The campaigns of 479 BC at Plataea and Mycale, the role of Pausanias, the end of the Persian invasion, the reasons for the Greek victory, and the immediate consequences for Greek leadership

What this dot point is asking

NESA expects you to describe the final phase of the Persian invasion in 479 BC, the Battles of Plataea and Mycale, the role of Pausanias and other commanders, the reasons for the Greek victory across both Marathon and the second invasion, and the immediate consequences for Greek politics.

The answer

The winter of 480 to 479 BC

After Salamis (late September 480 BC) Xerxes returned to Asia with the main army. Mardonius wintered in Thessaly with around 50,000 picked troops including Persian cavalry and the Immortals. He attempted to detach Athens from the alliance, offering autonomy and Persian support; the Athenian Assembly, in a famous reply preserved by Herodotus (8.143), refused while one Athenian survived. Athens was evacuated a second time in summer 479 BC when Mardonius marched south.

The Battle of Plataea (August 479 BC)

The Hellenic League army, the largest ever assembled by Greeks (Herodotus 9.28 to 30 gives around 110,000 including light troops and helots; 38,700 hoplites), gathered in southern Boeotia under Pausanias, Spartan regent for the young king Pleistarchus.

Pausanias. Nephew of Leonidas, regent for Pleistarchus son of Leonidas. Spartan commander-in-chief.

Aristides. Athenian commander, around 8,000 Athenian hoplites.

The position. Both armies camped on the slopes of Mount Cithaeron, watching each other across the Asopus river. The position favoured the Greeks (hilly ground); Mardonius could not deploy his cavalry to full effect. The deadlock lasted around 10 days.

Persian harassment. Mardonius's cavalry attacked Greek water supplies and supply lines. The Greek commander Megistias of Sparta and the cavalry commander Masistius were killed. The Athenians killed Masistius in a cavalry skirmish; the body became a Greek trophy.

The night march. Pausanias ordered a redeployment to a position with better water. The night march went badly: contingents lost contact in the dark.

The battle. At dawn Mardonius, thinking the Greeks were in flight, ordered a general attack. The Persians and the medising Boeotians crossed the river. The Spartans and Tegeans (Pausanias's wing) held against the Persian and Bactrian infantry. The Athenians and Plataeans (other wing) engaged the Thebans. The Persian formation, lighter and lacking the hoplite shield wall, was broken at close quarters. Mardonius was killed; his army broke. Artabazus, second in command, withdrew 40,000 troops north before they engaged.

The Persian camp. Stormed by the Athenians. Vast plunder including Mardonius's tent (later set up by Pausanias to display the difference between Persian luxury and Spartan simplicity).

The reckoning. Persian land power in Greece ended at Plataea. The medising Greek states were dealt with: Thebes was punished; its pro-Persian leaders were executed; Thessaly lost prestige.

The Battle of Mycale (August 479 BC)

The Hellenic League fleet, around 110 ships under the Spartan king Leotychidas and the Athenian Xanthippus (father of Pericles), crossed the Aegean and engaged the Persian fleet at Mycale on the Ionian coast.

The Persian disposition. The Persian fleet, demoralised after Salamis and undermanned, beached its ships at Mycale near Samos and built a stockade.

The battle. Greek hoplites landed and assaulted the stockade. The Ionian Greek contingent in the Persian force defected. The Persians were defeated; the ships were burned. The traditional account (Herodotus 9.100) places Mycale on the same day as Plataea (27 August 479 BC).

Significance. Mycale ended Persian naval power in the Aegean and triggered the revolt of the Ionian cities against Persia.

The siege of Sestos (winter 479 to 478 BC)

After Mycale the Athenian contingent under Xanthippus crossed to the Thracian Chersonese and besieged Sestos, the Persian-held base controlling the Hellespont. After a winter siege Sestos fell. The Athenians captured the Persian commander Artayctes and crucified him for sacrilege (Herodotus 9.118 to 121). The capture of Sestos completes Herodotus's narrative.

Reasons for the Greek victory

Hoplite warfare. The Greek heavy infantry in close formation, with bronze armour, the long thrusting doru spear, and the hoplon shield, outclassed Persian light infantry in close combat. The phalanx broke Persian formations at Marathon, Thermopylae (until outflanked), and Plataea.

