Quick questions on Nature of the war: guerrilla and conventional: HSC Modern History Indochina

Mao Zedong's three stages of revolutionary war (Yu Chi Chan, 1937; On Protracted War, 1938) provided the framework: strategic defensive (guerrilla), strategic stalemate (mobile war), strategic counter-offensive (conventional war). The doctrine assumed the revolutionary side could trade space for time and would win politically by exhausting an enemy with finite political will.

The National Liberation Front (founded 20 December 1960) and its People's Liberation Armed Forces, known in the south as Viet Cong, conducted classical guerrilla war in the rural south. PLAF organisation: - main force (chu luc) regiments at division level (around 30,000 by 1965), - regional forces (bo doi dia phuong) at province level (around 60,000), - local forces (bo doi xa) and village militia (around 100,000).

PAVN (the People's Army of Vietnam, also NVA) infiltrated regular regiments south from 1964 onwards down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. PAVN forces were better trained, better equipped, and better officered than the PLAF.

The United States imposed a conventional doctrine on what began as a counter-insurgency problem. General Westmoreland (MACV commander June 1964 to June 1968) chose attrition. The "crossover point" theory required PAVN-PLAF losses to exceed replacements; the metric was the body count.

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was trained on the US conventional model, with a heavy logistical tail and reliance on air support. ARVN performance was uneven. Strong units (the 1st Division at Hue, the 18th Division at Xuan Loc, the airborne and marine reserves) fought well. Many units were under-trained, under-paid, and politicised.

Australia, deployed in Phuoc Tuy Province from June 1966, adopted a different doctrine. Drawing on Malayan Emergency experience, 1ATF emphasised foot patrolling, ambush, careful population engagement, and small-unit aggression. The Battle of Long Tan (18 August 1966) is the iconic engagement. Phuoc Tuy was held relatively secure throughout the deployment.

Andrew Krepinevich (The Army and Vietnam, 1986) argues the US Army misapplied conventional doctrine to a counter-insurgency.

It was guerrilla in the south through 1968 and increasingly conventional after; Tet was a conventional attempt.

Some ARVN units (1st Division, airborne, marines, 18th Division) fought well; the systemic problems were political and logistical.

Phuoc Tuy is a different pattern from the US III Corps approach.