Free Will and Determinism - TCE Philosophy (Tasmania)
“Free will and determinism: hard determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism”
Determinism says every event, including human choices, is fixed by prior causes and the laws of nature. Hard determinists conclude that free will is therefore an illusion and no one is truly responsible. Libertarians insist we do have genuine free will, so determinism must be false for human choices. Compatibilists argue the whole conflict is mistaken: freedom is acting on your own desires without external compulsion, which is fully compatible with determinism.
What this dot point is asking
This dot point addresses the free will strand of the TASC Philosophy course, which examines hard determinism, soft determinism and libertarianism. You are asked to define each position, present the central arguments, and evaluate what is at stake for moral responsibility.
Determinism and the threat to freedom
Determinism is the thesis that, given the past and the laws of nature, only one future is possible. If your choices are just later links in a causal chain stretching back before your birth, it can seem you could never have done otherwise. The clearest statement is Peter van Inwagen's consequence argument: if determinism is true, our acts are consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past; but we have no control over those, so we have no control over their consequences, including our acts.
The thesis that every event is necessitated by prior events together with the laws of nature, so that at any moment exactly one future is physically possible. It is a claim about causation, not about prediction or fatalism.
Hard determinism
Hard determinists accept determinism and conclude that free will and moral responsibility are illusions. If no one could have acted otherwise, no one truly deserves blame or praise. Baron d'Holbach defended this in the eighteenth century, and modern hard incompatibilists like Derk Pereboom argue we should give up the notion of basic desert while keeping forward-looking practices like rehabilitation. The strength of the view is its honesty about causation; its cost is that it overturns deeply held practices of holding people accountable.
Much of the debate turns on whether free will requires the ability to have done otherwise. Hard determinists and libertarians agree it does, and disagree only about whether we have it. Compatibilists challenge the requirement itself.
Libertarianism
Libertarians, not to be confused with the political view of the same name, hold that we have genuine free will and that determinism is therefore false for human action. Some appeal to agent causation, defended by Roderick Chisholm, on which a person, as a substance, originates actions without being determined to do so. Others point to indeterminism in physics. The view preserves robust responsibility but faces the luck objection: if a choice is not determined by anything about the agent, including their reasons, it looks random rather than free, which is no better for responsibility than determinism.
Compatibilism
Compatibilists, also called soft determinists, argue that freedom and determinism are compatible because freedom is not the absence of causation but the absence of constraint. David Hume held that a free action is one that flows from your own will rather than external compulsion or coercion. A prisoner in chains is unfree; a person choosing what to eat is free, even if that choice has causes. Harry Frankfurt deepened this by locating freedom in acting on desires you reflectively endorse: an addict who wants to be rid of the craving but cannot is unfree, while one who endorses their desire acts freely.
Ask two questions. Is determinism true? Is determinism compatible with free will? Hard determinist: determinism true, incompatible, so no free will. Libertarian: incompatible, but we have free will, so determinism false. Compatibilist: compatible, so free will survives whether or not determinism is true.
Evaluating the debate
A strong answer weighs the trade-offs. Hard determinism is consistent but revisionary about responsibility. Libertarianism protects responsibility but must explain how undetermined choices are not merely lucky. Compatibilism saves both determinism and everyday responsibility but is accused of changing the subject, offering a freedom too thin to ground the deep desert we care about. Frankfurt-style cases, in which a person acts on their own reasons but could not have done otherwise because a neuroscientist stood ready to intervene, are widely used to argue that responsibility does not actually require alternative possibilities. For the exam, take a position and defend it against the strongest rival.
Determinism says your choices are caused, not that they make no difference. Fatalism says the outcome will happen whatever you do. Under determinism your deliberation is a real cause of what happens, so deciding to study can genuinely bring about passing. Do not argue that determinism makes effort pointless.
Exam-style questions
Questions in the style of TASC exam questions on this dot point, each with a worked answer. They are written by ExamExplained unless tagged "Past paper"; the year shows the paper a question is modelled on.
Practice6 marksExplain the difference between hard determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism.Show worked answer →
A 6 mark response needs all three positions, distinguished by two questions: is determinism true, and is it compatible with free will?
Hard determinism. Determinism is true and is incompatible with free will, so free will and moral responsibility are illusions (d'Holbach; Pereboom's hard incompatibilism).
Libertarianism. Free will is incompatible with determinism, but we do have genuine free will, so determinism is false for human action. Some appeal to agent causation (Chisholm).
Compatibilism (soft determinism). Free will is compatible with determinism, because freedom is the absence of constraint, not the absence of causation. A free act flows from your own will (Hume) or from desires you reflectively endorse (Frankfurt).
Markers reward all three positions, correctly placed on the compatibility question, ideally with a named defender for each.
Practice16 marks"Free will and determinism cannot both be true." Critically evaluate this incompatibilist claim, defending a position of your own.Show worked answer →
A 16 mark extended argument essay should engage the strongest case on each side.
Exposition. State incompatibilism and its motivation: van Inwagen's consequence argument, that our acts are consequences of the past and the laws, over which we have no control, so we lack control over our acts.
Case for the claim. If determinism fixes a single future, then in a strong sense we could never have done otherwise, and free will seems to require alternative possibilities.
Compatibilist reply. Freedom is not the absence of causation but acting on one's own reasons free from compulsion (Hume, Frankfurt). Frankfurt cases, where an agent acts on their own reasons but could not have done otherwise because a neuroscientist stood ready to intervene, suggest responsibility does not require alternative possibilities, undercutting the incompatibilist premise.
Libertarian alternative and its cost. Libertarianism keeps incompatibilism but must answer the luck objection: an undetermined choice not fixed by the agent's reasons looks random, not free.
Judgement. Conclude with a defended position, for example that compatibilism dissolves the claim by redefining freedom plausibly, or that the deep desert we care about needs more than compatibilist freedom. Markers reward the consequence argument, the Frankfurt-case reply, the luck objection, and a reasoned conclusion.