Liberal democracy and its breakdown in Indonesia 1949-1957: HSC Modern History National Study

A 3-mark "outline" wants three distinct, correctly framed points.

Seven cabinets in seven years

Between 1950 and 1957 Indonesia had seven cabinets (Natsir, Sukiman, Wilopo, Ali Sastroamidjojo I, Burhanuddin Harahap, Ali Sastroamidjojo II), none surviving much beyond a year.

No party majority

Power rested on fragile coalitions among the PNI, Masyumi and NU; a single defection or scandal (such as the 1952 "17 October Affair" army-government clash) could topple a cabinet.

Politics over governance

Cabinets spent their energy on coalition survival rather than the economy or administration, so reform stalled and public faith in the parties drained away.

Marking criteria

1 mark each for three distinct features (cabinet turnover, no majority, paralysis); dates and a named cabinet lift a foundation answer.

A 4-mark "explain" wants significance, not a list of percentages.

The vote

The September 1955 parliamentary election was Indonesia's first free national poll. Four parties dominated: PNI (22.3 per cent), Masyumi (20.9 per cent), NU (18.4 per cent) and the PKI (16.4 per cent).

What it revealed

No party came close to a majority, so the election entrenched rather than cured coalition instability. It also exposed deep cleavages: secular nationalism (PNI), modernist Islam (Masyumi), traditionalist Islam (NU), and a resurgent Communism (PKI).

The shock

The PKI's fourth place - a recovery from the 1948 Madiun Affair - alarmed the army, Masyumi and the West, sharpening the polarisation Sukarno would later "balance" through NASAKOM.

The effect

By proving that elections could not produce stable government, 1955 strengthened Sukarno's case that Western-style democracy did not fit Indonesia.

Marking criteria

1 mark for the four-party result; 1 mark for "no majority / instability persisted"; 1 mark for the PKI shock; 1 mark for linking the result to the case for Guided Democracy.

A 5-mark "explain ... using the source" wants the source decoded, then anchored in own knowledge.

Decode the source

Source A blames the breakdown on the political class (office-trading coalitions) rather than on any popular rejection of democracy, and points to three structural pressures left unsolved: regions, economy and army.

Coalition failure (own knowledge)

Seven cabinets in seven years, none with a majority; the 1955 election produced four equal blocs and changed nothing. Politics became a game of portfolios.

The three pressures

Regionally, the Outer Islands resented Javanese dominance and revenue capture, producing army-backed regional councils in 1956 to 1957. Economically, inflation, the failed Benteng programme and dependence on volatile export prices undermined every cabinet. Militarily, the army (politicised since the 1952 "17 October Affair") increasingly distrusted civilian politicians.

The outcome

Into this vacuum Sukarno advanced his "konsepsi" (21 February 1957) for Guided Democracy, and martial law followed in March 1957.

Marking criteria

1 mark for decoding the source's argument; 1 mark for coalition instability; 1-2 marks for the regional / economic / army pressures; 1 mark for linking to the turn to Guided Democracy.

A 5-mark "assess the usefulness" rewards origin/perspective plus own knowledge, ending in a judgement.

Origin and perspective

Source B is Sukarno's own 1957 justification - useful as direct evidence of the IDEOLOGY he used to legitimise Guided Democracy: the claim that liberal democracy was a foreign import unsuited to Indonesia, to be replaced by consensus (musyawarah-mufakat) under his leadership.

Corroboration from own knowledge

It fits the record: his "konsepsi" of 21 February 1957 proposed a "gotong royong" cabinet of all parties and a National Council, and his "I have a dream" speech (28 October 1956) had attacked the parties. The instability was real - seven cabinets, a deadlocked Constituente.

Limitation

As self-justifying rhetoric it conceals the self-interest: "guided" democracy concentrated power in Sukarno and the army and sidelined his critics (Masyumi, Hatta). It says nothing of the economic crisis or regional revolts that actually forced the issue.

Judgement

Highly useful for Sukarno's stated motives and the cultural packaging of Guided Democracy, but it must be read against the structural causes and his personal ambition that the speech tactfully omits.

Marking criteria

1 mark for origin/perspective (Sukarno's own justification); 1-2 marks for corroborating own knowledge (konsepsi, the parties' failure); 1 mark for a limitation (self-serving, omits economy/regions); 1 mark for a judgement on usefulness.

