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What did the Second New Deal add to the First and what opposition did Roosevelt face?

The Second New Deal, including the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the WPA, the court-packing plan, and conservative and radical opposition

A focused answer to the HSC Modern History dot point on the Second New Deal and opposition. The Wagner Act of July 1935, the Social Security Act of August 1935, the WPA, Huey Long's Share Our Wealth, Father Coughlin, Townsend, the Liberty League, the Supreme Court rulings, and the court-packing plan of 1937.

Generated by Claude Opus 4.810 min answerUpdated 2026-06-28

Reviewed by: AI editorial process; not yet individually human-reviewed

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Examples in context

What this dot point is asking

NESA expects you to give an integrated account of the Second New Deal of 1935 to 1938 and the political opposition Roosevelt faced from both right and left. Strong answers integrate the radical critics (Long, Coughlin, Townsend), the conservative critics (the Liberty League, the Supreme Court), the major Second New Deal legislation (Wagner, Social Security, WPA, Revenue Act of 1935), the 1936 election landslide, and the court-packing fight of 1937.

In plain English

By 1935 Roosevelt was being squeezed from both sides. On his left were three loud outsiders promising the poor much more than he was: a Louisiana senator who said he would cap every fortune and hand every family a guaranteed income, a radio priest with millions of listeners, and a retired doctor with a big pension plan for the old. On his right, rich businessmen and the Supreme Court were trying to tear his programme down.

Think of a manager whose star rivals are promising staff a far bigger pay rise than he is, while the board keeps vetoing his plans. He responds by offering a solid, realistic version of the rivals' promises - a proper pension scheme (Social Security), real union rights (the Wagner Act), and a big jobs programme (the WPA) - paid for partly by taxing the very rich. It works: he wins re-election in a landslide in 1936. But then he overreaches. Furious that the Supreme Court keeps blocking him, he tries to add extra judges to outvote the old ones - and the public sees it as cheating. The plan flops, his own party splits, and the burst of reform runs out of steam.

The answer

The pressures of 1934 to 1935

The 1934 mid-term elections, against all precedent, strengthened the Democratic majorities (74 to 21 in the Senate, 322 to 103 in the House). The First New Deal had stabilised the economy, but unemployment remained around 22 per cent and the political mood was radicalising on both sides.

Senator Huey Long of Louisiana, the populist "Kingfish", broadcast his "Share Our Wealth" speech on 23 February 1934. His program: cap personal fortunes at 5 million dollars; cap incomes at 1 million; guarantee every family a "household estate" of 5,000 dollars and an annual income of 2,000 to 2,500; introduce free college, pensions, and a 30-hour week. By August 1935 the Share Our Wealth Society had 27,000 clubs and claimed 7 million members. Long was assassinated by Carl Weiss in Baton Rouge on 8 September 1935.

Father Charles Coughlin, parish priest at the Shrine of the Little Flower in Royal Oak, Michigan, broadcast a weekly Sunday programme to an estimated 30 million listeners. Initially a Roosevelt supporter ("Roosevelt or Ruin", 1932), he turned against the New Deal in 1934 and founded the National Union for Social Justice in November 1934. By 1936 his rhetoric was overtly anti-Semitic; he was forced off the air by his Church in 1942.

Dr. Francis Townsend, a retired California physician, proposed in January 1934 a federal pension of 200 dollars a month to every American over 60, funded by a 2 per cent national sales tax and on condition that the entire pension be spent within 30 days. The plan would have cost around half of national income; the Townsend clubs reached around 2.2 million members by 1936.

The combined Long-Coughlin-Townsend movement threatened Roosevelt's renomination. The political logic of the Second New Deal was to draw their voters back.

The Second New Deal

The Second Hundred Days (June to August 1935) produced four major Acts.

The Wagner Act / National Labor Relations Act (5 July 1935). Replaced Section 7(a) of the unconstitutional NIRA. It established the National Labor Relations Board, banned a list of unfair labour practices, and required employers to bargain in good faith with unions chosen by majority vote of workers. Union membership rose from around 3.5 million (1935) to around 8.4 million (1939); the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was founded in November 1935 and organised the mass-production industries.

