The course and consequences of the Iraqi insurgency and sectarian civil war 2003 to 2008, including the Sunni insurgency, al-Qaeda in Iraq, the bombing of the al-Askari shrine, the Shia militias, the 2007 Surge, and the Sons of Iraq Awakening

What this dot point is asking

NESA expects you to explain why Iraq descended into insurgency and civil war after 2003 and how the violence was reduced. Strong answers integrate the immediate Sunni insurgency, the foreign jihadi escalation under Zarqawi, the al-Askari bombing as the inflection point, the 2006-07 sectarian civil war, the 2007 Surge, and the Anbar Awakening.

The answer

The roots of insurgency

The Coalition Provisional Authority's two May 2003 orders (de-Baathification on 16 May, dissolution of the army on 23 May) created the human raw material of the insurgency: around 30,000 senior Baath cadres without livelihoods and around 400,000 trained Iraqi soldiers without employment.

The first organised attacks began in May 2003. By June 2003 US troops were losing 1-2 personnel daily to IEDs and small-arms ambushes. The Sunni heartland in the "Sunni Triangle" (Falluja, Ramadi, Tikrit, Baquba) became contested.

The insurgent groups (2003-2005)

Former regime elements. Disbanded military, intelligence, and Baath Party cadres organised initially around the Saddam Fedayeen networks. Saddam's capture (13 December 2003) reduced this stream but did not end it.

Sunni nationalist Islamists. The Islamic Army in Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Ansar al-Sunna. Drew on tribal networks.

Foreign jihadis. The Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966-2006) had run a small group in Afghanistan and Iran. He moved to northern Iraq in 2002. His group pledged allegiance to bin Laden in October 2004 and renamed itself al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQI).

Shia militias. The Mahdi Army (Jaish al-Mahdi) under Moqtada al-Sadr, formed June 2003. The Badr Organization, connected to Iran. Active against Coalition forces from 2004 and against Sunnis from 2005.

Falluja, Abu Ghraib, and the escalation of 2004

Abu Ghraib (April 2004). Photographs of US military police abusing Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison appeared on 60 Minutes II on 28 April 2004 and in The New Yorker (Seymour Hersh) on 30 April. The images destroyed remaining US moral authority and became major recruiting material.

Falluja. On 31 March 2004 four Blackwater contractors were ambushed and killed in Falluja; their burnt bodies were hung from a bridge. The First Battle of Falluja (April 2004) was halted under Iraqi political pressure. The Second Battle of Falluja (Operation Phantom Fury, 7 November to 23 December 2004) cleared the city street by street.

Elections and the Maliki government

Three elections in 2005:

• 30 January 2005: Transitional National Assembly. Sunni boycott.
• 15 October 2005: Constitutional referendum.
• 15 December 2005: National Assembly.

Nouri al-Maliki (Dawa Party, Shia) became prime minister on 20 May 2006 after five months of deadlock.

The Zarqawi strategy

Zarqawi's "letter to bin Laden" (intercepted by Kurdish intelligence in January 2004) laid out the strategy: provoke the Shia into open warfare with the Sunni population.

Through 2004-2006 AQI executed the strategy. Suicide bombings of Shia markets, funerals, mosques, Ashura processions became routine. Beheading videos of Western hostages and Iraqi collaborators were posted online.

The al-Askari bombing and the civil war

On 22 February 2006 around 06:55 local time, AQI operatives in Iraqi National Guard uniforms detonated explosives in the golden dome of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra. The dome collapsed.

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf called for restraint but did not call off Shia retaliation. Within 24 hours Mahdi Army and other Shia militias attacked 184 Sunni mosques.

From February 2006 the violence escalated into open sectarian civil war. Monthly civilian deaths rose from around 1,000 (January 2006) to over 3,000 (July-October 2006). Mixed neighbourhoods were cleansed.

By late 2006 Iraq had crossed every standard threshold of civil war.

