The peace treaties that ended World War I, including the Treaty of Versailles, and the impact of these settlements on Germany and on the post-war international order

A 4-mark "outline" needs three to four geographical changes with brief consequence.

Germany (Treaty of Versailles, June 1919)

Alsace and Lorraine returned to France. The Polish Corridor and Danzig (a Free City under League administration) divided East Prussia from Germany. The Saar was placed under League administration for 15 years. North Schleswig was returned to Denmark. All overseas colonies were redistributed as League mandates. Germany lost around 13 per cent of its territory and 6.5 million inhabitants.

Austria-Hungary (Treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon)

The empire was dismembered. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland were created or expanded. Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory. The Anschluss with Germany was forbidden.

Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Sevres, 1920, replaced by Lausanne 1923)

The empire was dismembered. Britain and France took League mandates in the Middle East (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon).

Wider consequence

New states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) emerged. Ethnic minorities (Germans in Czechoslovakia, Hungarians in Romania) were trapped in new borders and became the grievance basis for revisionist nationalism.

Markers reward specific countries, treaty names, and at least one wider consequence.

A 10-mark extended response needs a clear thesis, three to four developed paragraphs, and sustained historiography.

Thesis

The Treaty of Versailles created severe grievances that nationalist movements could exploit, but it did not make war inevitable. The collapse of collective security in the 1930s and the deliberate choices of Hitler were the decisive factors.

The grievance case

Article 231, reparations, territorial losses, and military restrictions humiliated Germany. Hitler campaigned explicitly to overturn the treaty. The Rhineland (1936), Anschluss (1938), and Sudetenland (1938) were all framed as undoing Versailles.

The counter-case

Margaret MacMillan (Peacemakers, 2001) and Sally Marks argue the treaty was harsh but workable. Germany was not dismembered. By 1925 (Locarno) and 1926 (League membership) Germany was being reintegrated. The Dawes Plan (1924) and Young Plan (1929) eased reparations.

Depression and political collapse

The Great Depression, not Versailles, destroyed the Weimar Republic. Unemployment hit 6 million by 1932. Nazi vote share rose from 2.6 per cent (1928) to 37.4 per cent (July 1932). The treaty was the rhetorical weapon, not the underlying cause.

Hitler's agency

Richard Overy emphasises Hitler's ideological drive for Lebensraum, racial war, and destruction of the USSR. A.J.P. Taylor's revisionist view (Origins of the Second World War, 1961) that Hitler was an opportunist has been largely rejected.

Conclusion

The Treaty created the grievance; the Depression and Hitler created the war.

Award 1 mark per term where the term is correctly stated AND a consequence is named. Any three of the five main areas earn full marks.

Article 231 - the War Guilt Clause (1 mark)

Germany accepted sole responsibility for causing the war. Impact: it was the legal basis for reparations and the rhetorical hook for the "stab in the back" (Dolchstosslegende) myth used against the Weimar Republic.

Reparations (1 mark)

Set at 132 billion gold marks by the London Schedule (May 1921). Impact: a German default led to the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (January 1923), which triggered hyperinflation.

Territorial loss (1 mark)

Germany lost around 13 per cent of its territory and 6.5 million people - Alsace and Lorraine to France, the Polish Corridor and Danzig splitting off East Prussia, the Saar under League control for 15 years, and all colonies as League mandates. Impact: trapped German minorities became a grievance for later revisionism.

Other acceptable terms: the 100,000-man army cap and demilitarisation of the Rhineland; the creation of the League of Nations (which excluded Germany until 1926). A term with no stated impact scores half; a vague "Germany was punished" with no specific term scores nothing.

1 mark - definition. A Diktat is a "dictated peace": Germany was not invited to the Paris negotiations and was presented with the finished terms to sign on 28 June 1919 under threat of renewed war, with no chance to negotiate.

1 mark - why it was powerful. It let nationalists argue the treaty had no moral legitimacy because it was imposed, not agreed. This fed the attack on the "November Criminals" - the Weimar politicians who signed - and the Dolchstosslegende, weakening the new republic from birth.

A complete answer notes the legal counter-point (Germany did in the end sign), but the 2 marks are for the definition plus one reason it mattered.

A 5-mark "using Source A and your own knowledge, explain" rewards (i) reading the source's perspective and message, (ii) at least one supporting quote/feature, and (iii) own-knowledge corroboration.

Read the source (about 2 marks)

The cartoon's perspective is critical of the settlement. The weeping child labelled "1940 Class" is the message: the children being born in 1919 will be the soldiers of a future war. The caption ("I seem to hear a child weeping") is bitter irony - the peacemakers are walking away satisfied while a new war is already foreseeable. The origin (a British paper, 1919, the moment of signing) makes it evidence of contemporary British anxiety, not of what actually caused 1939.

Own knowledge (about 2 marks)

This pessimism matched John Maynard Keynes, who resigned from the British delegation and in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) called the settlement a "Carthaginian peace" that would impoverish Germany. The grievance terms - Article 231, 132 billion gold marks of reparations, the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the Polish Corridor, the Diktat - were the basis for predicting instability.

Judgement (about 1 mark)

Note these are contemporary predictions, not proof. Historians such as Sally Marks and Margaret MacMillan later argued the treaty was harsh but survivable, so the source shows 1919 opinion rather than settled historical fact.

Marking spine: source perspective + the "1940 Class" message (2), a feature/quote tied to own knowledge such as Keynes or a specific term (2), and a note that it is opinion not fact (1). Pure narration of the terms with no use of the source caps at 2.

A 6-mark "explain... contributed to" needs a sustained causal chain from specific terms to specific political consequences, not just a list.

