Regional and global situations that threaten peace and security: HSC Legal Studies

What this dot point is asking

Regional and global situations that threaten peace and security is one of the four contemporary issues that must be studied in the World Order option of the Legal Studies Stage 6 Syllabus (2009), alongside the principle of 'responsibility to protect', the success of global cooperation in achieving world order, and rules regarding the conduct of hostilities. You must identify and investigate the issue and evaluate the effectiveness of legal and non-legal responses to it.

The syllabus does not name particular situations, so you choose them. The strongest answers use two or three current, well-documented case studies that differ in kind (for example, an inter-state war involving a permanent member, an intra-state war with a humanitarian catastrophe, and a global threat such as nuclear proliferation), and judge the responses to each against the themes: cooperation and conflict, compliance and non-compliance, changing values, law reform and effectiveness. This page uses Russia and Ukraine, Sudan and North Korea's nuclear program, with shorter notes on other situations. Terrorism is a global threat with its own page.

Contested conflicts need care: describe facts neutrally and attribute contested claims to the court, UN body or government that made them.

The answer

What counts as a threat to peace and security

Under article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council decides whether there is a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression", which opens the way to binding measures under Chapter VII: sanctions (art 41) and military force (art 42). Member states must carry out its decisions (art 25). The concept has widened since 1945. It once meant war between states; the Council now treats intra-state conflict, humanitarian catastrophes, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as threats to international peace, which is why it could act on Darfur, on terrorist financing (Resolution 1373, 2001) and on North Korea's nuclear tests.

Regional situations are conflicts or crises centred on one region, such as the war in Sudan, which spill across borders through refugees, arms and foreign involvement. Global situations threaten the whole international system, such as major-power war, nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Many regional situations become global: the war in Ukraine has affected energy and food markets, nuclear safety and alliances worldwide.

The global picture in 2026

• Armed conflict. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recorded 61 state-based conflicts in 2024 and a record 65 in 2025, the highest since its records begin in 1946. It reported that inter-state conflicts doubled for the second consecutive year in 2025 and that fatalities in organised violence rose to about 244,600.
• Military spending. SIPRI estimated world military expenditure at $2,887 billion (US) in 2025, up 2.9 per cent in real terms and the 11th consecutive annual increase. The global military burden, 2.5 per cent of world GDP, was the highest since 2009. Spending rose 14 per cent in Europe and 8.1 per cent in Asia and Oceania.
• Nuclear risk. SIPRI estimated that nine states held about 12,187 nuclear warheads in January 2026, of which about 9,745 were in military stockpiles. China's arsenal (about 620) is growing faster than any other. New START, which capped deployed US and Russian strategic warheads at 1,550 each, expired on 5 February 2026, leaving no treaty limit on their strategic forces for the first time since 1972. The 2026 NPT Review Conference ended on 22 May 2026 without a consensus outcome, the third in a row.

These figures give you the evidence for the claim that the rules-based order is under greater strain than at any time since the Cold War. The nature of world order page explains inter-state and intra-state conflict in more detail.

How to analyse a situation

For each case study, work through the same questions:

1. Nature of the threat. Who are the parties? Is it inter-state, intra-state or global? What harm is caused, and how does it spread?
2. Legal responses. Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, sanctions, courts (ICJ, ICC, special tribunals), treaties and domestic laws.
3. Non-legal responses. Negotiation and mediation, military and economic aid, humanitarian relief, NGOs and the media.
4. Obstacles. Sovereignty, the veto, non-state actors, outside support for parties, and lack of enforcement.
5. Judgement. What have the responses achieved, and what have they failed to achieve?

Case study 1: Russia and Ukraine

The situation. Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, after occupying Crimea in 2014. It is the largest inter-state war in Europe since 1945 and involves a permanent member of the Security Council. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine verified at least 16,431 civilians killed (including 803 children) and 48,613 injured from 24 February 2022 to mid-2026, and warned that casualties in the first half of 2026 were 37 per cent higher than in the same period of 2025. It reported 437 civilians killed in July 2026, the highest monthly figure since May 2022. It notes that actual numbers are likely to be considerably higher.

Legal responses.

