What are former regime elements?

Disbanded military, intelligence, and Baath Party cadres organised initially around the Saddam Fedayeen networks. Saddam's capture (13 December 2003) reduced this stream but did not end it.

What are sunni nationalist Islamists?

The Islamic Army in Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Ansar al-Sunna. Drew on tribal networks.

What is foreign jihadis?

The Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966-2006) had run a small group in Afghanistan and Iran. He moved to northern Iraq in 2002. His group pledged allegiance to bin Laden in October 2004 and renamed itself al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQI).

What are shia militias?

The Mahdi Army (Jaish al-Mahdi) under Moqtada al-Sadr, formed June 2003. The Badr Organization, connected to Iran. Active against Coalition forces from 2004 and against Sunnis from 2005.

NESA Practice (NESA)-style practice: Account for the descent of Iraq into sectarian civil war between 2003 and 2007.

Needs thesis, dated evidence, conclusion. **Thesis.** Coalition occupation decisions created a Sunni insurgency, AQI under Zarqawi deliberately targeted Shia civilians, the al-Askari bombing broke the restraint, and Shia militias responded. **Initial insurgency (2003-2005).** Saddam loyalists, dispossessed army officers, and unemployed Sunnis began attacking from May 2003. The Falluja battles (April and November 2004) saw open Sunni resistance. Abu Ghraib photos (28 April 2004) fuelled recruitment. **Al-Qaeda in Iraq.** Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed AQI, pledging allegiance to bin Laden October 2004. His strategy targeted Shia civilians. **Elections.** 2005 elections boycotted by Sunni Arabs. The Shia UIA dominated; Maliki became PM May 2006. **Al-Askari bombing (22 February 2006).** AQI destroyed the golden dome of the al-Askari shrine. The bombing triggered open sectarian war. **Civil war (2006-2007).** Sunni death squads attacked Shia neighbourhoods; Shia militias (Jaish al-Mahdi, Badr Brigade) attacked Sunni neighbourhoods. Around 3,000 civilians killed per month at peak. **The Surge (January 2007).** Bush announced 20,000 additional troops 10 January 2007. Petraeus took command 10 February 2007. FM 3-24 emphasised population protection. **Sons of Iraq.** Anbar Awakening from late 2006. Coalition paid Sunni former insurgents to fight AQI. **Outcome.** Zarqawi killed 7 June 2006; Saddam executed 30 December 2006. By late 2008 civilian deaths down 80 per cent from peak. **Conclusion.** Occupation errors built the insurgency; Zarqawi escalated it; the Surge and the Awakening reduced it.

NESA Practice (NESA)-style practice: Explain the impact of the bombing of the al-Askari shrine in February 2006.

A 6-mark "explain" needs three or four developed impacts. **The shrine.** The al-Askari Mosque in Samarra contains the tombs of the tenth and eleventh Shia Imams (Ali al-Hadi and Hasan al-Askari) and is one of the four holiest Shia shrines. The golden dome (added 1905) was the city's landmark. **The attack.** On 22 February 2006 around 06:55 local time AQI operatives wearing Iraqi National Guard uniforms entered the shrine, planted explosives in the dome, and detonated them remotely. The dome collapsed. No deaths but extraordinary symbolic damage. **Immediate response.** Within 24 hours Shia mobs and Mahdi Army militiamen attacked 184 Sunni mosques, killed around 165 Sunni clerics and worshippers, and burnt Sunni businesses. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for restraint but his authority was tested. **Long impact.** Open sectarian war followed: monthly civilian deaths rose from around 1,000 (January 2006) to 3,000 (July-August 2006). Mixed neighbourhoods were cleansed. Around 2.5 million Iraqis became displaced. The bombing was the deliberate Zarqawi success in starting the war he had planned. Markers reward 22 February 2006, the destruction of the dome (not the mosque), and the Sistani restraint test.

§-Syllabus dot point

NSWModern HistorySyllabus dot point

Why did Iraq descend into insurgency and sectarian civil war after 2003 and how was the violence eventually brought under control?