The Diktat and the 'November Criminals' (about 2 marks)

Because Germany signed a dictated peace, the nationalist right branded the Weimar signatories "November Criminals" and spread the Dolchstosslegende (stab-in-the-back myth), claiming the army was undefeated and was betrayed by Jews and socialists. This delegitimised the republic from the start.

Article 231 and reparations (about 2 marks)

The War Guilt Clause justified the 132 billion gold marks reparations of the London Schedule (1921). The German default led to the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (January 1923); passive resistance and the printing of money produced the hyperinflation of 1923, wiping out middle-class savings and radicalising politics.

Territorial and military terms (about 1-2 marks)

Loss of the Polish Corridor, Alsace-Lorraine and the colonies, plus the 100,000-man army cap, fed humiliation that nationalist movements exploited. Hitler's 25 Points (February 1920) demanded the treaty's abolition; the Munich Putsch (November 1923) coincided with the hyperinflation crisis.

Marking spine: at least three terms, each tied to a specific instability (myth/assassinations, hyperinflation, putsch attempts), with chronology 1919-1923. A list of terms with no consequence, or consequences with no terms, stays mid-band.

"Assess the usefulness" asks for a judgement on how useful the source is, weighing what it offers against its limits, using origin, motive, perspective and corroboration.

What makes it useful (about 2 marks)

As a first-hand account by a German delegate present in May 1919, Source B is direct evidence of the German perception of the treaty as a Diktat (dictated, non-negotiable). It captures the sense of humiliation and the prediction of a future war that fed the "November Criminals" attack and the Dolchstosslegende - it is useful for the German nationalist response.

Limits on usefulness (about 2 marks)

Origin and motive limit it: a memoir is written after the event, often to justify the author's stance, so it may project later knowledge of WWII back onto 1919. It gives only one national perspective and says nothing of French security fears (Clemenceau) or the British view. It is evidence of opinion and self-justification, not proof that the treaty caused the next war.

Judgement (about 1 mark)

Source B is highly useful for understanding how Germans felt about and framed the treaty, but of limited use for judging the treaty's actual long-term effects; a historian would corroborate it with other sources (Keynes, French and Allied records) and with revisionist historians such as MacMillan and Marks.

Marking spine: at least one strength and one limitation drawn from origin/motive/perspective (up to 4), plus a clear judgement of usefulness FOR A STATED PURPOSE (1). An answer that only summarises the content, or only says "it is biased", caps at 2-3.

A "to what extent" extended response needs a clear thesis that takes a measured position, a sustained argument across paragraphs, specific evidence, and named historiography - not a narrative.

Band 6 essay PLAN.

Thesis: The Treaty of Versailles created the central grievances that destabilised post-war Europe, but it was a contributing cause, not the sole cause - the Great Depression, the failure of collective security and Hitler's own ideology turned grievance into a second war. Significant, but not the whole story.

Argument 1 - the treaty as a real source of instability. Evidence: Article 231, 132 billion gold marks (London Schedule, 1921), the Diktat, loss of the Polish Corridor, Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar, the 100,000-man army cap. These fuelled the Dolchstosslegende and the "November Criminals" attack; the Ruhr occupation (1923) and hyperinflation followed from the reparations dispute. Historiography: the orthodox view (drawing on Keynes' 1919 "Carthaginian peace") that the treaty was harsh and destabilising.

Argument 2 - the treaty was harsh but survivable (the revisionist case). Evidence: Germany was not dismembered; the Dawes (1924) and Young (1929) Plans eased reparations; Locarno (1925) and League membership (1926) reintegrated Germany; the Stresemann era brought relative stability. Historiography: revisionist historians Margaret MacMillan (Peacemakers, 2001) and Sally Marks - the treaty was workable, and Germany paid only about an eighth of the nominal bill; the failure was political enforcement, not the text.

Argument 3 - other causes were decisive after 1929. Evidence: the Great Depression destroyed Weimar (unemployment ~6 million by 1932; Nazi vote 2.6 per cent in 1928 to 37.4 per cent in July 1932); the collapse of collective security (Manchuria 1931, Abyssinia 1935); Hitler's agency - Richard Overy stresses the ideological drive for Lebensraum, so conflict in the East was likely even without Versailles. A.J.P. Taylor's revisionist claim (1961) that Hitler was a mere opportunist is now largely rejected.

Conclusion: To a significant but partial extent. Versailles supplied the grievance and the rhetoric Hitler used (Rhineland 1936, Anschluss and Sudetenland 1938 were all framed as undoing Versailles), but the Depression, weak enforcement and Hitler's choices were the decisive triggers between 1933 and 1939.

Model paragraph (Argument 2). The orthodox image of a uniquely crushing peace does not survive scrutiny. Margaret MacMillan (Peacemakers, 2001) argues that, faced with impossible constraints, the peacemakers produced a settlement that was harsh but workable: Germany remained a unified great power, larger in population than France, with its industrial heartland intact. Sally Marks shows that Germany ultimately paid only around one-eighth of the nominal reparations bill, and that the Dawes Plan (1924) and Young Plan (1929) repeatedly eased the burden. By the Locarno treaties (1925) and German entry to the League of Nations (1926), Stresemann's Germany was being reintegrated into Europe on its own terms. On this reading the treaty did not make instability inevitable; it was the non-enforcement of the treaty after 1933, not its severity in 1919, that mattered - shifting the weight of responsibility away from the text and towards the political failures of the 1930s.

Marker's note: markers reward a sustained thesis that genuinely answers "to what extent" (a measured, not absolute, judgement), specific and accurate evidence (correct dates, figures and terms), and integrated historiography that is used to argue rather than name-dropped - here the orthodox (Keynes) versus revisionist (MacMillan, Marks) debate, plus Overy and Taylor on Hitler's agency. A narrative of the terms, or a monocausal "Versailles caused WWII", cannot reach the top band.