The Reformasi period 1998 to 2004, including Habibie's openings, the 1999 election, the Wahid and Megawati presidencies, constitutional amendments, decentralisation, and the limits of democratisation

A 10-mark "assess" needs a judgement and four developed points with named historians.

Thesis

Reformasi transformed Indonesian institutions: four constitutional amendments dismantled dwifungsi and centralised presidential power, decentralisation devolved authority to over 400 regencies, three free elections were held, and the army was returned to barracks. But corruption persisted, military impunity for 1965 to 1999 violence was not addressed, and ethnic and religious conflicts (Ambon, Poso, Aceh) ran in parallel.

Habibie's openings

Habibie (May 1998 to October 1999) freed political prisoners, lifted press licensing, legalised parties, called the East Timor referendum, and held the 7 June 1999 election.

The 1999 election

Forty-eight parties contested. PDI-P (Megawati) 33.7 per cent; GOLKAR 22.4; PKB (Wahid) 12.6; PPP 10.7. The MPR elected Wahid President on 20 October 1999.

Wahid presidency

Wahid (October 1999 to July 2001) abolished Information and Social Affairs ministries, lifted the ban on Chinese culture (Keppres 6/2000), and reduced the army's political role. The MPR impeached him on 23 July 2001.

Megawati presidency

Megawati (July 2001 to October 2004) presided over the third and fourth constitutional amendments abolishing TNI seats, introducing direct presidential elections, and creating a Constitutional Court.

Decentralisation

UU 22/1999 and UU 25/1999 devolved authority from 1 January 2001 to over 400 regencies.

Limits

Around 1.4 million displaced in communal conflicts. The 2002 Bali bombing exposed Jemaah Islamiyah. Few New Order figures were prosecuted.

A 3-mark "outline" wants three distinct, correctly dated reforms in a sentence each.

Press freedom

The press licensing system (SIUPP) was revoked on 5 June 1998, ending New Order censorship and allowing new papers, magazines, and broadcasters.

Political parties

UU 2/1999 ended the three-party restriction, so 48 parties could contest the 7 June 1999 election - the first free poll since 1955.

Self-determination

Habibie offered East Timor a referendum on 27 January 1999, held on 30 August 1999, leading to independence.

Marking criteria

1 mark each for three distinct, correctly dated reforms (press, parties/election, East Timor, or the release of political prisoners). Do not simply narrate Suharto's fall.

A 4-mark "explain" needs a cause-and-effect chain with specific, dated detail.

First and second amendments (October 1999, August 2000)

Limited the president to two five-year terms, strengthened the DPR's lawmaking role, and entrenched a human-rights chapter.

Third amendment (November 2001)

Restructured the MPR, abolished the reserved seats for "functional groups," and introduced direct election of the president.

Fourth amendment (August 2002)

Abolished the reserved TNI seats in the DPR (from 2004), created the Constitutional Court (operational 2003), and constitutionalised regional autonomy.

The effect

Together they converted a personalist presidency into a term-limited, popularly elected office checked by an independent court - the institutional core of the new democracy.

Marking criteria

1 mark for the term limit/DPR strengthening; 1 mark for direct presidential election; 1 mark for the abolition of TNI seats and the Constitutional Court; 1 mark for linking the changes to democratic transformation.

A 5-mark "explain ... using the source" wants the source decoded, then linked to own knowledge.

Decode the source

It describes the MPR's choice on 20 to 21 October 1999: PDI-P had won the popular vote (33.7 per cent) but lacked an MPR majority, so a coalition elected Wahid (PKB) president and Megawati vice-president, defusing PDI-P street protests.

Own knowledge

The 7 June 1999 election was the first free poll since 1955, with 48 parties and 93.3 per cent turnout. Because the president was still chosen indirectly by the MPR (direct election did not arrive until the 2002 amendment), the largest party could be outmanoeuvred by a coalition of GOLKAR, PKB, and Islamic parties (the "Central Axis").

The point

The outcome shows Reformasi democracy working through bargaining, not yet through a direct popular mandate - the very gap the constitutional amendments would close.

