Unit 1: Change and conflict (Ideologies and conflict 1918-1945)

VICModern HistorySyllabus dot point

Why did appeasement fail to prevent WWII?

Analyse the path to the Second World War, including German rearmament (1935), the remilitarisation of the Rhineland (1936), the Anschluss with Austria (March 1938), the Munich Agreement (September 1938), the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 1939), and the British and French policy of appeasement

A focused answer to the VCE Modern History Unit 1 key knowledge point on the road to WWII. Hitler's foreign-policy revisionism, German rearmament (1935), Rhineland remilitarisation (1936), Anschluss (1938), Munich Agreement (1938), dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (1939), Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939), and the appeasement debate.

Generated by Claude OpusReviewed by Better Tuition Academy7 min answer

Have a quick question? Jump to the Q&A page

What this dot point is asking

VCAA wants you to analyse the diplomatic and military steps that led to the Second World War, the role of British and French appeasement, and the historiographical debate over responsibility.

Hitler's foreign policy

Mein Kampf (1925-1926) set out: revising Versailles; uniting all German-speaking peoples (Anschluss with Austria, Sudetenland with Czechoslovakia); seizing Lebensraum (living space) in Eastern Europe; eliminating European Jewry. These were not opportunistic positions; they were the consistent core of Nazi foreign policy.

Step-by-step revisionism

Withdrawal from disarmament conference and League (October 1933). Symbolic departure.

Saar plebiscite (January 1935). Saar voted 90.890.8% to return to Germany.

Conscription announced (March 1935). Wehrmacht expanded to 550000550\,000 men. Open breach of Versailles. Britain, France and Italy condemned at Stresa (April 1935) but took no action.

Anglo-German Naval Agreement (June 1935). Britain allowed Germany to build a navy up to 3535% of British size. Tacit British acceptance that Versailles was over.

Remilitarisation of the Rhineland (7 March 1936). German troops re-entered the demilitarised zone. France could have expelled them but did not act. Hitler later said: "the 48 hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking in my life. If the French had then marched into the Rhineland, we would have had to withdraw."

Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). German and Italian intervention; Britain and France non-intervention. Cemented Rome-Berlin Axis (1936).

Anti-Comintern Pact (November 1936). Germany and Japan against Soviet communism. Italy joined 1937.

Anschluss with Austria (12 March 1938). German troops entered. Plebiscite endorsed union with 99.799.7%. Britain and France protested formally but accepted.

Sudeten Crisis (April-September 1938). Hitler demanded the Sudetenland (German-speaking border regions of Czechoslovakia, with strong Czech defensive fortifications).

Munich Agreement (29-30 September 1938). Britain (Chamberlain), France (Daladier), Italy (Mussolini) and Germany (Hitler) met without Czech representation. Sudetenland ceded to Germany. Chamberlain returned to "peace for our time". Czechoslovakia lost its defensive lines.

Occupation of rest of Czechoslovakia (15 March 1939). Hitler broke the Munich Agreement; entered Prague. Slovakia became a German puppet state. Britain and France abandoned appeasement. British and French guarantee to Poland (31 March 1939).

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (23 August 1939). Soviet-German non-aggression pact with secret protocols dividing Poland and the Baltic states. Surprised the Western Allies.

Invasion of Poland (1 September 1939). Britain and France declared war 3 September 1939.

The historiographical debate

Orthodox (1940s-1950s): Appeasement as moral failure, ill-conceived policy of feeble politicians (the "guilty men" thesis from Cato's pamphlet, 1940).

A.J.P. Taylor revisionism (1961): The Origins of the Second World War. Argued Hitler was traditional German nationalist exploiting opportunities; appeasement was reasonable until Czechoslovakia. Provocative and influential.

Post-Taylor consensus (Alan Bullock 1962, Ian Kershaw 1998-2000, Richard Evans 2008): Hitler's ideological war aims were fixed from the 1920s. Appeasement failed because no concession could have satisfied a regime committed to expansion.

Realist defence of appeasement (David Dilks 1972, John Charmley 1993): Appeasement bought time for British rearmament. Chamberlain made a defensible choice given military weakness and public opinion.

Why appeasement failed

  • Hitler's objectives could not be satisfied by concession.
  • Each concession increased Hitler's confidence that Britain and France would not fight.
  • Czechoslovakia (1938) was the strategic miscalculation: the country had strong defences, a competent army and was an ally of France.
  • Stalin's calculation that the West would not protect the Soviet Union pushed him to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

In one sentence

Hitler's foreign policy 1933-1939 progressively dismantled Versailles through rearmament (1935), Rhineland remilitarisation (March 1936), Anschluss (March 1938), Munich (September 1938), and the occupation of Czechoslovakia (March 1939); British and French appeasement failed to deter him because his ideological commitment to expansion could not be satisfied by concession, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 1939) cleared the diplomatic path to the invasion of Poland that began WWII.

Past exam questions, worked

Real questions from past VCAA papers on this dot point, with our answer explainer.

Year 11 SACWas appeasement the cause of WWII? Justify your view.
Show worked answer →

A Year 11 response.

Thesis. Appeasement was not the cause of WWII but a contributing factor: Hitler's ideological commitment to territorial expansion was the primary cause; appeasement (Britain and France's policy of conceding German demands 1935-1938) failed to deter him and may have emboldened him, but the war's underlying driver was Nazi ideology not Allied weakness.

Body 1: The case for appeasement as cause. Britain and France allowed German rearmament (1935), remilitarisation of the Rhineland (March 1936), Anschluss with Austria (March 1938), and the Sudeten partition at Munich (September 1938). Each concession reinforced Hitler's belief that the Allies would not fight. The Czech crisis (1938) could have been the moment to stop Hitler when Germany was still militarily weak.

Body 2: The case for Hitler as cause. A.J.P. Taylor (The Origins of the Second World War, 1961) controversially argued Hitler was a traditional German nationalist exploiting opportunities. Most historians since (Alan Bullock, Ian Kershaw, Richard Evans) reject this and identify Hitler's ideological commitment to Lebensraum and racial war as a fixed objective from at least the mid-1920s. Munich did not change his trajectory; it postponed it.

Body 3: The role of context. British appeasement reflected genuine constraints: post-WWI exhaustion, fear of communism, public opinion against another war, economic depression, imperial overstretch. Chamberlain bought time for rearmament (which produced the Spitfires and radar networks that saved Britain in 1940).

Conclusion. Appeasement failed to prevent war and may have made it harder to win, but the cause of WWII was Nazi expansionist ideology pursued by a regime that had decided to go to war.

Markers reward dated events (1935, March 1936, March 1938, September 1938, August 1939), named historians (Taylor, Bullock, Kershaw), and the explicit causation analysis.

Related dot points