← Section III (Peace and Conflict): Conflict in the Gulf 1980-2011
How did President George H. W. Bush respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and what did he mean by a New World Order?
The role of President George H. W. Bush (Bush 41), including the formation of the 35-nation Coalition, the diplomacy at the United Nations, the decision to end Desert Storm with Saddam in power, and the New World Order rhetoric of 1990 to 1992
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf dot point on President George H. W. Bush. The 5 August 1990 line in the sand, the Coalition assembly with Baker and Scowcroft, the September 1990 New World Order speech, UNSCR 678 brinkmanship, the Highway of Death and the 28 February 1991 ceasefire, and the post-war containment policy.
Have a quick question? Jump to the Q&A page
What this dot point is asking
NESA expects you to explain the role of President George H. W. Bush ("Bush 41") in the Gulf conflict of 1990 to 1991: how he assembled the Coalition, secured the UN mandate, fought and ended the war, and articulated the "New World Order" vision. Strong answers tie his decisions to outcomes (Kuwait liberated; Saddam in power; sanctions and no-fly zones bequeathed to successors).
The answer
Bush's preparation
George Herbert Walker Bush (1924-2018) had unusual preparation for the Gulf crisis. He had been a Navy combat pilot in 1944-45, a Texas oil executive in the 1950s, US Ambassador to the UN (1971-1973), US envoy to Beijing (1974-1975), Director of Central Intelligence (1976-1977), and Vice President under Reagan (1981-1989).
His core team: Secretary of State James Baker; National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft (the most senior foreign-policy thinker of the team); Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell. The team was unusually experienced and unusually collegial.
Initial response, August 1990
The invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 reached Bush at his Kennebunkport, Maine, vacation home. Bush was at the Aspen Institute on 2 August meeting British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher was unequivocal: this was a clear breach of international law requiring military response. Her later "this is no time to go wobbly, George" remark crystallised the British position.
The first NSC meeting on 2 August was inconclusive. By the second meeting on 3 August, after Scowcroft's intervention, Bush was hardening. On 5 August on the South Lawn at Andrews Air Force Base, Bush told reporters "this will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait." This was the commitment.
Coalition building, August to November 1990
Soviet cooperation. Baker met Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow on 3 August 1990; the joint condemnation that day was unprecedented. Bush met Gorbachev at the Helsinki summit on 9 September 1990.
Arab participation. Baker secured Egypt (Mubarak), Saudi Arabia (King Fahd), and Syria (Assad). The Cairo Arab League summit (10 August 1990) voted to deploy Arab forces against Iraq. Bush met Assad in Geneva on 23 November 1990.
Japan and Germany. Constitutional restraints prevented combat participation but they paid: Japan around 13 billion US dollars, Germany around 6 billion. Baker's "tin cup" diplomacy raised around 54 billion total, more than covering US war costs.
Congressional authority. Bush requested authority to use force on 8 January 1991. The vote on 12 January 1991 was 250-183 in the House and 52-47 in the Senate.
The UN sequence
Bush insisted on UN cover. The five core resolutions:
- 660 (2 August 1990). Condemnation and demand for withdrawal.
- 661 (6 August 1990). Comprehensive sanctions.
- 662 (9 August 1990). Annexation void.
- 665 (25 August 1990). Naval enforcement of sanctions.
- 678 (29 November 1990). "All necessary means" with 15 January 1991 deadline.
The UN cover was a Bush priority. Powell later wrote that Bush insisted "we will go to the UN. We will get authority. We will get the world behind us." The decision distinguished Bush 41 from Bush 43 in 2003.
The war
Bush deferred operational command to Powell, Schwarzkopf, and Cheney. He set strategic objectives (expel Iraq from Kuwait; restore the Sabah government; protect American lives; promote regional security) but did not micromanage.
The war began at 03:00 Gulf time on 17 January 1991. Bush ordered the ceasefire on 27 February evening Washington time (28 February 08:00 Gulf), against Powell's preferred 24-hour continuation.
The ceasefire decision
Bush's reasons for halting at 100 hours, drawn from his and Scowcroft's memoir A World Transformed (1998):
- The UN mandate was achieved. Kuwait was liberated.