Naval policy. Themistocles's fleet (200 triremes built from 483/2 BC) made Salamis and Mycale possible.

Greek unity through the Hellenic League. The League formed at the Isthmus in autumn 481 BC bound the major states together for the duration of the crisis. Sparta took the overall command. Athens ceded naval leadership. The Serpent Column at Delphi commemorates the 31 League states.

Leadership. Themistocles at Salamis, Pausanias at Plataea, Leotychidas and Xanthippus at Mycale, Leonidas at Thermopylae, Miltiades at Marathon. Persian leadership was uneven: Mardonius at Plataea fought hard but lacked Xerxes's authority; Datis and Artaphernes had been defeated at Marathon.

Geography. Mountainous Greece favoured the defender. Narrow passes (Thermopylae) and narrow straits (Salamis) neutralised Persian numerical superiority. Long supply lines from the Hellespont strained Persia.

Religion and morale. Greek belief in the favour of Delphi and Olympia; the moral force of resisting "barbarian" submission; the contrast between free citizen-soldiers and conscripted subjects of a king.

Persian limitations. A combined-arms force operating 1,500 km from the Hellespont. Logistical strain. The need to divide between army and fleet at Salamis. The personal withdrawal of Xerxes after Salamis. The inability of the medising allies to deliver a decisive contribution.

The immediate consequences

End of the invasion. Persia would not attempt another major invasion of Greece. Persian and Greek wars continued (Ionian campaigns, the Peace of Callias around 449 BC) but the strategic threat had ended.

Greek confidence. The wars produced an enduring "Greek versus barbarian" ideology (Aeschylus's Persians, Herodotus's Histories) and a panhellenic dedication at Delphi.

The rise of Athens. Athens emerged with a fleet, a damaged city, and a network of grateful Ionian allies. The Delian League followed within a year.

The position of Sparta. Pausanias and Leotychidas led the Hellenic League into the Aegean in 478 BC but their conduct (Pausanias's arrogance at Byzantium; Leotychidas's bribery in Thessaly) discredited Spartan leadership outside the Peloponnese. Sparta withdrew, ceding the eastern Aegean to Athens.

The sources

Herodotus, Histories 9. The major source for Plataea, Mycale, and Sestos.

Thucydides, Pentecontaetia (Histories 1.89 to 117). Covers the aftermath: the rebuilding of Athens's walls, the formation of the Delian League, the recall of Pausanias.

Plutarch, Aristides and Cimon. Later but draws on lost authors.

Diodorus Siculus 11. A first-century BC summary, less reliable.

Archaeology. The Serpent Column at Delphi (dedicated by the 31 League states from Persian spoils, now in Istanbul); the Plataean ossuary; the trophy at Mycale.

How to read a source on this topic

Section IV sources on the final victory typically include extracts from Herodotus 9, Aeschylus, or the Serpent Column inscription. Three reading habits.

First, take the unity argument seriously but not exclusively. The Hellenic League is real; it is also fragile (the Peloponnesian commanders at Salamis nearly withdrew).

Second, watch the medising states. Greek victory is also a story of which Greeks did not join: Thebes, most of Boeotia, Thessaly, Argos. The narrative of "Greek freedom" exaggerates the share that fought.

Third, integrate Plataea and Mycale. They are paired victories; together they end Persian power on both sides of the Aegean.

Common exam traps

Treating Salamis as the end of the war. Salamis was decisive but not final; Plataea ended Persian land power.

Forgetting Mycale. Mycale ended Persian naval power and triggered the Ionian revolt.

Crediting Sparta alone with Plataea. Pausanias commanded but the Athenians, Tegeans, and others fought.

Underestimating Persia. Persia was not "doomed to lose." Mardonius's force at Plataea was elite and large; the Greek victory was hard-won.

In one sentence

In summer 479 BC the Hellenic League army of around 38,700 hoplites under the Spartan regent Pausanias defeated Mardonius's force at Plataea (with the Athenians under Aristides taking the Persian camp and the Theban medisers crushed), and on the same day a Hellenic League fleet under Leotychidas and Xanthippus destroyed the beached Persian fleet at Mycale and freed Ionia, ending the Persian invasion of Greece through a combination of hoplite warfare, Themistocles's naval policy, Greek unity in the League, capable leadership at every level, and the strategic limitations of a Persian expedition operating 1,500 km from base.