← Section III (Peace and Conflict): Conflict in Indochina 1954-1979
How was the war conducted by the United States and its allies from 1965 to 1968?
The nature and conduct of the war from 1965 to 1968, including the strategies of attrition and search and destroy, the use of air power and Operation Rolling Thunder, the role of Australia and other allies, and the experience of combatants and civilians
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Indochina dot point on the conduct of the war. Westmoreland's attrition and search and destroy, the body count, Operation Rolling Thunder, the use of helicopters, napalm and Agent Orange, the role of Australia at Long Tan and Phuoc Tuy, the experience of US conscripts and Vietnamese civilians.
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What this dot point is asking
NESA expects you to describe the conduct of the war from US escalation to Tet. Strong answers cover Westmoreland's strategy of attrition and search and destroy, the air war over the north, the role of allies (especially Australia in Phuoc Tuy), the technology of helicopter mobility and chemical defoliation, and the human experience on both sides.
The answer
The US strategy
General William Westmoreland, MACV commander from June 1964, adopted attrition. The goal was to inflict casualties on PAVN (the People's Army of Vietnam, also known as NVA) and PLAF until the "crossover point" at which losses exceeded replacements. The body count was the metric; battles were rated by kill ratios. The strategy assumed a conventional, Korean-style war.
Search and destroy operations sent battalion- and brigade-strength forces by helicopter into enemy base areas. Operations Cedar Falls (8 to 26 January 1967, Iron Triangle, around 30,000 US troops) and Junction City (22 February to 14 May 1967, War Zone C, around 35,000 US troops) were the largest. PAVN units typically withdrew across the Cambodian border into the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak; the operations returned strategic ground to the enemy.
Pacification, the political-civic side, was handled by CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) from May 1967 under Robert Komer. CORDS achieved limited rural improvements; from 1968 the Phoenix Program targeted the NLF infrastructure (around 26,000 killed by 1972).
Operation Rolling Thunder
Rolling Thunder ran from 2 March 1965 to 1 November 1968. The campaign delivered around 864,000 tonnes of bombs on the north (more than US bomb tonnage on Germany in the Second World War). Targets were graduated, controlled from Washington Tuesday lunch meetings; major targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, the dyke system, and the Sino-Vietnamese border buffer were off-limits for much of the war.
The campaign failed to halt the flow of supplies south. The POL campaign of mid-1966 destroyed around 70 per cent of north Vietnamese oil storage; PRC and Soviet imports compensated. The MiG-21s and SAM-2s introduced from 1966 imposed serious losses (around 990 US fixed-wing aircraft lost to all causes over the north, 1965 to 1968). Around 30,000 north Vietnamese civilians were killed by the bombing.
Helicopters, chemicals, and the war on the ground
The Bell UH-1 Iroquois ("Huey") provided air mobility on a scale never before seen. The 1st Cavalry Division (airmobile) deployed in 1965; the Ia Drang campaign of October to November 1965 was the first major air-mobile battle. Around 12,000 US helicopters operated in country; around 5,000 were lost.
Operation Ranch Hand (1962 to 1971) sprayed around 20 million gallons of defoliants, including around 11 million gallons of Agent Orange (dioxin-contaminated 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D). Around 12 per cent of South Vietnam, including 50 per cent of Mekong Delta mangrove, was defoliated. Long-term health effects on Vietnamese civilians, US veterans, and Australian veterans included birth defects and cancers; class-action settlements followed in the 1980s.
Napalm and white phosphorus were used extensively in close air support. Free fire zones declared whole areas hostile and authorised unrestricted fire. Around five million southerners were displaced; rural Vietnam emptied into city slums.
The role of Australia and other allies
Australia entered the war on 29 April 1965 under the Menzies government, citing the SEATO treaty. The Royal Australian Regiment served in Bien Hoa from 1965; from June 1966 the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) operated from Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy Province. Peak strength was around 8,500 personnel.
The Battle of Long Tan on 18 August 1966 saw D Company 6RAR (108 men) hold off a regimental-strength PAVN/PLAF assault in a rubber plantation. 18 Australians and around 245 PAVN/PLAF were killed. Australian doctrine emphasised foot patrolling, ambush, and engagement with the local population; Phuoc Tuy was held relatively secure throughout the deployment.
Around 60,000 Australians served. 521 died; around 3,000 were wounded. Conscription via the National Service Act (24 November 1964) was a major domestic political issue; the Moratorium marches of 1970 and 1971 mobilised an estimated 200,000 in Melbourne.
Other allies: South Korea (peak around 50,000 troops, including Tiger Division and Capital Division, brutal counter-insurgency reputation, around 5,000 killed); Thailand (around 11,000); the Philippines (around 2,000 civic action); New Zealand (around 550, attached to 1ATF). South Vietnam mobilised the ARVN to around 1.1 million by 1968 with mixed quality.
The experience of combatants
US ground troops were 25 per cent draftees overall but 88 per cent of infantry by 1969. The one-year tour rotation produced units with constantly changing personnel; the 13-month tour of officers was shorter still. Around 2.7 million Americans served. 58,220 died; around 304,000 were wounded. Combat fatigue, drug abuse, and "fragging" (attacks on officers) escalated towards the end. African Americans were over-represented in combat infantry and casualties (around 12.5 per cent of the population, around 14.1 per cent of fatalities to 1969).