Marking criteria

1 mark for reading the source as the indirect MPR election of Wahid; 1-2 marks for own knowledge (vote shares, turnout, indirect election, Central Axis); 1 mark for the Megawati vice-presidency/protests link; 1 mark for connecting the indirect system to the later reform.

A 5-mark "assess the usefulness" rewards origin/perspective plus own knowledge, ending in a judgement.

Perspective

Source B is the "pacted transition" reading associated with Edward Aspinall (Opposing Suharto, 2005) - useful because it explains why sweeping institutional reform coexisted with deep continuity of personnel and impunity.

Corroboration

It fits the record: there were no trials for the 1965 to 1966 killings, the May 1998 violence, or the Trisakti shootings; Suharto was deemed too ill to try in 2000; and New Order figures such as Akbar Tanjung and the GOLKAR machine returned to power within the new institutions.

Limitation

By stressing elite continuity it can understate genuine change - four constitutional amendments, free elections, an independent Constitutional Court, and the army's removal from parliament. Marcus Mietzner (Money, Power, and Ideology, 2013) reads the same patronage networks as a source of democratic resilience, not just impunity.

Judgement

Highly useful for explaining the limits and the impunity, but it must be weighed against the real institutional transformation; the truth is that Reformasi changed the rules far more than it changed the players.

Marking criteria

1 mark for identifying the pacted-transition perspective; 1-2 marks for own knowledge on impunity/continuity; 1 mark for a limitation (real institutional change; Mietzner's counter-reading); 1 mark for a judgement on usefulness.

This is an extended-response/essay. Markers reward a sustained, evidence-based argument that keeps "to what extent" in view and weaves in historiography - not a narrative.

Band-6 PLAN

• Thesis. Reformasi transformed the formal architecture of Indonesian politics - free elections, term limits, an independent court, devolved authority, the army out of parliament - but the transformation was institutional rather than substantive: the same elites survived, impunity persisted, and "money politics" rebuilt itself inside the new rules. The system changed far more than the people who ran it.
• Argument 1 - The scale of institutional change (the case for "to a great extent"). Four constitutional amendments (1999 to 2002) introduced direct presidential election, two-term limits, a human-rights chapter, and the Constitutional Court (2003); three free elections were held (1999, 2004); and the reserved TNI seats were abolished from 2004. Evidence: PDI-P 33.7 per cent in 1999; the 20 September 2004 direct presidential runoff.
• Argument 2 - Decentralisation as genuine but double-edged reform. UU 22/1999 and UU 25/1999 devolved authority and roughly 30 per cent of revenue to over 400 regencies from 1 January 2001, binding the resource-rich Outer Islands to the Republic. But it also localised corruption and bred regional "money politics" and a proliferation of new regencies.
• Argument 3 - The limits (the case against full transformation). No trials for 1965 to 1966, the May 1998 violence, or East Timor; Suharto never tried; New Order figures returned within GOLKAR; communal conflicts (Ambon, Poso) displaced around 1.4 million; the 2002 Bali bombing exposed Jemaah Islamiyah.
• Historiography. Edward Aspinall (Opposing Suharto, 2005) reads Reformasi as a "pacted transition" that shielded old elites; Vedi Hadiz (Localising Power, 2010) argues decentralisation entrenched local oligarchs; Marcus Mietzner (Money, Power, and Ideology, 2013) counters that patronage networks rebuilding inside the institutions made the democracy resilient rather than hollow.
• Judgement. Weigh Aspinall and Hadiz (continuity and capture) against Mietzner (resilient consolidation): the formal transformation was real and largely irreversible, but its substance was limited by elite survival and impunity. Transformed institutionally - yes; transformed in who holds power - only partly.

MODEL PARAGRAPH (Argument 3)

The clearest measure of Reformasi's limits is what it chose not to touch. For all the constitutional machinery built between 1999 and 2002, no government prosecuted the killings of 1965 to 1966, the May 1998 riots, the Trisakti shootings, or the army's conduct in East Timor; Suharto himself, shielded by claims of ill-health, was never brought to trial before his death. Old New Order networks reassembled inside the new institutions - GOLKAR survived the 1999 vote at 22.4 per cent and figures such as Akbar Tanjung remained central - while communal violence in Ambon and Poso and the 2002 Bali bombing showed that the state's monopoly on order remained incomplete. As Edward Aspinall argues, the transition was "pacted": the very elites who had run the New Order helped write the new rules and wrote themselves an exit from accountability. Marcus Mietzner reads the same survival more optimistically, as patronage networks adapting to and so stabilising democracy; but on the question of justice and impunity, the limits are unmistakable. Reformasi rebuilt the rules of Indonesian politics without dismantling the people who had broken the old ones.