The course and consequences of the Iraqi insurgency and sectarian civil war 2003 to 2008, including the Sunni insurgency, al-Qaeda in Iraq, the bombing of the al-Askari shrine, the Shia militias, the 2007 Surge, and the Sons of Iraq Awakening

A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf dot point on the Iraqi insurgency. The Sunni insurgency from 2003, al-Qaeda in Iraq under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al-Askari shrine bombing of 22 February 2006, the sectarian civil war 2006-2007, the Surge under General David Petraeus, the Sons of Iraq Awakening, and the violence reduction by 2008.

Generated by Claude Opus 4.89 min answerUpdated 2026-06-26

Reviewed by: AI editorial process; not yet individually human-reviewed

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What this dot point is asking

NESA expects you to explain why Iraq descended into insurgency and civil war after 2003 and how the violence was reduced. Strong answers integrate the immediate Sunni insurgency, the foreign jihadi escalation under Zarqawi, the al-Askari bombing as the inflection point, the 2006-07 sectarian civil war, the 2007 Surge, and the Anbar Awakening.

In plain English

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 it quickly toppled Saddam Hussein, but then made two decisions that backfired badly. It sacked everyone who had run the old government and disbanded the entire army, suddenly leaving hundreds of thousands of trained, armed men jobless and angry - most of them from Iraq's Sunni minority. Many of them started shooting back. Think of a company that fires its whole security team overnight and is then shocked when those people know exactly how to break in.

Into this mess came a Jordanian extremist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, with a cold plan: deliberately mass-murder Iraq's Shia majority until the two communities tore each other apart. His big moment came in February 2006 when his group blew the golden dome off one of the holiest Shia shrines. After that, Sunnis and Shia killed each other nightly across Baghdad - a full civil war - with thousands dying every month. The Americans eventually calmed it by doing three things at once: flooding Baghdad with extra troops who lived among the people ("the Surge"), paying former Sunni fighters to switch sides and hunt the extremists ("the Awakening"), and getting lucky when a powerful Shia militia leader called a ceasefire. By 2008 the killing had dropped by about 80 per cent.

The must-know spine

The insurgency grew from CPA Order 1 (de-Baathification, 16 May 2003) and Order 2 (army dissolution, 23 May 2003), which left around 30,000 Baath cadres and 400,000 soldiers dispossessed. Four streams fought: former regime elements, Sunni nationalist Islamists, foreign jihadis (AQI under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi), and Shia militias (the Mahdi Army and Badr). AQI's destruction of the al-Askari shrine dome on 22 February 2006 ignited the sectarian civil war; civilian deaths peaked above 3,000 a month in late 2006. Violence fell around 80 per cent by spring 2008 through the Anbar Awakening (from September 2006), the Surge under General David Petraeus (announced 10 January 2007), the Sons of Iraq, the killing of Zarqawi (7 June 2006), and Sadr's Mahdi Army ceasefire (29 August 2007).

The answer

The roots of insurgency

The Coalition Provisional Authority's two May 2003 orders (de-Baathification on 16 May, dissolution of the army on 23 May) created the human raw material of the insurgency: around 30,000 senior Baath cadres without livelihoods and around 400,000 trained Iraqi soldiers without employment.

The first organised attacks began in May 2003. By June 2003 US troops were losing 1-2 personnel daily to IEDs and small-arms ambushes. The Sunni heartland in the "Sunni Triangle" (Falluja, Ramadi, Tikrit, Baquba) became contested.

The insurgent groups (2003-2005)

Former regime elements: Disbanded military, intelligence, and Baath Party cadres organised initially around the Saddam Fedayeen networks. Saddam's capture (13 December 2003) reduced this stream but did not end it.
Sunni nationalist Islamists: The Islamic Army in Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Ansar al-Sunna. Drew on tribal networks.
Foreign jihadis: The Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966-2006) had run a small group in Afghanistan and Iran. He moved to northern Iraq in 2002. His group pledged allegiance to bin Laden in October 2004 and renamed itself al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQI).
Shia militias: The Mahdi Army (Jaish al-Mahdi) under Moqtada al-Sadr, formed June 2003. The Badr Organization, connected to Iran. Active against Coalition forces from 2004 and against Sunnis from 2005.