- The Arab participation depended on a limited war. Continuing to Baghdad would have lost Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.
- The Highway of Death imagery suggested a slaughter that could turn international opinion.
- Occupying Iraq would be a different war: counterinsurgency, civil administration, ethnic complexity.
- Bush expected the Iraqi military or the Shia uprising would do the regime-change job.
The fifth expectation failed. The Republican Guard, which had escaped the trap intact, crushed the Shia uprising in March 1991. The Kurdish refugee catastrophe of April 1991 forced the belated Operation Provide Comfort (5 April 1991) and the no-fly zones.
The New World Order
Bush used the phrase "new world order" repeatedly between September 1990 and his 1992 reelection campaign. The most important formulation came in the 11 September 1990 address to a joint session of Congress:
"Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective, a new world order, can emerge: a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace... A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle."
The order had three pillars: end of Cold War deadlock at the UN Security Council; collective response to aggression; US leadership of a legitimate international system.
The order had clear limits. The same Bush administration did not act on Tiananmen Square, the Bosnian war, or the genocide in Rwanda. Critics including Noam Chomsky (Deterring Democracy, 1991) treated the New World Order rhetoric as cover for US unilateralism.
Containment after the war
Bush 41's post-war policy was containment: maintained UN sanctions under UNSCR 687, UNSCOM weapons inspections (established 3 April 1991), and the Northern (33rd parallel, from 7 April 1991) and Southern (32nd parallel, from August 1992) No-Fly Zones.
Defeat in 1992
Bush 41 lost the November 1992 election to Bill Clinton (43.0 to 37.4 per cent, with Ross Perot taking 18.9 per cent), despite the Gulf victory pushing his approval rating to 89 per cent in March 1991. The recession of 1990-91 and Clinton's "it's the economy, stupid" campaign produced an unusual case of foreign-policy victory not translating into electoral success.
Timeline
| Date | Event | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| 2 Aug 1990 | Aspen meeting with Thatcher | UK pressure |
| 5 Aug 1990 | "This will not stand" | US commitment |
| 9 Sept 1990 | Helsinki summit | Soviet cooperation |
| 11 Sept 1990 | New World Order speech | Rhetorical frame |
| 29 Nov 1990 | UNSCR 678 | Legal basis |
| 12 Jan 1991 | Congressional vote | Domestic authority |
| 17 Jan 1991 | Air war opens | War begins |
| 27 Feb 1991 | Ceasefire ordered | War ends |
| 5 Apr 1991 | Provide Comfort | Belated Kurdish response |
Historiography
George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft (A World Transformed, 1998) is the participants' account.
Bob Woodward (The Commanders, 1991) is the contemporary inside-the-administration journalism.
Jeffrey Engel (When the World Seemed New, 2017) is the major academic study of Bush 41 foreign policy.
Andrew Bacevich (American Empire, 2002) treats the New World Order as an opening of US strategic overreach.
How to read a source on this topic
Sources commonly include Bush's 5 August "this will not stand" remarks, the 11 September 1990 New World Order address, the 16 January 1991 war announcement, and the 27 February 1991 ceasefire speech.
First, note the diplomatic-vs-rhetorical distinction. The diplomacy was meticulous (UN sequence, Coalition assembly). The rhetoric was grand (New World Order).
Second, distinguish Bush 41 from Bush 43. Bush 41 with UN cover, multilateral, limited objectives. Bush 43 (2003) without UN cover, mostly unilateral, regime change.
Common exam traps
Treating the Coalition as automatic. It was assembled through three months of intensive diplomacy.
Forgetting Thatcher. Her pressure on Bush in early August was significant.
Misreading the ceasefire. Bush's decision had five reasons; "running out of time" was not one of them.
In one sentence
President George H. W. Bush built the 35-nation Coalition against Iraq through Baker-Scowcroft diplomacy with the Soviets and Arabs, secured UN Security Council Resolutions 660-678 culminating in the 29 November 1990 authorisation, won narrow congressional approval on 12 January 1991, ordered Operation Desert Storm from 17 January 1991, halted the 100-hour ground campaign at 08:00 Gulf time on 28 February 1991 with Saddam still in power, and articulated a post-Cold-War "New World Order" in the 11 September 1990 address that the subsequent twelve years of sanctions and no-fly zones would test and that his son's 2003 war would discard.