• Security Council. Russia vetoed a draft resolution deploring its aggression on 25 February 2022. The Council used the "Uniting for Peace" procedure to refer the matter to the General Assembly. On 24 February 2025 it adopted Resolution 2774 (10 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions), a United States draft that implored a swift end to the conflict and urged a lasting peace without attributing responsibility for the war. Supporters saw it as a step towards negotiations; European members that abstained argued it failed to name the aggressor.
• General Assembly. Resolution ES-11/1 (2 March 2022; 141 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions) deplored Russia's aggression and demanded withdrawal, and ES-11/4 (October 2022) declared the attempted annexation of four Ukrainian regions invalid. These resolutions are not binding but express the views of most states.
• International Court of Justice. In Allegations of Genocide (Ukraine v Russia) the ICJ ordered on 16 March 2022 that Russia immediately suspend its military operations. Russia did not comply. In February 2024 the Court narrowed the case, finding jurisdiction only over Ukraine's claim that it had not itself committed genocide. Australia was one of 32 states whose interventions the Court admitted in June 2023.
• International Criminal Court. On 17 March 2023 the ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Vladimir Putin for the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of children from occupied areas. Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute and rejects the warrant, and the ICC cannot try him in his absence.
• New accountability mechanisms. Because the ICC cannot prosecute the crime of aggression in this situation, Ukraine and the Council of Europe signed an agreement on 25 June 2025 establishing a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine; 36 states and the European Union adopted the agreement to manage it on 15 May 2026. A Register of Damage (2023) records claims, and a convention establishing an International Claims Commission for Ukraine was opened for signature in The Hague on 16 December 2025.
• Sanctions. The EU, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia and others have imposed extensive autonomous sanctions. Australia had imposed more than 1,800 sanctions in response to the invasion by February 2026, under the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (Cth).

Non-legal responses. Military and economic aid has sustained Ukraine's defence; Australia has committed more than $1.7 billion in total assistance, including $1.5 billion in military support. United States-led negotiations since 2025 have produced prisoner exchanges and short truces, but no settlement as at September 2026. NGOs and journalists document attacks and deportations, which feeds the courts.

Evaluation. The responses have upheld the rules in principle: most states have condemned the invasion and refused to recognise annexation, and accountability mechanisms are being built for the future. But they have not stopped the war. The veto prevents Chapter VII action, Russia has ignored the ICJ, the ICC warrant cannot be enforced without arrest, and sanctions have not changed Russia's strategy. The case shows that the collective security system cannot coerce a permanent member.

Case study 2: the war in Sudan

The situation. War between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began on 15 April 2023. It is an intra-state conflict, internationalised by outside support for both sides. UN agencies describe it as the world's largest humanitarian and displacement crisis: in August 2026 IOM estimated about 8.6 million people internally displaced, and by 2025 more than 4 million had fled to neighbouring countries (UNHCR). After a siege of about 18 months the RSF captured El Fasher, the army's last major stronghold in Darfur, in late October 2025 amid reports from UN agencies of mass killings of civilians. The IPC Famine Review Committee confirmed famine in El Fasher and Kadugli in November 2025, the second famine finding in Sudan in less than a year. UN humanitarian appeals for Sudan remain badly underfunded.

Legal responses.

• Security Council. The Darfur arms embargo (Resolution 1556, 2004) and targeted sanctions regime (Resolution 1591, 2005) remain in force. Resolution 2736 (13 June 2024; 14 votes to 0, Russia abstaining) demanded that the RSF halt its siege of El Fasher. On 18 November 2024 Russia vetoed a United Kingdom and Sierra Leone draft demanding an end to attacks on civilians, which had 14 votes in favour; Russia said the text was unbalanced and did not respect Sudan's sovereignty. No protection force has been authorised.
• International Criminal Court. The Council referred Darfur to the ICC in 2005 (Resolution 1593). On 6 October 2025 the ICC convicted Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb of 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 2003 and 2004, and on 9 December 2025 sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment; he has appealed his conviction, and both the defence and the Prosecution have appealed the sentence. The ICC Prosecutor's office is also investigating crimes in the current war under the same referral.
• International Court of Justice. Sudan sued the United Arab Emirates in March 2025, alleging that its support for the RSF breached the Genocide Convention; the UAE denies supplying the RSF. On 5 May 2025 the Court found that it manifestly lacked jurisdiction because of the UAE's reservation to article IX of the Convention, and removed the case from its list.
• Determinations and investigations. The United States determined on 7 January 2025 that the RSF and allied militias had committed genocide. The UN Human Rights Council created an independent Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan in October 2023 to document violations.

Non-legal responses. The Jeddah talks led by Saudi Arabia and the United States produced a declaration of commitment to protect civilians in May 2023 that was not honoured. On 12 September 2025 the Quad (the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt) proposed a roadmap: a three-month humanitarian truce, then a permanent ceasefire and a nine-month transition to civilian-led government. Humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Programme, UNICEF and IOM, and NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières, deliver aid where access allows, but the response is chronically underfunded.