Falluja, Abu Ghraib, and the escalation of 2004

Abu Ghraib (April 2004). Photographs of US military police abusing Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison appeared on 60 Minutes II on 28 April 2004 and in The New Yorker (Seymour Hersh) on 30 April. The images destroyed remaining US moral authority and became major recruiting material.

Falluja. On 31 March 2004 four Blackwater contractors were ambushed and killed in Falluja; their burnt bodies were hung from a bridge. The First Battle of Falluja (April 2004) was halted under Iraqi political pressure. The Second Battle of Falluja (Operation Phantom Fury, 7 November to 23 December 2004) cleared the city street by street.

Elections and the Maliki government

Three elections in 2005:

30 January 2005: Transitional National Assembly. Sunni boycott.
15 October 2005: Constitutional referendum.
15 December 2005: National Assembly.

Nouri al-Maliki (Dawa Party, Shia) became prime minister on 20 May 2006 after five months of deadlock.

The Zarqawi strategy

Zarqawi's "letter to bin Laden" (intercepted by Kurdish intelligence in January 2004) laid out the strategy: provoke the Shia into open warfare with the Sunni population.

Through 2004-2006 AQI executed the strategy. Suicide bombings of Shia markets, funerals, mosques, Ashura processions became routine. Beheading videos of Western hostages and Iraqi collaborators were posted online.

The al-Askari bombing and the civil war

On 22 February 2006 around 06:55 local time, AQI operatives in Iraqi National Guard uniforms detonated explosives in the golden dome of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra. The dome collapsed.

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf called for restraint but did not call off Shia retaliation. Within 24 hours Mahdi Army and other Shia militias attacked 184 Sunni mosques.

From February 2006 the violence escalated into open sectarian civil war. Monthly civilian deaths rose from around 1,000 (January 2006) to over 3,000 (July-October 2006). Mixed neighbourhoods were cleansed.

By late 2006 Iraq had crossed every standard threshold of civil war.

The Surge

The November 2006 US midterm elections were a Democratic landslide, partly on Iraq. Rumsfeld was replaced by Robert Gates on 8 November 2006. The Iraq Study Group recommended phased withdrawal. Bush rejected the recommendation and announced the opposite: a Surge.

In his 10 January 2007 address, Bush announced 20,000 additional combat troops for Baghdad and Anbar. General David Petraeus, principal author of Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations (December 2006), took command in Iraq on 10 February 2007.

The new doctrine emphasised population protection: dispersing US forces among Iraqi neighbourhoods (Joint Security Stations) rather than concentrating on large forward operating bases.

The Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq

The Sunni tribal turn against AQI began in late 2006 in Anbar. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha of the Albu Risha tribe founded the Anbar Salvation Council on 14 September 2006. AQI had alienated the tribes through brutality.

Petraeus formalised the arrangement. The Coalition paid local "Sons of Iraq" around 300 US dollars per month each to fight AQI. At peak around 100,000 Sons of Iraq operated. Sheikh Sattar was assassinated on 13 September 2007 but the movement continued.

Maliki's Shia-dominated government was suspicious; only around 20 per cent were absorbed into the army.

Zarqawi killed; Saddam executed

Zarqawi was killed by a US F-16 strike on a safehouse in Hibhib north of Baqubah on 7 June 2006. He was replaced by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, then Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (Islamic State of Iraq, October 2006), then Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (April 2010).

Saddam Hussein was tried for the al-Dujail killings. Convicted and sentenced to death on 5 November 2006. Saddam was hanged at Camp Justice in Baghdad on 30 December 2006 at 06:00 local time.

Violence falls

By spring 2008 monthly civilian deaths had fallen 80 per cent from the late-2006 peak. The combination of factors:

The Surge concentrated force in Baghdad neighbourhoods.
The Anbar Awakening removed AQI's base of operations.
The 2006-07 sectarian cleansing had completed.
Moqtada al-Sadr declared a Mahdi Army ceasefire on 29 August 2007.
Iran encouraged its Shia clients to reduce attacks.