The Social Security Act (14 August 1935). Established:

Old-age pensions (payable from 1940) funded by employer and employee payroll taxes.
Federal-state unemployment insurance.
Federal grants for Aid to Dependent Children, the blind, and the disabled.
Initial coverage excluded farm workers and domestic servants, who were disproportionately African American.

The Works Progress Administration (8 April 1935). Under Harry Hopkins, the WPA was a direct federal employer rather than a grant-maker to states. By its end in 1943 it had employed around 8.5 million Americans on around 1.4 million projects: schools, libraries, airports, post offices, the Lincoln Tunnel, La Guardia Airport, and the WPA Federal Theater, Federal Writers', and Federal Art Projects.

The Revenue Act of 1935 (the "Wealth Tax Act", 31 August 1935). Raised top marginal income tax to 75 per cent on incomes over 5 million dollars and lifted estate, gift, and excess profits taxes. Critics called it the "Soak the Rich" Act.

The Public Utility Holding Company Act (28 August 1935) broke up the pyramided utility empires associated with Samuel Insull. The Banking Act of 1935 (23 August 1935) centralised power in the Federal Reserve Board (now under Marriner Eccles).

The 1936 election

The Republican convention nominated Governor Alf Landon of Kansas. The Liberty League and conservative Democrats endorsed Landon. Long's successor Gerald L.K. Smith ran with the Union Party candidate William Lemke (a Townsend, Coughlin, and Smith composite).

Roosevelt's coalition (the "New Deal coalition") united the Solid South, urban Catholics and Jews, African Americans newly switched from the Republicans, organised labour, and farmers. The result on 3 November 1936:

Roosevelt 27,752,648 votes (60.8 per cent) and 523 electoral votes (Maine and Vermont alone went Republican).
Landon 16,681,862 (36.5 per cent) and 8 electoral votes.
Lemke 892,378 (1.9 per cent).

The landslide was the largest since 1820. Democrats took 76 to 16 in the Senate and 334 to 88 in the House.

The court-packing plan

The Supreme Court had struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (27 May 1935), the Agricultural Adjustment Act in United States v. Butler (6 January 1936), and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act in Carter v. Carter Coal (May 1936). Roosevelt feared the Court would dismember the Second New Deal too.

His Judicial Procedures Reform Bill (5 February 1937) proposed that the President be authorised to appoint a new justice for each justice over 70 who had served 10 years, up to a total of 15. Six of the nine justices were over 70. The plan was widely seen as a constitutional power grab.

Two things saved the New Deal without saving the bill:

The "switch in time that saved nine". Justice Owen Roberts switched sides. On 29 March 1937 the Court upheld a Washington state minimum wage in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (5 to 4). On 12 April 1937 it upheld the Wagner Act in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. (5 to 4). On 24 May 1937 it upheld Social Security in Helvering v. Davis.

The Van Devanter retirement. Conservative Justice Willis Van Devanter retired on 2 June 1937. Roosevelt appointed Senator Hugo Black of Alabama. Five further retirements in the next four years gave Roosevelt the most extensive remake of the Court in American history.

The bill was sent back to committee in the Senate on 22 July 1937 in a major political defeat. Senate Democratic leader Joseph Robinson, who would have been Roosevelt's first nominee, had died on 14 July. The court-packing fight permanently divided the Democratic Party between Northern liberals and Southern conservatives and emboldened the conservative coalition that would block further New Deal legislation after 1938.

The 1937-38 recession and the end of the Second New Deal

Confident of recovery, Roosevelt cut spending and Morgenthau pushed for budget balance in 1937. The Federal Reserve doubled reserve requirements between August 1936 and May 1937. The "Roosevelt recession" followed: industrial production fell around 30 per cent and unemployment rose from 14 to 19 per cent between August 1937 and June 1938.

Roosevelt resumed spending with the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act (April 1938). The Fair Labor Standards Act (25 June 1938) established a national minimum wage (25 cents an hour) and a 40-hour week and banned child labour in interstate commerce. The second Agricultural Adjustment Act (16 February 1938) replaced the unconstitutional AAA of 1933.

The 1938 mid-term elections (8 November 1938) saw Republicans gain 81 seats in the House and 8 in the Senate. Combined with Southern Democrats, the conservative coalition ended major domestic legislation. The New Deal as a legislative project was over.

