Quick questions on Mao and the Korean War 1950 to 1953: HSC Modern History Personality

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) under Kim Il-sung invaded the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950. The UN Security Council, with the Soviet Union absent in protest over Taiwan's seat, authorised UN intervention. By August 1950 the DPRK had pushed UN and ROK forces into the Pusan Perimeter.

Mao chaired Politburo meetings on 4 to 5 October 1950 in which a majority opposed intervention. Lin Biao, designated to command, refused on grounds of illness. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Gao Gang were sceptical. Mao prevailed by arguing that "if we do not send troops, the reactionaries at home will be emboldened, the international reactionaries will be emboldened, and we will be at a disadvantage in every respect, above all on the question of the Northeast."

Peng Dehuai launched the First Offensive on 25 October 1950 in the Unsan area, ambushing the South Korean 6th Division. The Second Offensive (24 November to 24 December 1950) drove UN forces back from the Yalu. At the Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir from 27 November to 13 December 1950 the CPV 9th Army Group encircled the US 1st Marine Division and US 7th Infantry Division in temperatures of around minus 30 Celsius. The US Marines extracted via Hungnam with heavy losses on both sides.

Mao Zedong's eldest son Mao Anying, serving in Peng Dehuai's headquarters at Dayudong as a Russian interpreter, was killed by a US napalm strike on 25 November 1950. Peng Dehuai cabled Mao the same day. Mao's reaction, "Revolutionary war pays a price," was widely reported. Mao Anying was buried in Korea.

Negotiations opened at Kaesong on 10 July 1951 and moved to Panmunjom in October 1951. The talks took two years, hung up on the repatriation of prisoners of war. The CPV held about 14,000 POWs; the UN held about 132,000 CPV and DPRK POWs, of whom about 22,000 refused repatriation.

Casualty figures are disputed. Conservative estimates:

International. The PRC gained standing in the communist bloc and global recognition as a great power. The US committed to the defence of Taiwan, with the Seventh Fleet patrolling the Taiwan Strait from 27 June 1950 and the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC signed on 2 December 1954. UN recognition was deferred to 1971.

Chen Jian (China's Road to the Korean War, 1994; Mao's China and the Cold War, 2001) used Chinese archive materials to argue Mao's decision was driven by ideology, security, and the imperative to consolidate the new regime.

The PRC gained standing in the communist bloc and global recognition as a great power. The US committed to the defence of Taiwan, with the Seventh Fleet patrolling the Taiwan Strait from 27 June 1950 and the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC signed on 2 December 1954. UN recognition was deferred to 1971.

Stalin's reluctance over air cover, the price of Soviet weapons (the PRC repaid the entire Korean War debt), and Khrushchev's later criticisms strained the alliance. The Sino-Soviet split of 1960 was foreshadowed.

The war emergency justified intensification of the Zhenfan campaign and the Sanfan and Wufan campaigns. The Resist America, Aid Korea Movement mobilised mass donations: about 5.6 trillion yuan (old currency) and about 3,710 aircraft equivalent.

The PLA was modernised through Soviet equipment and combat experience. About 73 divisions rotated through Korea.

The PRC pushed UN forces back from the Yalu to the 38th parallel and forced an armistice on roughly the pre-war line. Internally and in the communist bloc this was treated as a victory.

Peng's command, and his later 1959 dissent at Lushan, are linked.

About 73 percent of the PRC budget at peak and several hundred thousand dead.