Timeline

Date	Event	Significance
16 May 2003	CPA Order 1	De-Baathification
23 May 2003	CPA Order 2	Army disbanded
31 Mar 2004	Blackwater killings, Falluja	Escalation
28 Apr 2004	Abu Ghraib photos	Moral collapse
7 Nov 2004	Second Falluja begins	Major combat
30 Jan 2005	National elections	Sunni boycott
22 Feb 2006	al-Askari bombing	Civil war begins
7 June 2006	Zarqawi killed	AQI leader gone
30 Dec 2006	Saddam executed	Regime ended
10 Jan 2007	Surge announced	Strategy shift
10 Feb 2007	Petraeus takes command	New doctrine
13 Sep 2007	Sheikh Sattar killed	Awakening tested
29 Aug 2007	Sadr ceasefire	Shia restraint

Historiography

Thomas Ricks (Fiasco, 2006; The Gamble, 2009) is the standard military journalism.

Linda Robinson (Tell Me How This Ends, 2008) is the major Surge account.

Bing West (The Strongest Tribe, 2008) on the Anbar Awakening.

Ali Allawi (The Occupation of Iraq, 2007) is the leading Iraqi political scientist analysis.

Emma Sky (The Unraveling, 2015) is the British civilian adviser's account.

The historiographical tension to deploy. The central debate is what reduced the violence by 2008. Linda Robinson and the official US Army history (Joel Rayburn and Frank Sobchak, The US Army in the Iraq War, 2019) credit the Surge's operational shift to population-centric counterinsurgency. Against them, Emma Sky - writing from inside the command as adviser to General Odierno - argues that the Anbar Awakening was the decisive turn and that the Surge reinforced rather than caused it. Toby Dodge (Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, 2012) sharpens the challenge further: he attributes the lull less to troops than to the near-completion of sectarian cleansing and a hollow political settlement, warning that the calm rested on unresolved sectarian authoritarianism. Set Robinson and Rayburn (the Surge worked) against Sky and Dodge (the Surge reinforced an Awakening, atop a cleansing that had run its course), then judge.

How to read a source on this topic

Sources commonly include the Abu Ghraib photos, the al-Askari dome before and after photos, the Sons of Iraq armband insignia, Petraeus's congressional testimony, and the Saddam execution video.

First, note the Maliki tension. The Shia-dominated government had different priorities from US counterinsurgency.

Second, weigh the Surge debate carefully. Critics argue the Surge was less important than the Awakening and the completion of sectarian cleansing.

Model exam responses

A. Source response (5 marks). Source: a US counterinsurgency officer's 2006 field report describing nightly reciprocal killings across mixed Baghdad districts after the al-Askari bombing, with infiltrated Iraqi police taking part rather than stopping it. Assess its usefulness for a historian studying the descent into civil war.

The source is a 2006 first-hand operational report by a US officer, so its purpose is professional assessment rather than persuasion, which makes it useful evidence of conditions on the ground. It is valuable for showing the mechanics of the civil war that followed the al-Askari bombing of 22 February 2006: organised reciprocal killing (Shia militias against Sunnis, Sunni death squads against Shia) and a security force so infiltrated it joined the violence rather than restraining it. Corroborated by own knowledge - the 184 Sunni mosques attacked within 24 hours, monthly civilian deaths rising from around 1,000 in January 2006 to over 3,000 by mid-year, and the cleansing of mixed neighbourhoods - it is strong evidence that the bombing converted an anti-occupation insurgency into community-against-community war. Its limitation is perspective: a single American officer sees the symptoms of collapse but not the deeper political causes (the May 2003 CPA orders, Maliki's exclusionary government), so it is useful for the "how" of the descent more than the "why."

Marker's note: a top response states origin and purpose, separates what the source is useful FOR (the mechanics of the civil war) from its limitation (one perspective, symptoms not causes), anchors this in dated own knowledge, and ends in a judgement rather than describing the extract.