Historiography

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (The Age of Roosevelt, 1957 to 1960) is the founding liberal interpretation.

Alan Brinkley (Voices of Protest, 1982; The End of Reform, 1995) is the major modern interpreter. Voices of Protest is the standard study of Long, Coughlin, and Townsend. The End of Reform argues the New Deal turned from structural reform to Keynesian compensation after 1938.

David Kennedy (Freedom from Fear, 1999) is the standard narrative.

Jeff Shesol (Supreme Power, 2010) is the standard study of the court-packing fight.

Robert McElvaine (The Great Depression, 1984) is the standard social history.

Model exam responses

A. Source response (5 marks). Source: an owned paraphrase of a 1936 Liberty League pamphlet attacking the Wealth Tax and Social Security as steps towards socialism. Assess its usefulness for a historian studying opposition to the Second New Deal.

The pamphlet originates with the American Liberty League (founded August 1934), the organised voice of business-conservative opposition - Al Smith, John W. Davis and the Du Ponts - so its purpose is to mobilise propertied voters against Roosevelt before the 1936 election. That makes it highly useful as direct evidence of the conservative critique: that the Revenue Act's 75 per cent top rate and Social Security's payroll taxes were "socialism" and an assault on free enterprise. Its very partisanship is its value, since it shows what the right feared and why. It is far less useful as a guide to the New Deal's actual scope - Social Security was contributory and modest, and excluded farm and domestic workers - and it tells us nothing about the radical-left opposition (Long, Coughlin, Townsend) that pushed Roosevelt in the opposite direction. Read critically, it is strong evidence for the conservative reaction and the class politics of 1936, and weak on the measures themselves.

Marker's note: a top response states origin and purpose, separates what the source is useful FOR (the conservative case) from what it conceals or omits (the actual scope, the left critics), grounds the judgement in specific own knowledge, and ends with a verdict rather than describing the pamphlet.

B. Essay paragraph (from a 25-mark response on whether opposition shaped the Second New Deal).

The Supreme Court did more than any other opponent to shape the limits and the fate of the Second New Deal. Having destroyed the NRA in Schechter (27 May 1935) and the AAA in United States v. Butler (6 January 1936), the Court appeared poised to dismember the 1935 legislation as well, and it was this judicial threat - not the Liberty League's propaganda - that drove Roosevelt to gamble on the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 5 February 1937. The gamble backfired politically: the bill was widely read as a constitutional power grab and was buried in committee on 22 July 1937, splitting the Democrats and emboldening the conservative coalition. Yet the opposition that provoked the gamble was also neutralised by it, as the "switch in time that saved nine" saw Owen Roberts uphold a minimum wage in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (29 March 1937) and the Court then sustain the Wagner Act (NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin, 12 April 1937) and Social Security (Helvering v. Davis, May 1937). As Jeff Shesol argues in Supreme Power, Roosevelt lost the bill but won the constitutional war - the clearest case of opposition shaping the New Deal in both directions at once.

Marker's note: the paragraph argues a single proposition (the Court as the decisive opponent), supports it with dated specifics, and uses a historian to clinch the judgement rather than as decoration. Sustained argument plus historiography is what lifts a paragraph into Band 6.

Command words and weaving historiography

Read the verb first. "Account for" and "Assess the reasons" want CAUSES weighed and ranked, not a story; "To what extent / Evaluate" want a JUDGEMENT defending a thesis; "Assess the usefulness/reliability" of a source wants ORIGIN, MOTIVE and PERSPECTIVE, then a verdict. For source questions, run O-M-P-U: Origin, Motive, Perspective, then Usefulness/limitation. On this topic, always split the opposition into two: the radical LEFT (Long, Coughlin, Townsend) that pushed FDR to be more redistributive, and the conservative RIGHT (Liberty League, Supreme Court) that shaped the limits - examiners reward students who see opposition working in both directions. Weave historians as a clash, not a list: pit the welfare-state achievement (Brinkley's lasting reform) against its compromises (Katznelson's Southern Democratic exclusions), or set Shesol's "lost the bill, won the war" reading of court-packing against the political damage. One historian used in genuine tension beats five name-dropped.

