Quick questions on Reasons for Allied victory in Europe: HSC Modern History Peace and Conflict

The combined Allied economies dwarfed the Axis from before the war and increasingly through it. US GNP in 1938 was around 800 billion (in 1990 dollars); German GNP around 350 billion; Soviet GNP around 360 billion. With Britain, France, and the Empire, the Allies began the war with around three times the resources of the Axis. The disparity grew through the war as Allied production climbed and the Axis stagnated.

Lend-Lease was authorised by Congress on 11 March 1941. Total deliveries by August 1945 reached around 50 billion dollars. Recipients: Britain (around 31 billion), USSR (around 11 billion), Free France (around 3 billion), China (around 1.6 billion).

The Red Army absorbed around 80 per cent of German army combat losses. Soviet military deaths totalled around 8.7 to 11.5 million; German military deaths around 5.3 million (of which around 4 million on the Eastern Front).

The Grand Alliance (Britain, USSR, United States, plus the British Empire and Free French) was held together against significant ideological strain. Key moments:

Ultra, the Bletchley Park decryption of German Enigma cipher traffic (from 1940 onwards), shaped Allied operations across theatres. By 1943 Bletchley was reading much of the German naval Enigma traffic that controlled the U-boat campaign; the Atlantic was won partly through this intelligence. Ultra also shaped operations in North Africa (the Mediterranean and the desert), the Battle of Britain (the "Y" intercept service), and Normandy.

Allied technological superiority was not uniform. Germany led in some categories (V-2 ballistic missile, jet aircraft like the Me 262, large tank designs). The Allies led in: - Radar: Chain Home (1938), H2S bombing radar (1943), centimetric radar in U-boat detection (1943). - Long-range fighter escort: P-51 Mustang with Merlin engine (operational early 1944).

Allied leadership made better strategic decisions than the Axis. Roosevelt and Churchill articulated war aims (the Atlantic Charter), held the alliance together, and accepted General Staff advice on most operational questions. Stalin made significant initial errors (the 1941 disaster) but learnt; from 1942 he generally accepted Stavka advice and let Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and Konev run operations.

Richard Overy (Why the Allies Won, 1995) is the major systemic account. Overy treats Allied victory as overdetermined by production, alliance, intelligence, and Nazi failure.

Production alone, or the Eastern Front alone, or D-Day alone, will not do. Overy's systemic account is the modern frame.

Post-1991 archival work has restored Lend-Lease as a significant (not decisive) factor in Soviet operational mobility from 1943.

Trinity (16 July 1945) was after the German surrender. The bomb was used in the Pacific war.

Hitler made some decisions that others would not have made and that worked (Rhineland 1936). From 1941 his interventions were generally damaging.