B. Essay paragraph (from a 25-mark response on whether the Surge was responsible for reducing violence by 2008).

The strongest check on crediting the Surge alone is the timing of the Anbar Awakening, which came first. The Sunni tribal revolt against al-Qaeda in Iraq had begun in late 2006, formalised when Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha founded the Anbar Salvation Council on 14 September 2006 - months before Bush announced the Surge on 10 January 2007. AQI's own brutality, not American troops, drove the tribes to switch sides; General Petraeus then formalised the turn by paying around 100,000 "Sons of Iraq" roughly 300 US dollars a month to fight their former allies, draining AQI of the Sunni base from which it had operated. Reinforced by Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army ceasefire of 29 August 2007, monthly civilian deaths fell around 80 per cent by spring 2008. As Emma Sky argues from inside the command, the Awakening was the decisive shift that Surge resources reinforced rather than caused; Linda Robinson, by contrast, credits the operational change to population-centric counterinsurgency. The evidence of sequence favours Sky: the Surge amplified a turnaround it did not originate.

Marker's note: the paragraph argues a single proposition (the Surge reinforced an Awakening it did not start), supports it with dated specifics, and sets two historians in genuine tension rather than name-dropping them. Sustained argument plus historiography is what lifts a paragraph into Band 6.

Command words and weaving historiography

Read the verb first. "Account for" and "Explain" want CAUSES set out and linked, not a story; "To what extent / Evaluate" want a JUDGEMENT that RANKS the factors and defends a thesis; "Assess the usefulness/reliability" of a source wants ORIGIN, MOTIVE and PERSPECTIVE, then a verdict. For source questions, run O-M-P-U: Origin, Motive, Perspective, then Usefulness/limitation. On this topic, the marks come from separating the four insurgent streams (former regime, Sunni nationalist, AQI, Shia militia) and from refusing to credit the Surge alone: weave the historians as a clash - the Surge worked (Robinson, Rayburn and Sobchak) versus the Surge reinforced an Awakening atop a completed cleansing (Sky, Dodge) - then say which carries more weight and why. One historian used in genuine tension beats five name-dropped.

Exam-style practice questions

Practice questions written in the style of NESA exam questions on this dot point, with worked answer explainers. The year tag is the paper they imitate, not the source.

Practice (NESA)15 marksAccount for the descent of Iraq into sectarian civil war between 2003 and 2007.

Show worked answer →

Needs thesis, dated evidence, conclusion.

Thesis: Coalition occupation decisions created a Sunni insurgency, AQI under Zarqawi deliberately targeted Shia civilians, the al-Askari bombing broke the restraint, and Shia militias responded.
Initial insurgency (2003-2005): Saddam loyalists, dispossessed army officers, and unemployed Sunnis began attacking from May 2003. The Falluja battles (April and November 2004) saw open Sunni resistance. Abu Ghraib photos (28 April 2004) fuelled recruitment.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed AQI, pledging allegiance to bin Laden October 2004. His strategy targeted Shia civilians.
Elections: 2005 elections boycotted by Sunni Arabs. The Shia UIA dominated; Maliki became PM May 2006.
Al-Askari bombing (22 February 2006): AQI destroyed the golden dome of the al-Askari shrine. The bombing triggered open sectarian war.
Civil war (2006-2007): Sunni death squads attacked Shia neighbourhoods; Shia militias (Jaish al-Mahdi, Badr Brigade) attacked Sunni neighbourhoods. Around 3,000 civilians killed per month at peak.
The Surge (January 2007): Bush announced 20,000 additional troops 10 January 2007. Petraeus took command 10 February 2007. FM 3-24 emphasised population protection.
Sons of Iraq: Anbar Awakening from late 2006. Coalition paid Sunni former insurgents to fight AQI.
Outcome: Zarqawi killed 7 June 2006; Saddam executed 30 December 2006. By late 2008 civilian deaths down 80 per cent from peak.
Conclusion: Occupation errors built the insurgency; Zarqawi escalated it; the Surge and the Awakening reduced it.

Practice (NESA)6 marksExplain the impact of the bombing of the al-Askari shrine in February 2006.

Show worked answer →

A 6-mark "explain" needs three or four developed impacts.

