← Section III (Peace and Conflict): Conflict in the Gulf 1980-2011
How did UN sanctions, no-fly zones, and weapons inspections seek to contain Iraq between 1991 and 2003, and why did containment ultimately fail?
The international response to Iraq 1991 to 2003, including UN sanctions, the No-Fly Zones, UNSCOM weapons inspections, the humanitarian consequences, the Oil-for-Food Programme, and the failure of containment
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf dot point on the containment of Iraq. UN Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, UNSCOM weapons inspections under Rolf Ekeus and Richard Butler, the Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones, the Oil-for-Food Programme of 1995, the humanitarian crisis, Operation Desert Fox 1998, and the breakdown of containment by 2003.
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What this dot point is asking
NESA expects you to explain the containment regime imposed on Iraq between 1991 and 2003: sanctions, weapons inspections, no-fly zones, the Oil-for-Food Programme, and the eventual breakdown of consensus. Strong answers integrate the legal framework (UNSCR 687, 986, 1441), the institutions (UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, IAEA), the humanitarian crisis, and the political collapse of the policy by 2003.
The answer
UNSCR 687 and the framework
UN Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April 1991), the formal ceasefire resolution, imposed the most intrusive disarmament regime ever applied to a sovereign state. The terms.
- Iraq must declare and accept the destruction of all chemical and biological weapons.
- Iraq must declare and accept the destruction of all ballistic missiles with range over 150 km.
- Iraq must not acquire or develop nuclear weapons; the IAEA would verify.
- A UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) would inspect and supervise destruction.
- Sanctions would remain in force until disarmament was verified.
- Iraq must pay reparations through the UN Compensation Commission (the eventual total was around 52 billion US dollars).
UNSCR 688 (5 April 1991) condemned Iraqi repression of its civilian population and created the legal basis for the no-fly zones.
The No-Fly Zones
Operation Provide Comfort (5 April 1991). US, UK, French, Dutch, and Turkish aircraft from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey protected Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. From 1996 it became Operation Northern Watch. The zone was north of the 36th parallel.
Operation Southern Watch (27 August 1992). US, UK, French (until 1996), and Saudi aircraft from Saudi and Kuwaiti bases enforced a no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel, extended to the 33rd parallel on 3 September 1996.
The zones flew around 350,000 sorties between 1991 and 2003.
UNSCOM and the IAEA
UNSCOM under Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus (1991-1997) and Australian Richard Butler (1997-1999) ran an unprecedented inspection regime.
The IAEA's Action Team handled the nuclear file. The August 1991 inspections uncovered the calutron-based enrichment program. The pre-war Iraqi nuclear program was further advanced than US and Israeli intelligence had estimated.
UNSCOM's chemical work destroyed around 38,000 chemical weapons, around 480,000 litres of chemical agents (mostly mustard gas, sarin, tabun precursors), and the al-Muthanna State Establishment.
The Hussein Kamel defection
Hussein Kamel al-Majid was Saddam's son-in-law and head of Iraq's WMD program. On 7 August 1995 he, his brother, and their families fled to Jordan.
Hussein Kamel debriefed UNSCOM, the CIA, and the IAEA. He confirmed the biological weapons program (production of anthrax and botulinum toxin at al-Hakam), the VX nerve agent program, and the renewed missile work. UNSCOM concluded the pre-1995 declarations had been false.
Hussein Kamel returned to Iraq in February 1996 under a promise of safety; he was killed three days after his return.
The Oil-for-Food Programme
UN Resolution 986 (14 April 1995) created the Oil-for-Food Programme. Iraq could sell up to 2 billion US dollars of oil every six months (raised to 5.26 billion in 1998 and uncapped in 1999); proceeds went into a UN escrow account that paid for food, medicine, infrastructure rehabilitation, reparations, and UN expenses. Iraq accepted on 20 May 1996; first oil exports under the programme began in December 1996.
The Volcker investigation (2005) showed Saddam had used the programme to award discounted oil contracts to political allies, generating kickbacks estimated at around 1.8 billion US dollars.
The humanitarian crisis
The 1996 UNICEF survey of southern Iraq estimated around 500,000 excess child deaths in the under-five cohort 1991-1996. Subsequent demographic work suggests the true figure was considerably lower (perhaps 100,000 to 200,000 excess deaths in the period) but the humanitarian damage was unambiguously severe.
UN humanitarian coordinators in Iraq Denis Halliday (resigned September 1998) and Hans von Sponeck (resigned February 2000) cited the human cost.