Common exam traps

Treating the New Deal as monolithic: The First (1933) and Second (1935) New Deals are distinct - the First emphasised cooperation and recovery, the Second labour, welfare and progressive taxation.
Forgetting Huey Long was assassinated: 8 September 1935, six weeks after Social Security - he never ran against Roosevelt in 1936.
Treating court-packing as a Roosevelt success: The bill failed (22 July 1937); the Court switched (Parrish, March 1937). Both are true, and a good answer holds them together.
Narrating the critics instead of weighing them: Listing Long, Coughlin and Townsend in turn without ranking their influence, or ignoring the historiography (Brinkley, Katznelson, Shesol), caps an essay in the middle bands.
Misdating or muddling the legislation: Wagner Act 5 July 1935, Social Security 14 August 1935, WPA 8 April 1935 - and the WPA (direct federal employment) is not the FERA (grants to states).

In one sentence

The Second New Deal was forged in 1935 under pressure from the radical left (Huey Long's Share Our Wealth from February 1934, Father Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice from November 1934, and Townsend's pension plan from January 1934) and the conservative right (the American Liberty League of August 1934 and the Supreme Court that struck down the NRA in May 1935 and the AAA in January 1936), produced the Wagner Act of 5 July 1935, the Social Security Act of 14 August 1935, the WPA of 8 April 1935, and the Wealth Tax Act of 31 August 1935, returned Roosevelt with 523 electoral votes in 1936, and broke politically over the court-packing plan of 5 February 1937 and the recession of 1937 to 1938.

Examples in context

Example 1. The Wagner Act (5 July 1935) and the Social Security Act (14 August 1935). The Wagner Act recognised collective bargaining; CIO union membership rose from 2.7 million to 8 million between 1935 and 1941. The Social Security Act introduced old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and aid to dependent children, though Ira Katznelson (Fear Itself, 2013) documents the exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers (around 65 per cent of African American workers).

Example 2. The conservative coalition and 1937 to 1938 setbacks. The Court-Packing fight (1937), the Roosevelt Recession (1937 to 1938) following premature fiscal consolidation, and the 1938 midterm losses checked the New Deal. James Patterson (Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, 1967) traces the formation of the southern Democratic-Republican coalition. Eric Rauchway (Why the New Deal Matters, 2020) is the latest synthesis.

Exam-style practice questions

Practice questions written in the style of NESA exam questions on this dot point, with worked answer explainers. The year tag is the paper they imitate, not the source.

Practice (NESA)15 marksExplain the political opposition Roosevelt faced and how it shaped the Second New Deal.

Show worked answer →

A 15-mark "explain" needs three or four developed strands and a synthesis.

Thesis: The Second New Deal was the product of pressure from the left (Huey Long, Father Coughlin, Francis Townsend) and reaction against the right (the Liberty League and the Supreme Court). It was more redistributive than the First.
The radical left: Senator Huey Long of Louisiana proposed Share Our Wealth (February 1934) capping personal fortunes at 5 million dollars and guaranteeing every American family 5,000 dollars; his organisation claimed 7 million members. Father Charles Coughlin of Royal Oak, Michigan, broadcast to an estimated 30 million weekly listeners and founded the National Union for Social Justice (November 1934). Dr. Francis Townsend's Old Age Revolving Pensions Plan (January 1934) proposed 200 dollars a month to every American over 60 with the requirement to spend within the month; the Townsend clubs reached around 2.2 million members.
The conservative right: The American Liberty League (August 1934) included Al Smith, John W. Davis, the Du Ponts, and J.P. Morgan partners; it spent around 1.5 million dollars in the 1936 election. The Supreme Court struck down the NRA (Schechter, 27 May 1935) and the AAA (Butler, 6 January 1936).
The Second New Deal: Pressure from both sides produced the Wagner Act (5 July 1935) protecting union organising and creating the NLRB; the Social Security Act (14 August 1935) creating old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and Aid to Dependent Children; the WPA (8 April 1935, around 8.5 million employed over its life); the Revenue Act of 1935 (the Wealth Tax Act, 31 August 1935) raising top marginal income tax to 75 per cent; and the Banking Act of 1935.
The 1936 election: Roosevelt won 523 to 8 electoral votes, the largest electoral landslide since 1820. He took 60.8 per cent of the popular vote.