A 6-mark "explain" wants two developed strands (regional, economic) tied to the breakdown.

Regional grievance

The Outer Islands (Sumatra, Sulawesi) produced most of Indonesia's export earnings - rubber, oil, copra - but felt that Java took the revenue and the offices. Centralised Jakarta control, Javanese over-representation, and stalled development bred resentment. By 1956 to 1957 regional army commanders set up their own councils (Dewan Banteng in West Sumatra, Dewan Manguni in Sulawesi), ran barter-smuggling of exports, and openly defied Jakarta - a direct challenge to the central government's authority.

Economic strain

Indonesia inherited a war-damaged, export-dependent economy. The Benteng programme (1950) tried to build a pribumi business class through import licences but mainly produced "briefcase" licence-traders and corruption. Falling commodity prices after the Korean War boom, budget deficits, and rising inflation undercut every cabinet's credibility.

The link to breakdown

Each cabinet fell partly because it could neither satisfy the regions nor stabilise the economy. The combination handed the army a security pretext (martial law, March 1957) and handed Sukarno the argument that the liberal system had failed.

Marking criteria

1-2 marks for developed regional grievance (revenue capture, the regional councils); 1-2 marks for developed economic strain (Benteng, inflation, export dependence); 1-2 marks for explicitly linking both to the collapse of parliamentary government.

This is an extended-response/essay. Markers reward a sustained, evidence-based argument that addresses the comparison directly and weaves in historiography - not a narrative.

Band-6 PLAN

• Thesis. The parties' failure was the most VISIBLE cause - seven cabinets, a deadlocked Constituente, office-trading coalitions - but it was not the deepest. Parliamentary democracy collapsed because that party failure intersected with structural forces the system could not contain: regional revolt, economic crisis, a politicised army and Sukarno's own ambition. The parties opened the door; the regions, the economy and the army pushed it down, and Sukarno walked through.
• Argument 1 - The party failure (the enabling cause). A fragmented system produced no majority and chronic instability: seven cabinets from 1950 to 1957, none lasting much beyond a year, and the 1955 election merely confirmed four roughly equal blocs (PNI 22.3 per cent, Masyumi 20.9 per cent, NU 18.4 per cent, PKI 16.4 per cent). The Constituent Assembly deadlocked over Pancasila versus an Islamic state. Politics became coalition arithmetic, not government.
• Argument 2 - The structural pressures (the deeper causes). The Outer Islands resented Javanese revenue capture; by 1956 to 1957 regional commanders ran their own councils and smuggling. The economy - export-dependent, inflationary, hollowed by the failed Benteng programme - undermined every cabinet. None of this was the parties' creation; it would have strained any government.
• Argument 3 - The army and Sukarno (the active agents). The army, politicised since the 1952 "17 October Affair," distrusted the civilians and exploited the regional crisis to declare martial law in March 1957. Sukarno, never reconciled to a ceremonial role, supplied the alternative: his "konsepsi" (21 February 1957) for Guided Democracy. Hatta's resignation (December 1956) removed the parties' ablest defender. The collapse was thus also a deliberate choice, not just a drift.
• Historiography. Herbert Feith (The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 1962) frames it as a tragedy in which "problem-solving" administrators lost out to "solidarity-makers" like Sukarno - locating the cause in political culture and leadership. Daniel Lev (The Transition to Guided Democracy, 1966) stresses the institutional deadlock and the army's rise. M.C. Ricklefs (A History of Modern Indonesia) integrates the regional and economic strain. Set Feith's leadership-and-culture reading in tension with Lev's institutional-and-army reading.
• Judgement. The parties' failure was necessary but not sufficient: it created the instability, but it was the convergence of economic crisis, regional revolt and an ambitious army-and-president that turned instability into collapse. The single decisive agent was the army-Sukarno alliance that chose to end the system in 1957.

MODEL PARAGRAPH (Argument 3)

The clearest sign that the collapse was a choice, not merely a drift, lies in the convergence of the army and Sukarno in 1956 to 1957. The army had distrusted civilian politicians since the 1952 "17 October Affair," when officers had paraded tanks before the palace demanding parliament's dissolution; the regional revolts of 1956 to 1957 now handed it both a grievance and a pretext, and on 14 March 1957 Sukarno proclaimed a nationwide State of War and Siege that placed real power in military hands. Sukarno, who had chafed at his ceremonial role under the 1950 Constitution, supplied the political alternative: his "konsepsi" of 21 February 1957 called for a "gotong royong" cabinet of all parties, including the PKI, and a National Council to replace adversarial politics with consensus under his leadership. The resignation of Vice-President Hatta in December 1956 had already removed the parties' most capable and Outer-Islands-minded defender. As Herbert Feith argues, the "solidarity-makers" - charismatic mobilisers like Sukarno - were displacing the "administrators" who had tried to make the institutions work; the parties' failure created the opening, but it was the army and the President who decided to close down parliamentary democracy rather than repair it.