The 1997-98 crisis
Iraq expelled American inspectors from UNSCOM in November 1997. The crisis was patched by Secretary-General Kofi Annan's mission to Baghdad in February 1998 (the Annan-Saddam Memorandum of Understanding, 23 February 1998).
In August 1998 Iraq suspended cooperation. Richard Butler's report of 15 December 1998 documented Iraqi non-compliance. UNSCOM withdrew.
Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998)
US and British forces conducted a 70-hour bombing campaign against Iraqi WMD-related sites, command and control, and security infrastructure. Around 415 cruise missiles and 600 bomb sorties were used.
Subsequent reporting (Scott Ritter and others) revealed that UNSCOM operations had been used by US intelligence services for separate intelligence collection, undermining UNSCOM's neutrality.
UNMOVIC and the breakdown
UN Resolution 1284 (17 December 1999) created the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), with Hans Blix as executive chairman. Iraq refused to admit UNMOVIC for nearly three years.
The political consensus had broken. France, Russia, and China increasingly favoured lifting sanctions; the US and UK pursued "smart sanctions." By 2002 sanctions enforcement was significantly weakened.
After 9/11, the Bush 43 administration pressed for a final reckoning. UN Resolution 1441 (8 November 2002) gave Iraq a "final opportunity" to comply and welcomed UNMOVIC and IAEA back. Inspections resumed on 27 November 2002 but were curtailed by the US-led invasion of 20 March 2003.
Timeline
| Date | Event | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| 3 Apr 1991 | UNSCR 687 | Framework set |
| 5 Apr 1991 | Provide Comfort | Northern NFZ |
| 27 Aug 1992 | Southern Watch | Southern NFZ |
| 14 Apr 1995 | UNSCR 986 | Oil-for-Food |
| 7 Aug 1995 | Hussein Kamel defects | Biological program exposed |
| Dec 1996 | First Oil-for-Food contracts | Humanitarian channel |
| 23 Feb 1998 | Annan-Saddam MoU | Crisis deferred |
| 16-19 Dec 1998 | Desert Fox | UNSCOM ends |
| 17 Dec 1999 | UNSCR 1284 | UNMOVIC created |
| 8 Nov 2002 | UNSCR 1441 | Final chance |
| 27 Nov 2002 | Inspections resume | Last attempt |
Historiography
Joy Gordon (Invisible War, 2010) is the definitive critique of the sanctions regime.
Sarah Graham-Brown (Sanctioning Saddam, 1999) is the major contemporary humanitarian analysis.
Charles Duelfer (Hide and Seek, 2009) is the deputy UNSCOM chief's account of inspections.
Scott Ritter (Iraq Confidential, 2005) is the famous whistleblower's critique.
Paul Volcker et al. (the Independent Inquiry Committee report, 2005) is the definitive Oil-for-Food investigation.
How to read a source on this topic
Sources commonly include UNSCOM inspection photographs, Madeleine Albright's "we think the price is worth it" remarks on Iraqi child deaths (60 Minutes, 12 May 1996), the Iraq Survey Group's post-2003 Duelfer Report, and Operation Desert Fox bomb damage assessments.
First, distinguish the legal framework from the operational reality.
Second, weigh humanitarian sources against regime-control sources.
Common exam traps
Treating sanctions as a failure. They prevented WMD reconstitution and constrained the regime. They failed politically and humanitarianly.
Misreading the Kamel defection. It exposed hidden programs; it did NOT show ongoing post-1995 WMD activity.
Confusing UNSCOM and UNMOVIC. UNSCOM 1991-1999; UNMOVIC 1999-2007.
In one sentence
The international containment of Iraq between 1991 and 2003 was built on UN Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April 1991) imposing sanctions and weapons inspections, was operationalised through UNSCOM under Ekeus and Butler with the IAEA, was enforced through the Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones (from 5 April 1991 and 27 August 1992), survived through the Oil-for-Food Programme of UNSCR 986 (April 1995) at the cost of an estimated 100,000-plus excess child deaths, and broke down through Iraqi obstruction, Operation Desert Fox of December 1998, and the Bush 43 administration's post-9/11 decision to seek regime change.
Past exam questions, worked
Real questions from past NESA papers on this dot point, with our answer explainer.
Practice (NESA)15 marksAssess the effectiveness of the international containment of Iraq between 1991 and 2003.Show worked answer →
Needs criteria, dated evidence, judgement.