The shrine: The al-Askari Mosque in Samarra contains the tombs of the tenth and eleventh Shia Imams (Ali al-Hadi and Hasan al-Askari) and is one of the four holiest Shia shrines. The golden dome (added 1905) was the city's landmark.
The attack: On 22 February 2006 around 06:55 local time AQI operatives wearing Iraqi National Guard uniforms entered the shrine, planted explosives in the dome, and detonated them remotely. The dome collapsed. No deaths but extraordinary symbolic damage.
Immediate response: Within 24 hours Shia mobs and Mahdi Army militiamen attacked 184 Sunni mosques, killed around 165 Sunni clerics and worshippers, and burnt Sunni businesses. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for restraint but his authority was tested.
Long impact: Open sectarian war followed: monthly civilian deaths rose from around 1,000 (January 2006) to 3,000 (July-August 2006). Mixed neighbourhoods were cleansed. Around 2.5 million Iraqis became displaced. The bombing was the deliberate Zarqawi success in starting the war he had planned. Markers reward 22 February 2006, the destruction of the dome (not the mosque), and the Sistani restraint test.

Practice questions

Original practice questions graded from foundation to exam level, each with a full worked solution. Try them before revealing the solution.

foundation3 marksOutline how the two May 2003 Coalition Provisional Authority orders contributed to the Iraqi insurgency.

Show worked solution →

A 3-mark "outline" wants the two orders dated, plus their effect.

CPA Order 1 (16 May 2003): De-Baathification stripped around 30,000 senior Baath Party members of their posts and livelihoods, removing the experienced administrators who ran the state.
CPA Order 2 (23 May 2003): Dissolving the Iraqi army threw around 400,000 trained, armed and now unemployed soldiers onto the street, many in the Sunni heartland.
The effect: Together the orders created the human raw material of the insurgency: tens of thousands of dispossessed, militarily trained Sunnis with grievance, weapons skills and no stake in the new order. Attacks began from May 2003.
Marking criteria: 1 mark each for correctly dating and describing the two orders; 1 mark for linking them to insurgent recruitment.

foundation4 marksExplain the strategy of al-Qaeda in Iraq under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Show worked solution →

A 4-mark "explain" needs the strategy stated, its method, and its purpose.

The aim: Zarqawi (1966-2006), a Jordanian jihadi whose group pledged allegiance to bin Laden in October 2004, sought to ignite an all-out Sunni-Shia civil war and prevent any stable Iraqi state from forming.
The method: AQI mounted suicide bombings of Shia markets, mosques, funerals and Ashura processions, and posted beheading videos of hostages, to terrorise and provoke.
The evidence: His intercepted "letter to bin Laden" (January 2004) set out the plan; its clearest execution was the al-Askari shrine bombing of 22 February 2006, which triggered the civil war he had sought.
Marking criteria: 1 mark for the provocation-of-civil-war aim; 1 mark for the targeting of Shia civilians; 1 mark for dated evidence (the letter and/or al-Askari); 1 mark for linking the strategy to the 2006 outcome.

core5 marksSource A (paraphrased, owned): A 2006 report by an American counterinsurgency officer describes how, after the destruction of the al-Askari dome, Shia militiamen and Sunni death squads carried out nightly killings across mixed Baghdad districts, while Iraqi police units, themselves infiltrated by militia, took part rather than stopping it. Using Source A and your own knowledge, explain how the al-Askari bombing turned the insurgency into a sectarian civil war. [5 marks]

Show worked solution →

A 5-mark "explain ... using the source" wants the source decoded, then linked to own knowledge.

Decode the source: Source A captures the post-22 February 2006 collapse: organised reciprocal killing (Shia militias against Sunnis, Sunni death squads against Shia) and a security force so infiltrated it joined in rather than restraining the violence. This is the mechanics of a civil war, not an insurgency against an occupier.
Own knowledge: AQI destroyed the golden dome of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra on 22 February 2006; within 24 hours Shia militias attacked 184 Sunni mosques, and Sistani's call for restraint could not hold. Monthly civilian deaths rose from around 1,000 (January 2006) to over 3,000 (mid-to-late 2006), and mixed neighbourhoods were ethnically cleansed.
The judgement: The bombing converted scattered anti-Coalition attacks into reciprocal community-against-community killing - exactly the war Zarqawi had planned to provoke.
Marking criteria: 1 mark for reading the source as reciprocal sectarian killing with compromised security forces; 1-2 marks for own knowledge (22 February 2006, the 184 mosques, the death-toll rise); 1 mark for the Zarqawi-strategy link; 1 mark for the judgement that it crossed into civil war.

core6 marksExplain how the Anbar Awakening and the 2007 Surge worked together to reduce violence in Iraq.