Marker's note. A band-6 response keeps "to what extent" in view throughout - ranking the party failure against the regional, economic and army-Sukarno factors rather than narrating the 1950s - anchors every claim in dated evidence (seven cabinets, 1955 percentages, the konsepsi, March 1957 martial law), and sets at least two historians in genuine tension (Feith's culture-and-leadership reading versus Lev's institutional-and-army reading) before reaching a graded judgement. Listing causes without weighing them caps the response in the middle bands.

This is an extended-response/essay. Markers reward a sustained, evidence-based argument that addresses the view directly and weaves in historiography - not a narrative.

Band-6 PLAN

• Thesis. The view is largely correct: the 1955 elections were a genuine democratic achievement, but in producing four roughly equal blocs with no majority they laid bare - rather than mended - the fragmentation, ideological division and instability that had crippled parliamentary government since 1950, and so strengthened the case for abandoning it.
• Argument 1 - What the elections achieved (the qualification). They were free, orderly and massively participated in - a real milestone for a five-year-old state, conferring democratic legitimacy and a measured PKI/PNI/Masyumi/NU map of the nation.
• Argument 2 - What they exposed (the core). No party neared a majority (PNI 22.3, Masyumi 20.9, NU 18.4, PKI 16.4 per cent), so coalition instability continued - the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet (1956) was as fragile as its predecessors. The result also exposed the cleavages it counted: secular nationalism, two rival Islams (Masyumi versus NU), and a resurgent Communism, mapping a society pulling four ways.
• Argument 3 - What it failed to resolve. The Constituent Assembly elected in December 1955 deadlocked over Pancasila versus an Islamic state and never produced a constitution. The vote did nothing for the economy or the regions, whose revolts erupted in 1956 to 1957. By demonstrating that even a clean election could not yield stable government, 1955 fed Sukarno's argument that the system itself was the problem.
• Historiography. Herbert Feith (The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, 1962), the authority on the elections, reads them as the high point of constitutional democracy whose very outcome accelerated its decline. Daniel Lev (The Transition to Guided Democracy, 1966) emphasises the post-election deadlock and the army's rise. Ricklefs notes the regional-economic strain the vote left untouched. Set Feith's "high point that hastened the fall" against Lev's institutional-deadlock reading.
• Judgement. The elections exposed far more than they resolved: they legitimised the state but confirmed its divisions and solved none of its structural crises, making them a milestone on the road to Guided Democracy rather than a rescue of liberal democracy.

MODEL PARAGRAPH (Argument 2)

For all their legitimacy, the 1955 elections diagnosed the disease of parliamentary democracy without curing it. The September parliamentary poll returned four parties of almost equal weight - the PNI on 22.3 per cent, the modernist-Islamic Masyumi on 20.9, the traditionalist-Islamic Nahdlatul Ulama on 18.4, and the Communist PKI on 16.4 - so that no party, and no obvious two, could command a stable majority. The arithmetic that had produced seven cabinets in seven years simply reproduced itself, and the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet formed in 1956 proved no more durable than its predecessors. Worse, the result mapped a society divided four ways - between secular nationalism, two rival visions of political Islam, and a resurgent Communism whose fourth place, only seven years after the Madiun Affair, alarmed the army and the West. As Herbert Feith argues, 1955 was the high point of Indonesian constitutional democracy precisely because it revealed, in hard numbers, the fragmentation that made stable parliamentary government impossible; the election was less a remedy than an X-ray of the breakdown to come.

Marker's note. A band-6 response holds the "expose versus resolve" balance throughout - crediting the achievement before driving the argument that the result deepened the crisis - quotes the four percentages accurately, links the deadlock to the turn towards Guided Democracy, and deploys Feith and Lev in genuine tension rather than as decoration. Narrating the campaign without weighing exposure against resolution caps the response in the middle bands.