Can the existence of a wholly good, all-powerful God be reconciled with the suffering in the world?
The problem of evil and responses to it
The problem of evil as a challenge to theism in TASC Unit 4.2, covering the logical and evidential versions, the free will defence, soul-making theodicy and the distinction between moral and natural evil.
Reviewed by: AI editorial process; not yet individually human-reviewed
Have a quick question? Jump to the Q&A page
What this dot point is asking
This dot point belongs to Unit 4.2 of the TASC Philosophy course, Life, the Universe and Everything, which examines arguments concerning the existence of God. Where the cosmological and teleological arguments try to establish God, the problem of evil is the most powerful argument against the existence of the traditional God.
Stating the problem
The problem arises from a set of claims a traditional theist accepts: God is omnipotent, so able to prevent evil; omniscient, so aware of it; and wholly good, so wanting to prevent it. Yet evil and suffering clearly exist. Epicurus is credited with an early form of the dilemma, and David Hume gave it sharp expression: if God is willing to prevent evil but unable, God is not omnipotent; if able but not willing, not good. The challenge is to show how all the divine attributes can hold together with the reality of suffering.
Logical and evidential versions
The logical problem, pressed by J. L. Mackie, claims the propositions God exists and evil exists are logically inconsistent, so that theism is incoherent. The evidential problem, associated with William Rowe, makes a weaker but resilient claim: even if not strictly contradictory, the amount and distribution of suffering, especially seemingly pointless suffering, counts as strong evidence against God's existence. The distinction matters because a successful response to the logical version, showing mere consistency, still leaves the evidential version standing.
The free will defence
The most influential response is the free will defence, developed rigorously by Alvin Plantinga. Genuine moral goodness requires free creatures who can choose between good and evil; a world with free agents is more valuable than one of programmed puppets. But if creatures are truly free, even God cannot guarantee they always choose well without removing their freedom. Moral evil is therefore the price of a greater good, free will. Plantinga argues this shows God and evil are consistent, defeating the logical problem. A standard objection is that it addresses moral evil, caused by human choices, but not natural evil such as disease and earthquakes, which no human freely causes.
Soul-making and evaluation
John Hick advanced a soul-making theodicy, arguing that a world containing hardship and suffering is necessary for the development of virtues like courage, compassion and resilience, so that souls can grow toward moral and spiritual maturity. A frictionless paradise would produce no such growth. Critics reply that the sheer scale and apparent pointlessness of some suffering, including that of animals and infants who develop no virtues from it, far exceeds what soul-making could justify, which is just the evidential problem returning. For the TASC course, set out the problem in both its logical and evidential forms, present the free will defence and a theodicy such as soul-making, distinguish moral from natural evil, and reach a reasoned judgement on whether theism can absorb the challenge.