Examine the period of detente (1969 to 1979), including the SALT I and SALT II treaties, the Helsinki Accords (1975), Nixon's opening to China (1972), and the eventual breakdown of detente by the end of the 1970s

What this dot point is asking

QCAA wants you to examine the period of detente between approximately 1969 (Nixon's election) and 1979 (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan): the arms-control treaties (SALT I, SALT II, ABM), the political opening to China, the Helsinki Accords, and the underlying continuities and tensions that produced the breakdown.

The answer

Detente (French for "relaxation") was the period of reduced tensions and increased cooperation between the superpowers in the 1970s. It produced major arms-control agreements, a triangular reshaping of Cold War diplomacy through US-China rapprochement, and human-rights commitments at Helsinki. But it did not end the underlying conflict, was contested at the time, and broke down by 1979.

Background and causes

By 1969 several factors made detente attractive:

• Nuclear parity. USSR had reached approximate strategic parity with USA. Both sides faced the risk of unconstrained arms racing.
• Economic strain. USA was funding Vietnam, the Great Society, and the arms race. USSR was approaching limits of its centrally-planned economy.
• Sino-Soviet split. Border clashes between USSR and China (1969 at Damansky Island). The USSR feared a two-front confrontation; the USA saw an opportunity for triangular diplomacy.
• Domestic pressure. US anti-war movement and Cold War fatigue.
• Personalities. Nixon (President 1969-1974) and Kissinger (National Security Adviser, then Secretary of State) believed in realpolitik diplomacy. Brezhnev (General Secretary 1964-1982) was more cautious than Khrushchev.

Nixon's opening to China (1971-1972)

The Sino-Soviet split and Mao's interest in countering Soviet power created an opening:

• Ping-pong diplomacy (April 1971). US table tennis team invited to China.
• Kissinger's secret visit (July 1971). Set up Nixon's visit.
• Nixon's visit (February 21-28, 1972). Met Mao and Zhou Enlai. The Shanghai Communique acknowledged "one China" while leaving Taiwan's status ambiguous. Trade and cultural exchange began.
• Strategic effect. The USSR was now flanked diplomatically. Brezhnev was pressured to engage with the USA, partly to prevent a closer US-China relationship.

China was not seated at the UN until October 1971 (replacing Taiwan in the China seat). Full diplomatic relations with the USA came in 1979.

The SALT agreements

SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, signed May 26, 1972). Negotiated in Helsinki and Vienna 1969-1972. Two components:

1. Interim Agreement. Froze the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers at existing levels for 5 years.
2. ABM Treaty (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). Limited each side to two (later one) anti-missile defence sites. The treaty stabilised Mutual Assured Destruction by preventing a defensive arms race that would have undermined deterrence.

SALT I did not limit MIRVs (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles), which proved a major loophole. Both sides MIRVed their existing missiles, multiplying warheads while keeping launcher numbers constant.

SALT II (signed June 18, 1979, never ratified by US Senate). Carter-Brezhnev. Set ceilings on missile launchers and addressed MIRVs. The Senate did not ratify SALT II because of conservative opposition and, decisively, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979). Both sides nonetheless observed its terms informally for several years.

The Helsinki Accords (August 1, 1975)

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE) produced the Helsinki Final Act, signed by 35 states including the USA, USSR, and all European states except Albania. Three "baskets":

1. Security in Europe. Recognition of post-war European borders (a Soviet diplomatic goal since 1945; this acknowledged the legitimacy of the postwar settlement).
2. Cooperation in economic, scientific, technological, and environmental fields.
3. Cooperation in humanitarian fields. Human rights, freer movement of people and information.

The third basket was a Soviet concession. It seemed at the time relatively minor (the USSR was confident it could ignore the commitments). But the Helsinki human-rights provisions empowered Eastern European and Soviet dissidents (Helsinki Watch groups, including what became Human Rights Watch), provided rhetorical leverage for Western governments, and contributed to the eventual delegitimisation of the communist regimes.

Continued superpower competition

Detente did not end the Cold War. Both sides continued to compete in regions where direct conflict was not at issue:

Africa. Soviet/Cuban support for Marxist movements in Angola (from 1975) and Ethiopia (from 1977). The USA supported anti-communist forces (UNITA in Angola, Somalia against Ethiopia).

Middle East. USA supported Israel; USSR backed Arab states. The 1973 Yom Kippur War was a Cold War crisis: USSR threatened intervention; USA placed nuclear forces on DEFCON 3.

Vietnam. US withdrew (Paris Accords 1973), then South Vietnam fell (April 1975). The USSR's ally won; the US "Vietnam syndrome" took hold.

Latin America. US-backed military coup in Chile (1973) installed Pinochet, replacing the elected socialist Allende.

The breakdown of detente (1977-1979)

Several factors converged:

Carter's human-rights focus (1977 onwards). Carter's emphasis on human rights challenged Soviet sensitivities. Sakharov, Helsinki Watch dissidents, and Jewish refusniks became diplomatic flashpoints.

Soviet activism in Africa. US politicians criticised detente as one-sided when Soviet/Cuban forces supported Marxist movements.

SALT II opposition. Conservative critics ("Committee on the Present Danger", 1976) argued the treaty disadvantaged the USA. Carter struggled to gain Senate support.

Iranian Revolution (1979). The Shah, a US ally, was overthrown by Khomeini. The USA lost a key Middle East ally. The US embassy in Tehran was seized (November 1979); 52 American hostages held for 444 days.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 25, 1979). Soviet troops crossed into Afghanistan to support a faltering communist government. Carter described it as "the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War". The invasion ended detente.

Carter's response

Carter (President 1977-1981) responded to Afghanistan with:

• Withdrawal of SALT II from Senate consideration.
• Grain embargo against the USSR.
• Boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics (USA and 65 other nations).
• Increased defence spending.
• Carter Doctrine (January 1980): the USA would use military force to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf.

The "second Cold War" had begun.

Historiography

Liberal / detente-supportive. Detente was substantively valuable. SALT I and II prevented unconstrained arms racing. Helsinki Accords contributed to the eventual end of the Cold War through human-rights pressure. The breakdown was unavoidable given Soviet behaviour but did not invalidate the gains.

Conservative / detente-critical. Detente was a strategic mistake that allowed the USSR to gain advantage. The "myth of equivalence" obscured Soviet expansionism. SALT II was unverifiable and disadvantaged the USA. Reagan's later confrontational approach was vindicated.

Post-Cold War (1990s onwards). Detente was a transitional period that locked in nuclear stability and laid groundwork for the eventual end of the Cold War through human-rights mechanisms. Its breakdown reflected specific Soviet decisions (Afghanistan, African activism) rather than inherent flaws.

In one sentence

Detente (1969-1979) was the period of reduced Cold War tensions characterised by the SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979, unratified) arms-control agreements, the ABM Treaty (1972) stabilising mutual deterrence, Nixon's opening to China (1972) creating triangular diplomacy, and the Helsinki Accords (1975) trading European border recognition for human-rights commitments; it did not end the underlying superpower rivalry and was definitively ended by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) and Carter's reactive measures.