PAVN/PLAF combatants endured the Trail, US bombing, and chronic supply shortages. Total Vietnamese military deaths (north and south combined, including NLF and ARVN) exceeded 1.1 million.
The civilian experience
Around two million Vietnamese civilians died across the war. The My Lai massacre, 16 March 1968, saw Charlie Company, 1st Battalion 20th Infantry, kill around 504 unarmed villagers in Son My village in Quang Ngai. The cover-up unravelled in 1969 (Seymour Hersh's reporting). Only Lt William Calley was convicted (29 March 1971, life imprisonment, paroled 1974).
The war emptied the countryside. Saigon's population grew from around 1.4 million in 1954 to around 4 million by 1975. Refugees, prostitution, and a black-market economy reshaped urban life.
Historiography
Andrew Krepinevich (The Army and Vietnam, 1986) argues the conventional Army misapplied a big-unit doctrine to a counter-insurgency war.
Lewis Sorley (A Better War, 1999) argues Creighton Abrams from 1968 onwards adopted a winning pacification approach and the war was lost politically at home.
Christian Appy (Working-Class War, 1993) on the class composition of the US infantry.
Heather Marie Stur on Australian and US gender, race, and rear-echelon dynamics.
Common exam traps
Treating attrition as a strategy that worked. Hanoi sustained the losses; the political defeat came from the bombing failing to break the will.
Missing the Australian dimension. Long Tan, Phuoc Tuy, conscription, and the Moratoriums are part of the NESA Australian engagement.
Misdating My Lai. 16 March 1968, the day after Hue was cleared in Tet's late phase.
In one sentence
US strategy in Indochina from 1965 to 1968 combined attrition and search and destroy on the ground, Operation Rolling Thunder in the air, and pacification through CORDS, with allies including Australia (Phuoc Tuy, Long Tan 18 August 1966) and South Korea, but neither air power nor body counts nor defoliation could break the will of the DRV, and the My Lai massacre of 16 March 1968 and the Tet Offensive that followed broke American public support for the war.
Past exam questions, worked
Real questions from past NESA papers on this dot point, with our answer explainer.
Practice (NESA)15 marksAssess the effectiveness of United States military strategy in Indochina from 1965 to 1968.Show worked answer →
Needs a clear judgment, dated evidence, and analysis across strategies.
Thesis. US military strategy from 1965 to 1968 inflicted huge damage on the enemy but failed to achieve its political objective, because attrition could not break Hanoi's will, air power could not interdict the Trail, and search and destroy alienated the rural population.
Attrition. Westmoreland's strategy assumed a "crossover point" at which PAVN/PLAF losses would exceed replacements. The Order of Battle dispute (1967) showed CIA estimates (around 600,000) suppressed by MACV in favour of lower figures (around 300,000). The body count corrupted units.
Search and destroy. Cedar Falls (Iron Triangle, January 1967) and Junction City (War Zone C, February to May 1967) inserted divisions into base areas; PAVN withdrew across the border. Around 5 million South Vietnamese were displaced by 1968.
Rolling Thunder. Around 864,000 tonnes dropped on the north from March 1965 to October 1968, more than the European theatre in WWII. The POL campaign of 1966 destroyed 70 per cent of north Vietnamese oil storage; PRC and Soviet imports replaced it.
Civilian experience. Around 2 million Vietnamese civilians died across the war. Operation Ranch Hand sprayed around 20 million gallons of defoliants from 1962 to 1971. The My Lai massacre (16 March 1968) killed around 504 civilians.
Tet and the verdict. Tet was a military victory for MACV but a political defeat. Cronkite's broadcast of 27 February 1968 called it a stalemate; Johnson on 31 March 1968 stopped Rolling Thunder above the 20th parallel and withdrew from the race.
Markers reward My Lai, the body count critique, and the political verdict.
Related dot points
- The reasons for and nature of United States involvement, including the policy of containment, the domino theory, the Gulf of Tonkin incident and Resolution of August 1964, and the deployment of ground troops from 1965
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Indochina dot point on US escalation. The policy of containment, the domino theory under Eisenhower, the Kennedy advisers, the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of 2 and 4 August 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, the Pleiku attack and Operation Rolling Thunder of February 1965, and the Marine landing at Da Nang on 8 March 1965.
- The Tet Offensive of January to March 1968, including the planning by the DRV and the NLF, the attacks on Saigon and Hue, the response of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam, and the political and strategic consequences
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Indochina dot point on the Tet Offensive. Le Duan's planning, the attacks of 30 to 31 January 1968 across more than 100 cities and bases, the embassy raid in Saigon, the battle for Hue from 31 January to 25 February 1968, Khe Sanh, the military defeat of the PLAF, Walter Cronkite's broadcast, and Johnson's 31 March 1968 speech.
- The anti-war movement in the United States and Australia, the role of the media, including television coverage of the war and the publication of the Pentagon Papers, the Moratorium movement, and the impact of events such as the Kent State shootings
A focused answer to the HSC Modern History Indochina dot point on the anti-war movement and the media. The Students for a Democratic Society, the March on the Pentagon, the Moratorium marches in Washington and Melbourne, conscription resistance, Kent State on 4 May 1970, the Pentagon Papers in 1971, and television's transformation of war reporting.