Practice questions

Original practice questions graded from foundation to exam level, each with a full worked solution. Try them before revealing the solution.

foundation3 marksOutline three major measures of the Second New Deal of 1935.

Show worked solution →

A 3-mark "outline" wants three distinct, correctly identified measures, each in a sentence.

The Wagner Act (5 July 1935): The National Labor Relations Act protected union organising and created the NLRB to enforce collective bargaining.
The Social Security Act (14 August 1935): Established old-age pensions, federal-state unemployment insurance, and aid to dependent children.
The WPA (8 April 1935): A direct federal employment program under Harry Hopkins that put around 8.5 million Americans to work.
Marking criteria: 1 mark each for three distinct, correctly dated measures; do not simply list "the New Deal" or repeat the First New Deal agencies (CCC, AAA).

foundation4 marksExplain why the radical critics (Long, Coughlin, Townsend) pushed Roosevelt towards the Second New Deal.

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A 4-mark "explain" needs a cause-and-effect chain with specific detail.

The threat: By 1935 Huey Long's Share Our Wealth claimed 7 million members, Father Coughlin reached up to 30 million radio listeners, and Townsend's pension clubs reached around 2.2 million members - a populist movement that could split the Democratic vote in 1936.
The political logic: Roosevelt needed to draw these voters back. The Second New Deal answered their demands in moderate form: Social Security met the call for old-age pensions (Townsend); the Wagner Act and the Wealth Tax Act met the appeal to labour and the poor (Long, Coughlin).
The effect: The 1935 legislation was more redistributive than the First New Deal, and Roosevelt's landslide in 1936 (523 to 8) showed the strategy worked; the Union Party (Lemke) took under 2 per cent.
Marking criteria: 1 mark for identifying the three critics and their scale; 1 mark for the electoral threat; 1 mark for linking a specific measure to a specific demand; 1 mark for the outcome.

core5 marksSource A (paraphrased, owned): A 1935 editorial from a conservative newspaper attacks the new "Wealth Tax" and the labour board as the work of a President who has abandoned recovery for class war, warning that "Soak the Rich" taxation and forced unionism will frighten away the capital the country needs. Using Source A and your own knowledge, explain the conservative opposition to the Second New Deal. [5 marks]

Show worked solution →

A 5-mark "explain ... using the source" wants the source decoded, then linked to own knowledge.

Decode the source: The editorial voices the business-conservative case: the Revenue Act of 1935 ("Soak the Rich", top rate 75 per cent) and the Wagner Act ("forced unionism", the NLRB) were seen as redistribution and an attack on property, not recovery.
Own knowledge: The organised face of this opposition was the American Liberty League (founded August 1934 - Al Smith, John W. Davis, the Du Ponts, J.P. Morgan partners), which spent around 1.5 million dollars backing Alf Landon in 1936. The Supreme Court was the other front: it had already struck down the NRA (Schechter, May 1935) and the AAA (Butler, January 1936), and conservatives hoped it would dismember the Second New Deal too.
The outcome: The opposition failed at the ballot box - Roosevelt won 523 to 8 in 1936 - but the Court remained a threat, which is what drove the court-packing plan of 1937.
Marking criteria: 1 mark for decoding the source (tax + labour as "class war"); 1-2 marks for the Liberty League with specific detail; 1 mark for the Supreme Court strand; 1 mark for the outcome (1936 result and the link to court-packing).

core6 marksSource B (paraphrased, owned): A leading modern historian argues that the Second New Deal's welfare state was real and lasting, but was deliberately built with holes - farm and domestic workers, the majority of African American labour, were left outside Social Security and the minimum wage to keep Southern Democrats in the coalition. Using Source B and your own knowledge, assess the usefulness of this interpretation for understanding the Social Security Act. [6 marks]

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A 6-mark "assess the usefulness" question rewards perspective plus own knowledge, ending in a judgement.

