism (Blackburn) or constructivism (Korsgaard) cannot ground objectivity in practical reason. Markers reward accurate use of at least two positions, the leading objection to each, and a reasoned conclusion.