Show worked solution →

A 6-mark "explain" wants both elements developed and the interaction shown.

The Anbar Awakening (from late 2006): AQI's brutality alienated the Sunni tribes of Anbar. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha founded the Anbar Salvation Council on 14 September 2006, turning former insurgents against AQI. Petraeus formalised this as the "Sons of Iraq": around 100,000 paid roughly 300 US dollars a month to fight AQI.
The Surge (from January 2007): Bush announced around 20,000 extra troops on 10 January 2007; Petraeus took command on 10 February 2007 and applied Field Manual 3-24, dispersing forces into neighbourhood Joint Security Stations to protect the population.
The interaction: The Awakening stripped AQI of its Sunni base and gave the Surge local partners; the Surge supplied the troops and money that protected and sustained the Awakening. Reinforced by Sadr's 29 August 2007 Mahdi Army ceasefire, monthly civilian deaths fell around 80 per cent by spring 2008.
Marking criteria: 1-2 marks for the Awakening (Abu Risha, Sons of Iraq); 1-2 marks for the Surge (troops, Petraeus, FM 3-24, JSS); 1-2 marks for showing they reinforced each other and citing the violence reduction.

exam25 marksEvaluate the extent to which the 2007 Surge was responsible for the reduction of violence in Iraq by 2008.

Show worked solution →

This is an extended-response/essay. Markers reward a sustained, evidence-based argument that ranks the Surge against the other factors and weaves in historiography - not a narrative.

Band-6 PLAN

Thesis. The Surge was a necessary but not the sole cause of the 2008 fall in violence: its population-centric troops mattered, but they reinforced an Anbar Awakening already underway, a Sadrist ceasefire and a sectarian cleansing that had largely run its course. The Surge was the amplifier, not the origin, of the turnaround.
Argument 1 - The case for the Surge. Around 20,000 extra troops (announced 10 January 2007), Petraeus's command from 10 February 2007 and FM 3-24's Joint Security Stations dispersed force into Baghdad's neighbourhoods and protected the population. Evidence: violence in secured districts fell sharply through 2007.
Argument 2 - The Awakening came first. The Anbar Awakening began in late 2006 under Sheikh Abu Risha (Anbar Salvation Council, 14 September 2006), before the Surge, and the Sons of Iraq (around 100,000) stripped AQI of its Sunni base. The Surge resourced and extended a turn it did not start.
Argument 3 - The other decisive factors. Sadr's Mahdi Army ceasefire (29 August 2007) cut Shia attacks; the 2006-07 sectarian cleansing had already separated communities, removing the mixed neighbourhoods that fuelled killing; Iran restrained its clients. Violence fell where there was little left to fight over.
Historiography. Linda Robinson (Tell Me How This Ends, 2008) and the official US Army history (Rayburn and Sobchak, 2019) credit the Surge's operational shift; Emma Sky (The Unraveling, 2015), adviser to General Odierno, argues the Awakening was decisive and the Surge reinforced it; Toby Dodge (2012) stresses that the cleansing and a hollow political settlement, not the troops, explain the lull.
Judgement. The Surge ranks among the leading proximate causes but was effective only in combination with the Awakening, the Sadr ceasefire and the completed cleansing. Important - yes; sufficient on its own - no.

MODEL PARAGRAPH (Argument 2)

The strongest check on crediting the Surge alone is the timing of the Anbar Awakening, which preceded it. The Sunni tribal revolt against al-Qaeda in Iraq had begun in late 2006, formalised when Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha founded the Anbar Salvation Council on 14 September 2006 - months before Bush announced the Surge on 10 January 2007. AQI's own brutality, not American troops, drove the tribes to switch sides; Petraeus then formalised the turn by paying around 100,000 "Sons of Iraq" roughly 300 US dollars a month to fight their former allies, draining AQI of the Sunni base from which it had operated. The Surge supplied the troops and money that protected and sustained this realignment, but it did not create it. As Emma Sky argues from inside the command, the Awakening was the decisive shift that Surge resources reinforced rather than caused - which is why attributing the 2008 calm to the Surge alone misreads the sequence of events.

