Quick questions on Konfrontasi: Sukarno's Confrontation with Malaysia 1963-1966 HSC Modern History

British Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya proposed the Malaysia Federation on 27 May 1961, intended to combine Malaya, Singapore, and the British colonies of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. From the Indonesian perspective the plan extended British strategic influence around northern Borneo on Indonesia's doorstep, and protected British military bases (notably Singapore) for the long term.

The Brunei Revolt of 8 December 1962, led by A.M. Azahari of the Brunei People's Party and supported logistically by Indonesia, attempted to seize Brunei before the Federation came into being. British Gurkhas defeated the revolt within a week. Azahari fled to Manila.

Sukarno escalated the campaign with the Dwi Komando Rakyat (Dwikora, Two People's Commands) speech of 3 May 1964. The two commands were to "heighten the revolutionary endurance of the Indonesian people" and to "assist the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei to dissolve the puppet state of Malaysia."

The military phase ran along the 1,500-kilometre border between Indonesian Kalimantan and British Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah). Indonesia infiltrated regular Army and Marine units, KKO Marines, RPKAD paratroops (Indonesian Army special forces), and Air Force paratroops alongside locally recruited "volunteers."

Konfrontasi cost Indonesia diplomatically. Malaysia was elected to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council on 30 December 1964. Sukarno responded on 7 January 1965 by withdrawing Indonesia from the United Nations, the only state ever to do so. Indonesia further established (with China) a "Conference of New Emerging Forces" as an alternative; this collapsed after Sukarno's fall.

Defence absorbed up to 75 per cent of state expenditure in 1964 to 1965. Inflation reached 600 per cent in 1965. Foreign-owned enterprises were nationalised: British in 1963 to 1964 (around 300 estates and trading houses), American in 1965. The rupiah ceased to function as a stable currency.

After the 30 September coup attempt and Suharto's rise to operational power, the army moved quickly to wind up the campaign. Foreign Minister Adam Malik met Tun Razak in Bangkok on 28 May to 1 June 1966 and signed the Bangkok Accord. The formal Treaty was signed in Jakarta on 11 August 1966. Diplomatic relations were restored.

J.A.C. Mackie (Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966, 1974) is the standard work. He treats Konfrontasi as the necessary expression of Sukarno's "revolutionary state" and as a strategic miscalculation by Sukarno of British and Commonwealth resolve.

Both sides avoided the framing, and the military scale was small (around 600 Indonesian deaths). The political and economic effects far outran the combat scale.

Trikora (December 1961) launched the West Irian campaign. Dwikora (May 1964) launched the escalation of Konfrontasi.

Australian SAS and 3RAR played important roles, and the campaign hardened Australian foreign-policy thinking on Southeast Asia for the rest of the decade.

Konfrontasi was ended by Suharto, not by Sukarno; the Bangkok Accord of June 1966 is part of the New Order story.