The Surge

The November 2006 US midterm elections were a Democratic landslide, partly on Iraq. Rumsfeld was replaced by Robert Gates on 8 November 2006. The Iraq Study Group recommended phased withdrawal. Bush rejected the recommendation and announced the opposite: a Surge.

In his 10 January 2007 address, Bush announced 20,000 additional combat troops for Baghdad and Anbar. General David Petraeus, principal author of Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations (December 2006), took command in Iraq on 10 February 2007.

The new doctrine emphasised population protection: dispersing US forces among Iraqi neighbourhoods (Joint Security Stations) rather than concentrating on large forward operating bases.

The Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq

The Sunni tribal turn against AQI began in late 2006 in Anbar. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha of the Albu Risha tribe founded the Anbar Salvation Council on 14 September 2006. AQI had alienated the tribes through brutality.

Petraeus formalised the arrangement. The Coalition paid local "Sons of Iraq" around 300 US dollars per month each to fight AQI. At peak around 100,000 Sons of Iraq operated. Sheikh Sattar was assassinated on 13 September 2007 but the movement continued.

Maliki's Shia-dominated government was suspicious; only around 20 per cent were absorbed into the army.

Zarqawi killed; Saddam executed

Zarqawi was killed by a US F-16 strike on a safehouse in Hibhib north of Baqubah on 7 June 2006. He was replaced by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, then Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (Islamic State of Iraq, October 2006), then Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (April 2010).

Saddam Hussein was tried for the al-Dujail killings. Convicted and sentenced to death on 5 November 2006. Saddam was hanged at Camp Justice in Baghdad on 30 December 2006 at 06:00 local time.

Violence falls

By spring 2008 monthly civilian deaths had fallen 80 per cent from the late-2006 peak. The combination of factors:

• The Surge concentrated force in Baghdad neighbourhoods.
• The Anbar Awakening removed AQI's base of operations.
• The 2006-07 sectarian cleansing had completed.
• Moqtada al-Sadr declared a Mahdi Army ceasefire on 29 August 2007.
• Iran encouraged its Shia clients to reduce attacks.

Timeline

Historiography

Thomas Ricks (Fiasco, 2006; The Gamble, 2009) is the standard military journalism.

Linda Robinson (Tell Me How This Ends, 2008) is the major Surge account.

Bing West (The Strongest Tribe, 2008) on the Anbar Awakening.

Ali Allawi (The Occupation of Iraq, 2007) is the leading Iraqi political scientist analysis.

Emma Sky (The Unraveling, 2015) is the British civilian adviser's account.

How to read a source on this topic

Sources commonly include the Abu Ghraib photos, the al-Askari dome before and after photos, the Sons of Iraq armband insignia, Petraeus's congressional testimony, and the Saddam execution video.

First, note the Maliki tension. The Shia-dominated government had different priorities from US counterinsurgency.

Second, weigh the Surge debate carefully. Critics argue the Surge was less important than the Awakening and the completion of sectarian cleansing.

Common exam traps

Treating insurgency as one movement. Sunni nationalist, AQI foreign jihadi, Shia militia, former regime: four distinct streams.

Crediting the Surge alone. The Awakening preceded the Surge by months and arguably mattered more.

Forgetting the displacement. Around 4.7 million Iraqis displaced by 2008.

In one sentence

The Iraqi insurgency began with the May 2003 CPA orders that disbanded the army and de-Baathified the state, escalated through the Falluja battles of 2004 and the foreign jihadi entry under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ignited into open sectarian civil war after AQI bombed the al-Askari shrine on 22 February 2006, peaked at around 3,000 civilian deaths per month in late 2006, and was brought under control through the combination of the Anbar Awakening from September 2006, the Surge under General David Petraeus from January 2007, the Sons of Iraq programme, the killings of Zarqawi (7 June 2006) and Saddam (30 December 2006), and the Sadr ceasefire of 29 August 2007.