Marker's note. A band-6 response keeps "to what extent" in view throughout, ranking the Surge against the Awakening, the Sadr ceasefire and the completed cleansing rather than narrating 2007; anchors every claim in dated evidence; sets historians in genuine tension (Robinson/Rayburn crediting the Surge versus Sky and Dodge qualifying it); and reaches a graded judgement. Crediting the Surge alone, or simply listing factors, caps the response in the middle bands.

exam25 marksTo what extent were Coalition decisions, rather than sectarian divisions within Iraq, responsible for the descent into civil war between 2003 and 2007?

Show worked solution →

This is an extended-response/essay. Markers reward a sustained, evidence-based argument that weighs the two factors directly and weaves in historiography - not a narrative.

Band-6 PLAN

Thesis. Coalition decisions did not invent Iraq's sectarian fault lines, but they removed the state that had contained them and created the conditions in which Zarqawi could detonate them; agency lay primarily with occupation choices, with sectarian division as the accelerant they released.
Argument 1 - Coalition decisions as the trigger. CPA Order 1 (de-Baathification, 16 May 2003) and Order 2 (army dissolution, 23 May 2003) created around 30,000 dispossessed cadres and 400,000 unemployed soldiers, and the failure to secure the country let an insurgency take root from May 2003. The occupation built the insurgency's manpower and grievance.
Argument 2 - Sectarian division as the accelerant. Iraq's Sunni-Shia and Sunni-Kurd divisions long predated 2003, sharpened by Saddam's Sunni-minority rule. AQI under Zarqawi deliberately weaponised them - the al-Askari bombing (22 February 2006) and the reciprocal militia killings show the divisions were real and combustible.
Argument 3 - The interaction. The two are not rivals: Coalition decisions dismantled the coercive state that had suppressed sectarian conflict, and a deliberate jihadi strategy then ignited it. Maliki's exclusionary Shia government deepened the split the occupation had exposed.
Historiography. Thomas Ricks (Fiasco, 2006) and Ali Allawi (The Occupation of Iraq, 2007) emphasise catastrophic occupation decisions; Toby Dodge (2012) stresses the structural fragility of the Iraqi state and sectarian authoritarianism; Emma Sky (2015) highlights how political exclusion under Maliki turned division into war.
Judgement. Coalition decisions were the principal proximate cause - they removed the lid - but they mattered precisely because deep sectarian divisions were there to be released. Primary responsibility lies with occupation choices, with sectarianism as the charge they lit.

MODEL PARAGRAPH (Argument 1)

The clearest evidence that Coalition decisions, not pre-existing hatreds alone, triggered the descent into war lies in the two Coalition Provisional Authority orders of May 2003. Order 1 (16 May) imposed sweeping de-Baathification, stripping around 30,000 senior party members of their posts and the state of its experienced administrators; Order 2 (23 May) dissolved the Iraqi army, discharging around 400,000 trained and armed soldiers - many of them Sunnis from the heartland - into unemployment and humiliation. Within weeks, attacks on Coalition forces began, and by June 2003 US troops were losing personnel daily to IEDs and ambushes. As Thomas Ricks argues in Fiasco, these were self-inflicted wounds that manufactured the insurgency's manpower and grievance, while Ali Allawi shows how dismantling the state left a vacuum into which sectarian actors moved. The divisions were old, but it was the occupation's choices that armed them and gave them a cause.

Marker's note. A band-6 response keeps both factors in tension throughout - weighing Coalition agency against structural sectarianism rather than asserting one - anchors claims in dated specifics (the May 2003 orders, the al-Askari bombing), deploys historians who genuinely differ (Ricks/Allawi on occupation error versus Dodge on structural fragility), and reaches a judgement. Narrating 2003 to 2007 without weighing the two causes caps the response in the middle bands.