Perspective: Source B reflects Ira Katznelson's argument (Fear Itself, 2013, and earlier work on "affirmative action for whites") that the New Deal welfare state was structurally compromised by Southern Democratic power. It is useful because it corrects a purely celebratory reading.
Corroboration from own knowledge: The record supports it: the Social Security Act (14 August 1935) initially excluded farm workers and domestic servants - around two-thirds of African American workers in the South - and old-age coverage was contributory, so the poorest gained least. Roosevelt depended on Southern committee chairs to pass any legislation, which set the limits.
Limitation: Stressing the holes can understate what was achieved: Social Security created the first permanent federal old-age and unemployment system, the NLRB transformed labour, and Alan Brinkley shows the Second New Deal entrenched a welfare state no later government dismantled. The exclusions were later closed (coverage extended from 1950).
Judgement: Highly useful for explaining the limits and the racial politics of the Act, but it must be read alongside the genuine institutional achievement; the Act was both compromised and foundational.
Marking criteria: 1 mark for identifying the Katznelson perspective; 2 marks for own knowledge corroborating the exclusions (who, how many, why); 1-2 marks for a limitation (the lasting achievement, Brinkley); 1 mark for a judgement on usefulness.

exam25 marksEvaluate the extent to which opposition shaped the Second New Deal between 1934 and 1938.

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This is an extended-response/essay. Markers reward a sustained, evidence-based argument that addresses "to what extent" directly and weaves in historiography - not a narrative.

Band-6 PLAN

Thesis. Opposition shaped the Second New Deal more than any other single factor, but in two opposite ways: pressure from the radical left (Long, Coughlin, Townsend) drove its redistributive content in 1935, while conservative opposition (the Liberty League and, decisively, the Supreme Court) shaped its limits, its caution after 1937, and its collapse. Opposition was the engine of the reform and the brake that stopped it.
Argument 1 - The left drove the 1935 content. The Share Our Wealth movement (7 million claimed members), Coughlin (up to 30 million listeners) and Townsend (2.2 million) threatened FDR's 1936 vote. The Second Hundred Days answered them: Social Security (Townsend), the Wagner Act and the Wealth Tax (Long, Coughlin). Evidence: the legislation clustered in June-August 1935 as the threat peaked.
Argument 2 - The right shaped the limits and the timing. The Liberty League and the Court were the brake. Schechter (May 1935) and Butler (January 1936) struck down the First New Deal and threatened the Second; Southern Democrats won the exclusion of farm and domestic workers from Social Security. Evidence: the contributory, exclusionary design of the welfare state (Katznelson).
Argument 3 - Opposition broke the New Deal after 1937. The court-packing fight (5 February 1937), though it "won" through the switch in time (Parrish, Jones and Laughlin), split the Democrats and built the conservative coalition that, with the 1938 midterms (Republicans +81 House seats), ended major reform.
Historiography. Alan Brinkley (Voices of Protest, 1982) is the standard study of the left critics and (The End of Reform, 1995) traces the turn from structural reform to compensation after 1937; Ira Katznelson (Fear Itself, 2013) stresses the Southern Democratic veto that shaped the limits; Jeff Shesol (Supreme Power, 2010) treats the Court fight as the decisive turning point; James Patterson (Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, 1967) traces the conservative coalition.
Judgement. Opposition shaped the Second New Deal to a very great extent - left pressure made it redistributive, right and judicial pressure made it limited and short-lived - but FDR's own choices (the 1937 spending cuts, the court-packing gamble) converted opposition into defeat. Most important factor, yes; the sole factor, no.

MODEL PARAGRAPH (Argument 1)

The clearest sign that opposition drove the Second New Deal is the timing and content of the 1935 legislation, which answered the radical critics point for point. By early 1935 Roosevelt faced a populist insurgency to his left: Huey Long's Share Our Wealth Society claimed 7 million members and promised every family a guaranteed income, Father Coughlin reached as many as 30 million radio listeners through the National Union for Social Justice, and Dr Francis Townsend's pension clubs, some 2.2 million strong, demanded 200 dollars a month for the old. A composite of these movements threatened to split the Democratic vote in 1936. The Second Hundred Days of June to August 1935 met each demand in moderate, durable form - the Social Security Act (14 August 1935) created the old-age pensions Townsend wanted; the Wagner Act and the Revenue Act ("Soak the Rich", top rate 75 per cent) answered Long's and Coughlin's appeal to labour and the poor. As Alan Brinkley argues in Voices of Protest, these figures mattered less as movements that could win than as pressures that pushed Roosevelt left; the 1936 landslide of 523 electoral votes to 8, with the Union Party taking under 2 per cent, shows the strategy of co-option worked.