Past exam questions, worked
Real questions from past NESA papers on this dot point, with our answer explainer.
Practice (NESA)15 marksEvaluate the role of President George H. W. Bush in the Gulf conflict of 1990 to 1991.Show worked answer →
Needs criteria, dated evidence, judgement.
Thesis. Bush 41 was the decisive Coalition architect: his diplomatic mobilisation of the post-Cold-War UN, his Coalition building, and his 28 February 1991 ceasefire defined the war. The unresolved Saddam problem was Bush's inheritance to his successors.
Initial response. Bush met with Margaret Thatcher in Aspen on 2 August 1990. The 5 August "this will not stand" press conference at Andrews committed the US to reversal.
Coalition diplomacy. Bush, James Baker, and Brent Scowcroft built a 35-nation Coalition through August-November 1990. Baker's diplomacy secured Soviet acquiescence (Helsinki summit with Gorbachev, 9 September 1990) and Arab participation.
UN sequence. Bush refused to act outside Security Council authority. The sequence (Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 665, 678) created the legal basis. UNSCR 678 (29 November 1990) authorising "all necessary means" was a personal Bush priority.
Congressional authorisation. Bush sought and won congressional authority (House 250-183, Senate 52-47 on 12 January 1991).
War conduct. Bush deferred operational decisions to Powell, Schwarzkopf, and Cheney. The 28 February ceasefire after 100 hours was Bush's call.
New World Order. The 11 September 1990 address to Congress promised "a new world order... where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle."
Limits. Bush expected the Iraqi army or the Shia uprising would topple Saddam. He did not back the March 1991 uprisings. This decision shaped the next 12 years.
Conclusion. Bush built the Coalition, fought the war well, and ended it too soon; his containment legacy was bequeathed to Clinton and Bush 43.
Practice (NESA)5 marksExplain what President Bush meant by the 'New World Order' in 1990 to 1991.Show worked answer →
A 5-mark "explain" needs three developed components.
The phrase. Bush 41 used "new world order" repeatedly between September 1990 and 1992, most prominently in his 11 September 1990 address to a joint session of Congress on the Persian Gulf crisis.
The content. The new order had three pillars. First, the end of US-Soviet rivalry and the operability of the UN Security Council. Second, the rule of law in international relations: aggression met collective response. Third, US leadership.
The application. The Gulf war was the test case. The 35-nation Coalition under UN authority would expel Iraq from Kuwait, vindicating collective security.
Critique and limits. Critics pointed to the selective application (no equivalent response to other invasions of the era) and the unilateral US assertion of "what is at stake". The order proved more US-led than UN-led. Markers reward 11 September 1990 address, the link to UN Security Council operability, and the contrast with Cold War deadlock.
Related dot points
- The causes and immediate consequences of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, including the post-war debt crisis, the role of the United Nations, and the formation of the Coalition
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf dot point on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Saddam's post-war debt and oil-price grievances, the April Glaspie meeting, the invasion of 2 August 1990, the annexation, the UN Security Council response (Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 678), and the formation of the 35-nation Coalition under Bush 41.
- The course and outcome of Operation Desert Storm 1991, including the air campaign, the ground offensive, the role of new military technology, the Highway of Death, and the decision to end the war on 28 February 1991
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf dot point on Operation Desert Storm. The 38-day air campaign opened 17 January 1991, the 100-hour ground campaign of 24-28 February 1991, precision-guided munitions and stealth aircraft, the Highway of Death, and President Bush 41's decision to end the war with Saddam still in power.
- The international response to Iraq 1991 to 2003, including UN sanctions, the No-Fly Zones, UNSCOM weapons inspections, the humanitarian consequences, the Oil-for-Food Programme, and the failure of containment
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf dot point on the containment of Iraq. UN Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, UNSCOM weapons inspections under Rolf Ekeus and Richard Butler, the Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones, the Oil-for-Food Programme of 1995, the humanitarian crisis, Operation Desert Fox 1998, and the breakdown of containment by 2003.