Marker's note. A band-6 response keeps "to what extent" in view throughout - explicitly weighing institutional transformation against the limits rather than narrating the three presidencies - anchors every claim in dated evidence, sets at least two historians in genuine tension (Aspinall/Hadiz capture vs Mietzner resilience), and reaches a graded judgement. Narrating Habibie-Wahid-Megawati in sequence without arguing degree caps the response in the middle bands.

This is an extended-response/essay. Markers reward a ranked, evidence-based judgement that weighs TNI reform against the other Reformasi achievements and weaves in historiography - not a narrative.

Band-6 PLAN

• Thesis. Removing the military from formal political power was a major and durable achievement, but it was not the single most important: it mattered chiefly because it was locked in by the wider constitutional settlement and the free elections that gave civilian institutions their legitimacy. TNI reform was a pillar; the electoral-constitutional framework was the foundation.
• Argument 1 - The case for TNI reform as most important. Dwifungsi - the army's institutionalised "dual function" - had underpinned 32 years of New Order rule. Its dismantling was concrete: TNI and POLRI separated (April 1999); dwifungsi formally abolished (2000); reserved DPR seats cut from 75 to 38 and then abolished from 2004; active officers barred from civilian posts. Without this, civilian democracy was reversible.
• Argument 2 - Why the electoral-constitutional reforms rank higher. The army's removal was secured by the third and fourth amendments and ratified by elected bodies; it was an output of the constitutional settlement (term limits, direct presidential election, the Constitutional Court) and the free elections of 1999 and 2004, not an independent achievement. Remove those and TNI reform would have lacked any guarantor.
• Argument 3 - The qualifications. Territorial command structures (KODAM to KORAMIL) survived, preserving the army's reach into local life; impunity for military violence (1965, East Timor, May 1998) was untouched; and "money politics" gave informal power to many old actors. The removal was formal more than total.
• Historiography. Marcus Mietzner (Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 2009) is the authority on the army's managed retreat and argues civilian supremacy was real but incomplete; Edward Aspinall frames the whole transition as "pacted," with the military's exit negotiated on terms that protected it from accountability; Adrian Vickers (A History of Modern Indonesia, 2013) stresses the contrast between political opening and persistent communal violence the army still policed.
• Judgement. TNI reform was indispensable and ranks among the top two achievements, but it depended on, and was secured by, the electoral and constitutional framework; the most important achievement was the institutional settlement that made the army's removal stick. Most important - a strong contender, but second to the constitutional-electoral foundation.

MODEL PARAGRAPH (Argument 2)

The removal of the military from parliament was decisive, but it is better understood as the product of Reformasi's constitutional settlement than as its independent crown. The reserved TNI seats were abolished not by fiat but by the fourth constitutional amendment of August 2002, passed by an MPR that the free 1999 election had legitimised, and they expired with the 2004 election that the third amendment had made directly presidential. In other words, the army left politics because elected, constitutionally grounded institutions told it to and could make the order stick - the term limits, the independent Constitutional Court inaugurated in 2003, and the popular mandate of a directly elected president. Marcus Mietzner shows that this was a managed retreat the military accepted partly on its own terms, which is precisely why the civilian framework mattered: only a legitimate elected order could hold the line. Strip away the amendments and the elections and the abolition of TNI seats would have been a paper concession a future strongman could reverse; embedded in them, it became durable.

Marker's note. A band-6 response ranks the achievement against the others rather than describing TNI reform alone, sustains the judgement (most important vs a leading contender), anchors claims in dated specifics, and uses at least two historians in genuine tension (Mietzner's managed-but-real retreat vs Aspinall's pacted exit). Listing achievements without weighing them caps the response in the middle bands.