Marker's note. A band-6 response keeps "to what extent" in view throughout - ranking opposition against FDR's own agency and the wider context, not just describing the critics - distinguishes the two kinds of opposition (left as engine, right as brake), anchors every claim in dated evidence, sets at least two historians in genuine tension (Brinkley on the left critics vs Katznelson or Shesol on the limits and the Court), and reaches a graded judgement. Narrating Long, Coughlin and Townsend in turn without weighing their influence caps the response in the middle bands.

exam25 marksAssess the view that the court-packing plan of 1937 was Roosevelt's greatest political mistake.

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This is an extended-response/essay. Markers reward a sustained, evidence-based argument that addresses the proposition directly and weaves in historiography - not a narrative.

Band-6 PLAN

Thesis. The court-packing plan was a serious political mistake - it squandered the 1936 mandate, split the Democrats and built the conservative coalition - but calling it the "greatest" mistake overstates it, because the substantive goal (saving the New Deal from the Court) was achieved and the 1937 recession did comparable damage. It was a self-inflicted political wound more than a policy failure.
Argument 1 - The case that it was a grave mistake. The Judicial Procedures Reform Bill (5 February 1937) looked like a constitutional power grab; it was sent back to committee on 22 July 1937, a humiliating defeat at the peak of FDR's power. It permanently split the party between Northern liberals and Southern conservatives and emboldened the conservative coalition that blocked reform after 1938.
Argument 2 - Why the verdict must be qualified. The plan arguably achieved its real aim. The "switch in time that saved nine" - Owen Roberts upholding a minimum wage in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (29 March 1937), then the Court upholding the Wagner Act (NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin, 12 April 1937) and Social Security (Helvering v. Davis, May 1937) - removed the judicial threat. Van Devanter's retirement (June 1937) let FDR appoint Hugo Black, and five more retirements gave him the most extensive remake of the Court in US history.
Argument 3 - A rival candidate for "greatest mistake". The 1937-38 "Roosevelt recession" - caused by premature spending cuts and the Fed doubling reserve requirements - sent unemployment from 14 to 19 per cent and did at least as much to discredit the New Deal as the Court fight. The greatest-mistake claim is contestable.
Historiography. Jeff Shesol (Supreme Power, 2010) is the standard study and presents the plan as a costly miscalculation that nonetheless coincided with victory on the substance; Alan Brinkley (The End of Reform, 1995) sets both the Court fight and the recession within the broader exhaustion of reform after 1937; William Leuchtenburg (the classic account of the "constitutional revolution") stresses that the Court did change course.
Judgement. A major political mistake, yes - it cost FDR his command of Congress; the "greatest" mistake, only arguably, because it won on the substance and the 1937 recession is a serious rival. The fairest verdict: a political defeat that paradoxically secured a policy victory.

MODEL PARAGRAPH (Argument 2)

The charge that court-packing was Roosevelt's greatest mistake must be qualified by the fact that it largely achieved its underlying purpose. Roosevelt's real fear was that a Court which had already destroyed the NRA (Schechter, 1935) and the AAA (Butler, 1936) would dismember the Second New Deal as well. Within weeks of the bill, that danger evaporated: in the "switch in time that saved nine", Justice Owen Roberts changed sides to uphold a state minimum wage in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (29 March 1937), and the Court then upheld the Wagner Act in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel (12 April 1937) and Social Security in Helvering v. Davis (May 1937). The retirement of the conservative Willis Van Devanter in June 1937 let Roosevelt appoint Hugo Black, and five further retirements by 1941 gave him the most thorough remake of the Court in American history. As Jeff Shesol argues in Supreme Power, Roosevelt lost the bill but won the war over the constitutionality of the New Deal - which is why "greatest mistake" is too strong: the gamble failed in Congress while succeeding on the very ground it was meant to secure.

Marker's note. A band-6 response interrogates the value-laden word "greatest" rather than just narrating the Court fight - it sets the plan against a rival candidate (the 1937 recession), weighs the political cost against the substantive win, deploys at least two historians in genuine tension (Shesol on the paradox, Brinkley on the wider decline), and reaches a defended judgement. Simply describing the bill and the switch, without evaluating the "greatest" claim, caps the response in the middle bands.