Thesis. Containment achieved its narrow military objectives (no WMD reconstitution, no external aggression) but at high humanitarian cost and at the price of eroding international consensus. By 2002 the policy was politically exhausted.
UNSCR 687 (3 April 1991). The ceasefire resolution required Iraqi WMD disarmament, return of Kuwaiti property, payment of reparations, and maintained sanctions until verified disarmament.
UNSCOM successes 1991-1995. UNSCOM under Rolf Ekeus uncovered Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, including programs revealed after the August 1995 defection of Hussein Kamel. By 1995 Iraq's pre-1991 WMD stockpiles had been destroyed.
No-Fly Zones. Operation Provide Comfort (5 April 1991) protected Iraqi Kurds north of the 36th parallel. Operation Southern Watch (August 1992) protected Shia south of the 32nd (extended to 33rd in 1996).
Humanitarian cost. The 1996 UNICEF estimate of 500,000 excess Iraqi child deaths under sanctions damaged the legitimacy. UN coordinators Denis Halliday and Hans von Sponeck resigned in protest (1998, 2000).
Oil-for-Food (UNSCR 986, April 1995). Allowed limited Iraqi oil sales for food and medicine. Implementation was later shown to have been corrupted by Iraqi kickbacks.
Crisis 1997-1998. Saddam expelled American UNSCOM inspectors (November 1997). Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998) was a 70-hour US-UK bombing campaign. UNSCOM withdrew; UNMOVIC replaced it (UNSCR 1284, December 1999).
Breakdown. By 2000 the Security Council was split: France, Russia, China wanted sanctions lifted; US and UK pursued "smart sanctions." UNMOVIC returned under UNSCR 1441 (November 2002) but consensus had collapsed.
Conclusion. Effective on disarmament; severe humanitarian costs; politically unsustainable by 2003.
Practice (NESA)6 marksExplain the role of UNSCOM in the containment of Iraq between 1991 and 1998.Show worked answer →
A 6-mark "explain" needs three or four developed roles.
Mandate. UN Special Commission was created by UNSCR 687 (3 April 1991) to inspect, verify, and supervise the destruction of Iraqi chemical, biological, and ballistic missile programs. Headed by Rolf Ekeus (1991-1997) and Richard Butler (1997-1999), it conducted over 250 inspections.
Findings 1991-1995. UNSCOM uncovered Iraq's pre-1991 chemical stocks (around 30,000 munitions), biological agents, and ballistic missile inventories. The August 1995 defection of Hussein Kamel (Saddam's son-in-law) led to the disclosure of major hidden programs.
Cat and mouse. From 1996 Iraq escalated obstruction. The November 1997 crisis (Iraq expelled American inspectors) and the February 1998 Annan-Saddam agreement set up the 1998 collapse.
Withdrawal and Desert Fox. Butler's December 1998 report cited Iraqi non-cooperation; UNSCOM withdrew on 16 December 1998 hours before Operation Desert Fox began. UNSCOM was replaced by UNMOVIC (1999). Markers reward Ekeus, Butler, Hussein Kamel August 1995, and Desert Fox December 1998.
Related dot points
- The course and outcome of Operation Desert Storm 1991, including the air campaign, the ground offensive, the role of new military technology, the Highway of Death, and the decision to end the war on 28 February 1991
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf dot point on Operation Desert Storm. The 38-day air campaign opened 17 January 1991, the 100-hour ground campaign of 24-28 February 1991, precision-guided munitions and stealth aircraft, the Highway of Death, and President Bush 41's decision to end the war with Saddam still in power.
- The role of President George H. W. Bush (Bush 41), including the formation of the 35-nation Coalition, the diplomacy at the United Nations, the decision to end Desert Storm with Saddam in power, and the New World Order rhetoric of 1990 to 1992
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf dot point on President George H. W. Bush. The 5 August 1990 line in the sand, the Coalition assembly with Baker and Scowcroft, the September 1990 New World Order speech, UNSCR 678 brinkmanship, the Highway of Death and the 28 February 1991 ceasefire, and the post-war containment policy.
- The impact of the 11 September 2001 attacks and the War on Terror on US policy in the Gulf, including the Bush Doctrine, the invasion of Afghanistan, the Axis of Evil speech, and the road to the 2003 Iraq War
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf dot point on 9/11 and the War on Terror. The al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan and Operation Enduring Freedom, the Bush Doctrine and the National Security Strategy of September 2002, the Axis of Evil speech of January 2002, and the road from 9/11 to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.