Evaluation. Sudan shows the limits of world order in intra-state conflict. The Council's sanctions and ICC referral have produced a historic conviction for earlier Darfur crimes, but its demands were ignored, its only protective draft was vetoed, and jurisdictional rules closed the ICJ route. Mediation depends on outside states that are themselves accused of backing parties. Responses have been largely ineffective at protecting civilians, and the humanitarian response is failing for lack of money.

Case study 3: nuclear proliferation and North Korea

The situation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003 and conducted six nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017. SIPRI estimated in January 2026 that it had about 60 assembled nuclear warheads, with fissile material for more, and it continues to test ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. This is a global threat: it undermines the NPT, risks a regional arms race in North-East Asia and, since 2023, has become linked to the war in Ukraine.

Legal responses.

• UN sanctions. From Resolution 1718 (2006), adopted after the first test, to Resolution 2397 (2017), the Security Council imposed binding sanctions under Chapter VII, including arms embargoes, bans on coal, iron and textile exports, caps on oil imports and limits on overseas workers. These were adopted unanimously, showing what the Council can do when the permanent members agree.
• Erosion of the regime. In May 2022 China and Russia vetoed a draft that would have tightened sanctions after new missile tests. On 28 March 2024 Russia vetoed the renewal of the Panel of Experts that monitored sanctions compliance, and the Panel ceased work on 30 April 2024. Russia and the DPRK signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in June 2024, and North Korean troops were deployed to fight for Russia in the Kursk region.
• Plurilateral monitoring. In October 2024, 11 states, including Australia, created the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT). Its first report (May 2025) documented DPRK-Russia military cooperation in violation of UN sanctions, and later reports have covered other evasion schemes, such as overseas labour.
• Australia. Australia imposes autonomous sanctions on the DPRK and has deployed aircraft and ships under Operation ARGOS to monitor illegal ship-to-ship transfers.

Non-legal responses. The Six-Party Talks (2003 to 2009) and the United States and DPRK summits of 2018 and 2019 produced statements but no verified disarmament. Deterrence and alliance cooperation among the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan are the main security response.

Evaluation. The sanctions regime slowed but did not stop the DPRK's program, and it is now weakening, because the consensus that built it has broken down. The MSMT keeps monitoring alive but lacks the authority of a UN body. The case shows that non-proliferation depends on cooperation among the permanent members.

Other situations you can use

Australia's role

The syllabus asks you to explain the role of Australia's federal government. In these situations Australia has acted mainly through autonomous sanctions (on Russia, the DPRK and Myanmar's military), military and humanitarian aid (Ukraine), legal support (intervening in Ukraine's ICJ case), monitoring (the MSMT and Operation ARGOS), and diplomacy at the UN. As a middle power it cannot force outcomes, but it adds legitimacy and resources to collective responses.

Evaluating the effectiveness of responses

Judgement. Legal and non-legal responses to current threats are effective at condemnation, documentation and long-term accountability, but ineffective at prevention and resolution. When the permanent members agree, as they once did on the DPRK, the Charter system can impose real costs. When a permanent member or its partner is involved, as in Ukraine, Sudan and now the DPRK, the Security Council is blocked, and the burden shifts to the General Assembly, courts, coalitions of states and aid agencies, which lack the power to end wars. The record 65 conflicts of 2025 show that world order is under severe strain.

In one sentence

With a record 65 state-based conflicts in 2025, rising military spending and eroding arms control, legal responses such as sanctions, resolutions and courts have condemned aggression and pursued accountability in Ukraine, Sudan and North Korea, but because the Security Council is blocked when major powers are involved, they have done little to prevent or end these threats.

Try this

Q1. Identify TWO global situations that threaten peace and security, with evidence. (3 marks)

• What the marker wants. Two situations (for example nuclear proliferation and major-power war) with specific data such as SIPRI or UCDP figures.

Q2. Explain how the veto has affected responses to ONE regional situation. (5 marks)

• What the marker wants. Article 27(3), a specific veto (Ukraine 2022 or Sudan 2024) and what happened instead (General Assembly, courts, coalitions).

Q3. To what extent have courts and tribunals contributed to resolving threats to peace and security? (8 marks)

• What the marker wants. ICJ (Ukraine v Russia, Sudan v UAE), ICC (Putin warrant, Kushayb), the Special Tribunal, their limits, and a judgement.