The Problem of Evil (SACE Stage 2 Philosophy)

What this dot point is asking

You need to set out the logical and evidential problems precisely, explain the leading theodicies, and evaluate whether they succeed against each version.

The logical problem of evil

The logical problem claims a strict contradiction. J. L. Mackie set it out: God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good; a good being eliminates evil as far as it can; an omnipotent being can do anything logically possible; so if such a God existed there would be no evil. Yet evil exists. The theist therefore appears committed to an inconsistent set of beliefs.

The most influential reply is Alvin Plantinga's free will defence. Plantinga argues it is at least possible that God could not create a world containing morally significant free agents without allowing the possibility that they choose evil. If free will is a great good, and genuine freedom entails the possibility of wrongdoing, then God's allowing moral evil is compatible with perfect goodness. This is widely thought to defeat the strictly logical version, since it shows the beliefs are not formally contradictory, though it deals less easily with natural evils like disease and earthquakes.

The evidential problem of evil

Conceding that some evil might be logically compatible with God, the evidential problem argues that the actual quantity, intensity and apparent pointlessness of suffering count strongly against God's existence. William Rowe gives the example of a fawn burned in a forest fire, dying slowly and unobserved. Such suffering seems to serve no greater good. If there are gratuitous evils, evils an omnipotent good God would have no reason to permit, then God probably does not exist.

This version is harder to answer because it does not claim contradiction, only improbability. The theist cannot simply describe a possible justifying reason; they must make it plausible that no suffering is genuinely pointless, which is a heavy burden given cases like the fawn.

Theodicies

A theodicy tries to give God's actual reasons for permitting evil, going beyond the merely defensive claim that some reason is possible. The free will theodicy holds that a world of free creatures capable of love and virtue is more valuable than a world of automata, and that this good outweighs the evil free will makes possible. The soul-making theodicy, associated with John Hick and drawing on Irenaeus, holds that the world is a vale of soul-making: a challenging environment with real suffering is necessary for developing virtues such as courage, compassion and resilience that could not exist in a painless paradise.

The sceptical theist response takes a different tack, arguing that we are in no position to judge whether a given evil is pointless, since God's reasons may exceed our grasp. Critics reply that this undercuts ordinary moral reasoning and verges on making God's goodness empty.

Evaluation

The debate has shifted decisively from the logical to the evidential form. Most philosophers accept that Plantinga's free will defence shows there is no outright contradiction, so the logical problem is largely conceded. The evidential problem remains live: theodicies must make it credible that the staggering scale of suffering is not gratuitous, and critics charge that appeals to soul-making or unknown goods strain against cases of animal suffering and the deaths of children. A strong answer keeps the two versions sharply apart and judges each theodicy against the version it is meant to address.