The policy of Vietnamisation, the expansion of the war into Cambodia and Laos, the role of Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the Easter Offensive and Linebacker bombings of 1972, and the Paris Peace Accords of January 1973

What this dot point is asking

NESA expects you to explain Vietnamisation, the geographic expansion of the war into Cambodia and Laos, the diplomatic process led by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the 1972 Easter Offensive, the Linebacker air campaigns, and the terms and significance of the Paris Peace Accords of 27 January 1973.

The answer

Nixon's strategy

Richard Nixon was inaugurated on 20 January 1969. The administration adopted a four-track strategy. First, Vietnamisation: build up the ARVN and progressively withdraw US ground forces. Second, negotiation through Henry Kissinger's back-channel to Le Duc Tho in Paris. Third, escalated coercion through bombing and incursions to weaken DRV bargaining position. Fourth, linkage to Soviet and Chinese diplomacy (the SALT process, the February 1972 Beijing visit, the May 1972 Moscow visit).

The Nixon Doctrine, articulated at Guam on 25 July 1969, generalised the strategy: allies would provide the manpower for their own defence, with US support but not US ground combat. The "silent majority" speech of 3 November 1969 framed it for the home audience.

Vietnamisation

The ARVN expanded to around 1.1 million by 1972. The US transferred around one million M-16 rifles, around 2,000 M-48 tanks and M-113 APCs, around 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft, and around 600 helicopters. ARVN officer schools, NCO academies, and logistics commands expanded.

US troop levels fell from 549,500 (April 1969) to 334,600 (end 1970), 156,800 (end 1971), 24,200 (end 1972), and effectively zero by 29 March 1973. US combat fatalities fell from around 11,000 in 1969 to fewer than 300 in 1972. Operation Phoenix (run by CORDS and the CIA from 1967) targeted the NLF political infrastructure, with around 26,000 killed and 28,000 captured by 1972.

The Cambodian and Laotian operations were tests of the policy. Lam Son 719 (8 February to 25 March 1971), an ARVN operation into Laos to cut the Trail at Tchepone, was a chaotic ARVN withdrawal under PAVN counter-attack. The ARVN took around 50 per cent casualties; the operation exposed serious limitations.

The expansion into Cambodia

Cambodia, under King Norodom Sihanouk's neutralist regime, had tolerated PAVN sanctuaries on its eastern border. Nixon authorised Operation Menu, the secret bombing of those sanctuaries, on 18 March 1969; the campaign ran to 26 May 1970, dropping around 110,000 tonnes on Cambodian territory. The bombing was disclosed when The New York Times published it (9 May 1969).

On 18 March 1970, while Sihanouk was abroad, General Lon Nol overthrew him in a coup; Sihanouk allied with the Khmer Rouge. On 30 April 1970 Nixon announced the Cambodian incursion: around 50,000 US and 50,000 ARVN troops crossed the border into the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak. US ground forces withdrew by 29 June 1970 under the Cooper-Church Amendment.

The incursion captured arms and supplies but failed to find COSVN headquarters; it triggered the campus protests (Kent State, 4 May 1970), drove PAVN deeper into Cambodia, and accelerated the Khmer Rouge's rural insurgency.

The Easter Offensive 1972

PAVN launched the Nguyen Hue Offensive on 30 March 1972 with around 14 divisions and Soviet-supplied T-54 tanks. Three axes: across the DMZ into Quang Tri; from Laos into Kontum; from Cambodia into Binh Long (An Loc).

Quang Tri City fell to PAVN on 1 May. An Loc held against a siege; Kontum held. ARVN performance was mixed; US air power was decisive, with B-52 strikes hitting PAVN concentrations.

Operation Linebacker I (10 May to 23 October 1972) mined Haiphong harbour and bombed lines of communication in the north. Around 155,000 tonnes were dropped, including the first major use of precision-guided "smart" bombs (the Thanh Hoa railway bridge, after years of inconclusive strikes, was destroyed on 13 May 1972).

PAVN lost around 100,000 killed but held substantial new territory in Quang Tri, the Central Highlands, and Binh Long.

The Paris negotiations

The Paris peace talks had opened on 13 May 1968. The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho back channel began on 4 August 1969. The substantive negotiation ran from May 1971 onwards. Sticking points: the continued PAVN presence in the south (Hanoi insisted), the political future of Thieu (Hanoi demanded his removal), the demilitarised zone (the US insisted).

A breakthrough came in October 1972. Hanoi dropped the demand for Thieu's removal; the US accepted PAVN forces remaining in the south. Kissinger announced "peace is at hand" on 26 October 1972. President Thieu, presented with the draft, objected to the PAVN presence and demanded 69 changes.

Nixon, re-elected on 7 November 1972, sent Kissinger back. Negotiations broke down on 13 December 1972. Operation Linebacker II (the "Christmas Bombing") ran from 18 to 29 December 1972: 729 B-52 sorties dropped around 15,000 tonnes on Hanoi and Haiphong, with around 1,600 civilians killed; 15 B-52s were lost.

Negotiations resumed on 8 January 1973. The Paris Peace Accords were signed on 27 January 1973.

The terms of the Accords

• Ceasefire in place at 0800 GMT, 28 January 1973.
• US withdrawal of all remaining ground forces within 60 days.
• Return of prisoners of war (Operation Homecoming, around 591 US POWs released by 1 April 1973).
• PAVN forces in the south were permitted to remain.
• An International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS, Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland) to monitor.
• A Council of National Reconciliation and Concord (representing the GVN, PRG, and Third Force) to organise elections.

The Accords gave Nixon "peace with honour" and won Kissinger and Le Duc Tho the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize (Le Duc Tho declined).

The secret commitment and the aftermath

Nixon privately assured President Thieu in letters (October 1972 and 14 January 1973) that the US would respond "with full force" to any major DRV violation. The commitment was never publicly disclosed.

The War Powers Resolution (7 November 1973, over Nixon's veto) limited the President's ability to commit forces. Watergate consumed the administration; Nixon resigned on 9 August 1974. Congress reduced military aid to South Vietnam from $2.27 billion (FY1973) to$700 million (FY1975). The promise to enforce the Accords was impossible to keep.

PAVN built up forces in the south in 1973 and 1974 under the cover of the ceasefire. ARVN, short of fuel, spare parts, and air support, weakened. The final offensive launched in March 1975.

Historiography

Jeffrey Kimball (Nixon's Vietnam War, 1998) on the strategy.

Pierre Asselin (A Bitter Peace, 2002) on Hanoi's negotiating posture.

Larry Berman (No Peace, No Honor, 2001) argues Nixon and Kissinger knew the Accords would not hold and intended to use B-52s to enforce them, blocked by Watergate.

Stephen Randolph (Powerful and Brutal Weapons, 2007) is the standard on the Easter Offensive and Linebacker.

Common exam traps

Treating Vietnamisation as a failure on its own terms. Its limited objective (US disengagement) was achieved; the broader objective (a viable South Vietnam) was not.

Misdating the Accords. 27 January 1973, signed in Paris.

Forgetting the Christmas Bombing. Linebacker II of 18 to 29 December 1972 brought Hanoi back to the table.

In one sentence

Vietnamisation and the Paris peace process, run from June 1969 to January 1973 by Nixon and Kissinger against Le Duc Tho through the Cambodian incursion of 1970, Lam Son 719 of 1971, the Easter Offensive and Linebacker I of 1972, the Linebacker II "Christmas Bombing" of 18 to 29 December 1972, and the Paris Peace Accords signed on 27 January 1973, achieved a face-saving US withdrawal but, in leaving PAVN forces in the south and being unenforced after Watergate, set up the collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975.