Quick questions on US withdrawal from Iraq 2011: HSC Modern History Conflict in the Gulf

By 2008 the political conditions for US troop presence in Iraq had changed. The Surge had reduced violence; Maliki's Shia-dominated government was increasingly confident; Iraqi public opinion strongly opposed continued occupation. The UN mandate was due to expire on 31 December 2008.

Barack Obama had opposed the Iraq war from October 2002 ("a dumb war") and made withdrawal a central campaign promise. His 27 February 2009 address at Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base laid out the plan:

By 2011 both administrations had reason to extend the SOFA. The Iraqi army was nowhere near able to provide its own air defence, train its own pilots, or conduct serious counterterrorism without US support.

The US footprint had been drawn down through 2011 from around 50,000 troops at the start of the year to around 6,000 by late November.

Direct US costs. - 4,491 US military killed in Iraq. - 32,226 US military wounded in action. - Direct appropriations: around 800 billion US dollars.

The Iraq the US left in December 2011 was a fragile state.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized Mosul on 10 June 2014 and Tikrit on 11 June. By August 2014 ISIL controlled a third of Iraqi territory and was attempting Yazidi genocide at Sinjar. US Special Forces returned to Iraq on 26 June 2014; Operation Inherent Resolve began airstrikes on 8 August 2014.

Michael Gordon (The Endgame, 2012) is the standard journalism on the 2007-2011 endgame.

Three key provisions: - US combat forces would leave Iraqi cities, villages, and localities by 30 June 2009. - All US forces would leave all Iraqi territory by 31 December 2011. - US forces would be subject to Iraqi jurisdiction for major felonies committed off-duty and off-base.

Maliki's Shia-dominated government had marginalised Sunni Arab political participation. Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi was charged with terrorism on 19 December 2011, the day after the US withdrawal; he fled to Turkey. The Sons of Iraq were not integrated into the army as promised.

Maliki replaced competent professional officers with loyalists. The Iraqi army that would face the Islamic State in 2014 was nominally large but corruption-riddled and incompetent.

Iran had been the silent winner of the 2003 war. The Maliki government included parties with deep Iranian ties.

The Kurdish Regional Government in the north exercised effective sovereignty.

Iraqi oil production had recovered to 2.7 million barrels per day by late 2011 (above 2002 levels).

The 2008 SOFA committed both administrations.